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Cauzele apariţiei conflictului
Role of the peacekeeping forces
Influenţa factorului geopolitic
Context general
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Cauzele apariţiei conflictului


Am identificat nouă cauze mai importante ale apariţiei conflictului pe care le punctăm mai jos. O parte dintre acestea au fost deja explicate, iar celelalte vor fi explicate în capitolele următoare.

  1. Existenţa unei mari mase de colonişti la Tiraspol, Tighina, Râbniţa şi în celelalte oraşe nistrene. Aceştia făceau parte din organele de conducere ale administraţiei şi ale întreprinderilor. Fiindu-le frică să-şi piardă posturile şi privilegiile, persoanele respective au procedat la crearea RSSMN.
  2. Populaţia rurală moldovenească, şi nu numai aceasta, a fost apatică, derutată şi speriată (au fost doar câteva excepţii – satele în care s-a opus rezistenţă armată: Cocieri, Molovata, Coşniţa, Doroţcaia ş.a.). Apatia a fost consecinţa fricii inoculate de regimul stalinist.
  3. Parlamentul de la Chişinău a adoptat legile despre funcţionarea limbilor, despre drapelul de stat – tricolorul – fără să ţină seama de realitatea din Transnistria şi fără a lua în calcul reacţia de acolo. Deoarece în regiune se afla o importantă populaţie de colonişti care nu a folosit limba moldovenească până în 1989, persoanele respective s-au speriat şi au început să ia măsuri de apărare care au dus până la crearea unei republici.
  4. Regiunea transnistreană nu a făcut parte din statul român în perioada în care Basarabia a fost unită cu ţara (1918-1940).
  5. În perioada sovietică moldovenii din Transnistria nu au beneficiat de suficiente grădiniţe şi şcoli cu predare în limba maternă, copiii fiind nevoiţi să fie instruiţi în limba rusă. Evident, li s-a format o altă conştiinţă culturală (regională), decât cea a basarabenilor.
  6. Deoarece populaţia din Transnistria a fost victima terorii staliniste din 1917 până după al doilea război mondial (cu excepţia anilor 1941-1944), unii oameni de aici erau mult mai sovietizaţi în mentalitate şi în 1989 îşi vedeau ameninţat modul de viaţă constituit de decenii, crezul ideologic, sistemul de organizare a vieţii. În 1989 o parte a populaţiei de aici încă nu era gata să conştientizeze schimbările radicale ce se efectuau la Chişinău: introducerea limbii moldoveneşti în instituţiile de stat şi în întreprinderi (până atunci era folosită limba rusă), apariţia germenilor economiei de piaţă, renunţarea la sistemul politic monopartid şi la ideologia comunistă etc.
  7. Propaganda sovietică a exagerat abuzurile administraţiei româneşti din perioada 1941-1944 în Transnistria, care nici pe departe nu se apropie de crimele staliniste de până atunci şi de după.
  8. Forţe politice din Moscova (preşedintele parlamentului sovietic A. Lukianov ş.a.) au sprijinit impunerea structurilor regimului care a uzurpat puterea, ca un mijloc de şantaj asupra Chişinăului pentru a menţine Moldova în cadrul URSS.
  9. Armata a 14-a a URSS, staţionată până în prezent în zona nistreană, a participat la acţiunea de uzurpare a puterii şi de impunere a unui regim de ocupaţie militară rusească.
  10. Cazacii de pe Don, mercenarii din Rusia, ofiţerii în rezervă ai armatei sovietice, care au primit locuinţe şi s-au stabilt în oraşele din estul Moldovei, persoane din forţele de ordine din alte republici (în special cele baltice), care
    s-au refugiat după puciul din august 1991 la Titaspol, au realizat uzurparea puterii şi impunerea regimului de ocupaţie militară rusească.


