Влияние корпоративного управления на стоимость российских компаний (эмпирический анализ)

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Библиографический список

МОНОГРФИИ И АНАЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ СБОРНИКИ

1. Российская промышленность: институциональное развитие. Вып.1 / Под ред. Т.Г. Долгопятовой. – М.: ГУ-ВШЭ, 2002.- 239с.
   
2. Инвестиционный климат и экономическая стратегия России: Тез. докл. Международная конф. Инвестиционный климат и перспективы экономического роста в России.- М.: ГУ-ВШЭ, 2000. – 432с.
   
3. Модернизация Российской экономики: В 4 кн. / Отв. ред. Е.Г. Ясин. Кн.2. – М.: Издательский дом ГУ-ВШЭ, 2002г. – 208с.
   
4. Модернизация Российской экономики: Социальный контекст: В 4 кн. / Отв. ред. Е.Г. Ясин. Кн.4. – М.: Издательский дом ГУ-ВШЭ, 2004. – 243с.
   
5. Развитие спроса на правовое регулирование корпоративного управления в частном секторе. Серия «Научные доклады: независимый экономический анализ», №42. М.: Московский общественный научный фонд; АНО «Проекты для будущего: научные и образовательные технологии», 2003г. – 366с.
   
6. Пособие по корпоративному управлению: В 6 т., - М.: Альпина бизнес букс, 2004г.
   

НЕЗАВИСИМЫЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ И МАТЕРИАЛЫ КОНФЕРЕНЦИЙ

7. Васильев Д..В. Корпоративное управление в России: есть ли шанс Улучшения?. Инвестиционный климат и экономическая стратегия России: Тез. докл. Международная конф. Инвестиционный климат и перспективы экономического роста в России.- М.: ГУ-ВШЭ, 2000. – C. 164-188.
   
8. Гольцман М.М. Эмпирический анализ смены менеджеров в российских фирмах. М.: РЭШ, 2000.
   
9. Роль независимых членов советов директоров в управлении российскими предприятиями. Исследование Ассоциации менеджеров и Ассоциации по защите прав инвесторов, 2001.
   
10. Аналитический отчет Ассоциации менеджеров по результатам опроса о готовности российских компаний к принятию Кодекса корпоративного поведения. М.: Российский институт директоров, Ассоциация менеджеров, 2001.
    
11. Основные направления и факторы реструктуризации промышленных предприятий. Аналитический доклад. - М.: Бюро экономического анализа, 2001г.
    
12. Радыгин А.Д., Архипов С.А. Тенденции в структуре собственности, интенсивность корпоративных конфликтов и финансовое состояние предприятий: эмпирический анализ и проблемы государственного регулирования // Научные труды РЕЦЭП. - М., 2001.
    
13. Радыгин А.Д., Турунцева М.Ю., Гонтмахер А.Е. Проблемы корпоративного управления в России и регионах. - М.: Институт Экономики Переходного Периода (ИЭПП), 2002.
    
14. Радыгин А.Д., Энтов Р.М. Корпоративное управление и защита прав собственности: эмпирический анализ и актуальные направления реформ. - М.: ИЭПП, 2001(а).
    
15. Радыгин А.Д., Энтов. Р.М. Корпоративное управление и защита прав собственности: эмпирический анализ и актуальные направления реформ. - ИЭПП, Научные труды №36. - М.: ИЭПП, 2001(б).
    
16. Радыгин А.Д., Энтов Р.М. Унификация корпоративного законодательства: общемировые тенденции, законодательство ЕС и перспективы России. - Научные труды РЕЦЕП. - М.: 2002.
    
17. Радыгин А.Д., Энтов Р.М. Инфорсмент прав собственности и контрактных обязательств: теоретические подходы и опыт России. - М.: Дело, 2003.
    
18. Радыгин А.Д., Энтов Р.М., Гонтмахер А.Е., Межераупс И.В. Экономико-правовые факторы и ограничения в становлении моделей корпоративного управления. - ИЭПП, Научные труды №73. - М.: ИЭПП, 2004.
    
19. Радыгин А.Д., Энтов Р.М., Межераупс И. Проблемы правоприменения (инфорсмента) в сфере защиты прав акционеров. - ИЭПП, Научные труды №41. - М.: ИЭПП, 2002.
    
20. Радыгин А.Д., Энтов Р.М., Межераупс И.В. Особенности формирования национальной модели корпоративного управления. - ИЭПП, Научные труды №55. - М.: ИЭПП, 2003.
    
21. Радыгин А.Д., Энтов Р.М., Шмелева Н.А. Корпоративное управление и права собственности: актуальные направления реформ. - М.: ИЭПП, 2001.
    
22. Радыгин А.Д., Энтов Р.М., Шмелева Н.А.Проблемы слияний и поглощений в корпоративном секторе. - ИЭПП, Научные труды №43. - М.: ИЭПП, 2002.
    
23. Радыгин А.Д., Энтов Р.М., Юдин А.Д. Трансформация отношений собственности и сравнительный анализ российских регионов соавторы. - М.: ИЭПП, 2001.
    
24. Сонин К. Журавская Е. Экономика и политика российских банкротств: Тез. докл. Международная конф. Модернизация экономики России: итоги и перспективы. - М.: ГУ-ВШЭ, 2002.
    
25. Симачев Ю.В. Спрос на банкротства в России: основные «потребители», мотивация, механизмы, результаты и ограничения: Тез. докл. Международная конф. Модернизация экономики России: итоги и перспективы. М.: ГУ-ВШЭ, 2002.
    
26. Проблемы корпоративного управления и особенности перераспределения прав контроля в России. // Информационно аналитический бюллетень Бюро экономического анализа.- 2004. №56.
    
27. Предпринимательская этика и корпоративное управление в России: события, мнения инвесторов. – М: Аналитический центр «Эксперт», West Bridge Consulting., 2004. - .php?db_id=1001&l=ru.
    

ПЕРИОДИКА И СТАТЬИ

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