Referinţe:
  1. Aurelian Lavric. Incredibila revoluţie // Timpul. – Iaşi, 7 aprilie 1990.
  2. Nicolae Iorga. Românii de peste Nistru. Editura Excelsior, 1990, p. 8.
  3. Ibidem.
  4. Ibidem, p.10.
  5. Mihai Eminescu, Basarabia. – Bucureşti: Editura Mileniul Trei, 1990, p.11.
  6. Nicoale Iorga, Op.cit., p.16.
  7. Ibidem.
  8. Mihai Eminescu. Op. cit., p.31.
  9. Olivian Verenca. Administraţia civilă română în Transnistria. – Chişinău: Editura
  10. Universitas, 1993, p.33.
  11. Nicolae Iorga. Op. cit., p.28.
  12. Olivian Verenca. Op. cit., p.34.
  13. Victor Bârsan. Masacrul inocenţilor. – Bucureşti: Editura Fundaţiei Culturale
  14. Române, 1993, p.20.
  15. Olivian Verenca. Op. cit., p.90.
  16. Anuarul statistic al Republicii Moldova. – Chişinău, 1992, p.30
Bibliografie:
  1. Anton Raţiu. Românii de dincolo de Nistru. – Bucureşti: Editura Fundaţiei Culturale Române, 1992.
  2. Guy Hermet. Istoria naţiunilor şi a naţionalismului în Europa. – Iaşi: Editura Institutul European, 1997.
  3. Victor Bârsan. Procesul Ilaşcu. – Bucureşti: Editura Fundaţiei Culturale Române, 1994.
  4. Hurst Hannum. Autonomie, suveranitate şi autodeterminare. – Bucureşti: Editura Paideia.
  5. Constituţia URSS.
  6. Constituţia RSSM.
  7. Constituţia Republicii Moldova.
  8. Săptămânalul “Literatura şi Arta”. – Chişinău.
  9. Documente ale Misiunii permanente a OSCE în Moldova.
  10. Presa din Republica Moldova şi România.


ROLE OF THE PEACEKEEPING FORCES

IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT21


Diana MOLODILO,

magistru, lector,

Catedra Relaţii Internaţionale,

Facultatea Relaţii Internaţionale,

Ştiinţe Politice şi Administrative, USM


Acest studiu oferă o imagine de ansamblu asupra rolului forţelor de menţinere a păcii în soluţionarea conflictului din stânga Nistrului de pe teritoriul Republicii Moldova. Zona de securitate a conflictului transnistrean a fost stabilită prin Acordul de încetare a focului, semnat între Republica Moldova şi Federaţia Rusă în 1992.

Deoarece de-a lungul activităţii sale, din 1992 până azi, forţele de menţinere a păcii nu au stopat dislocarea ilegală a trupelor transnistrene în zonă, unica posibilitate a Republicii Moldova este să-şi apere interesele naţionale prin intermediul unor procese şi instituţii democratice, de asemenea, s-a convins că nu poate spera la o înţelegere cu forţele militare „pacificatoare” care de fapt apară şi întăresc regimul totalitar transnistrean şi slujesc drept paravan forţelor transnistrene şi aparatului lor represiv. Înlocuirea lor cu forţe internaţionale din societăţi democratice care respectă principiile de drept a devenit un element imperativ în eliminarea unuia dintre pilonii regimului represiv al lui Smirnov. Elementele care ar trebui să asiste Republica Moldova în racordarea intereselor sale cu cele occidentale, inclusiv cele ale UE şi SUA, sunt:

1. Soluţionarea conflictului transnistrean prin mecanisme internaţionale democratice şi recunoscute.

2. Mecanismele noi presupun înlocuirea aşa-ziselor forţe de menţinere a păcii actuale cu nişte forţe de menţinere a păcii internaţionale.

3. UE şi SUA trebuie să recepţioneze nu doar o declaraţie de intenţii, dar şi o propunere motivată şi concretă.


At present, a generally accepted system of terms and concepts pertaining to peace operations has been defined in international practice. These terms and concepts describe different types of peacekeeping operations and characterize actions undertaken in the framework of these operations. Moldova has not officially adopted yet the terminology regarding peacekeeping operations. Lack of clarity in the above-mentioned terminology creates problems in a successful implementation itself of the peacekeeping operations in Moldova.

For the state authorities of the Republic of Moldova, involved in the peacekeeping forces on the left bank of the Nistru River, a study and classification of this terminology is of a special practical importance. An incorrect or imprecise interpretation of terms leads to a misunderstanding or confusion in the process itself of the peace operation development, since this terminology reflects essential features of these operations and plays an important role in their planning and development.

In order to adequately understand the issue of the peace operation on the territory of Moldova it is necessary to place it in the historical framework of the events that happened on the country’s territory, especially during the armed phase of the conflict in the Eastern region of the Republic.

Transnistria is a separatist region within Moldova, located between the Dniester River and the Ukrainian border. The roots of the modern conflict between Transnistria and Moldova date to 1924, when the Soviet Union established the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the area to the east of the Dniester River (Transnistria). At the end of World War II both Transnistria and the historical Bessarabia on the west side of the river came under the control of the newly-renamed Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1989, against the backdrop of "glasnost" and "perestroika," the Supreme Soviet of Moldova, led by a group called the Popular Front, began enacting measures to reinforce Moldovan national identity and its historical and cultural connections to Romania, followed quickly by a declaration of sovereignty by the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic. Dissatisfied with the measures taken by the Moldovan Supreme Soviet and fearing reunification with Romania, residents of Transnistria voted for Transnistrian independence from Moldova in September 1991.

Fighting escalated in mid-March 1992 when the Dniester Republic Guards attacked Moldovan police units in three villages in Dubasari region in an attempt to eliminate the last remaining Moldovan police presence on the left bank of the Dniester. Reaction to the fighting came rapidly. The following day, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister called for a cease-fire and offered his services to mediate the conflict. Meanwhile, fighting continued, the initiative being in rebels hands. Moldovan police were no match for the attackers’ firepower, logistics, and military professionalism. At the same time, mass demonstrations in Chisinau criticized President Mircea Snegur and his government for not declaring a general mobilization.

At the Helsinki Foreign Ministers’ conference, Moldova protested the activities of rebel forces operating on the left bank of the Dniester River. They were supported by the Romanian government, which issued a statement in this regard. On 24 March, following the CSCE meeting in Helsinki, the Foreign Ministers of Romania, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine issued a joint statement saying they would continue their efforts to resolve the conflict in Moldova and announced the creation of a quadripartite mechanism of political consultations for solving the Moldovan conflict.

In the course of the armed phase of the conflict the republic’s leadership addressed to the international community with an appeal to contribute to putting an end to the conflict. As a result the UN, CSCE, NATO, as well as the USA, Great Britain and other countries demanded Russia to withdraw the 14th Army from Moldova.

Since 1992, talks concerning the status of Transnistria have continued, facilitated by the involvement of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which became involved in negotiations in 1993. Although a Memorandum on the Principles of Settlement of Relations was signed by both sides in May of 1997, talks on the matter subsequently stalled, as have numerous attempts at mediation since.

The idea of an international peacekeeping operation was launched during the meeting on 17 April 1992 of Foreign Ministers of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Romania. Heads of these states at their meeting on 25 June in Istanbul agreed on the necessity to examine the issue. At the same time they mentioned that they would greet a more active peacekeeping role of the UN in the process of settlement of the conflict in the region of the left bank of the Dniester river of the Republic of Moldova. They also expressed their satisfaction with the UN Secretary General’s decision to send to Moldova an evaluation mission.

Thus, there can be spotlighted two diametrically opposed approaches of tackling this problem. First, that of the Moldovan leadership that required a massive involvement of international organizations in the peacekeeping operation in Moldova and, secondly, that of the Russian leadership that, though joined some declarations, like the one quoted above, was not interested in the internationalization of the conflict settlement process since the involvement of international organizations would have diminished Russia’s role or would have deterred it from orchestrating the conflict and in a longer term would have undermined Russia’s interests in the region.

Thus, The "peace making" forces acting presently on the territory of the Republic of Moldova were formed on July 27, 1992 according to the "Convention regarding the principles of a peaceful resolution of the armed conflict in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova», by decision of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), a commission created to ensure the practical implementation of the agreement. The Joint Control Commission is a tri-lateral ссылка скрыта force and joint military command structure which operates in a ссылка скрыта on the border between the ссылка скрыта and the disputed territory controlled by the ссылка скрыта. Following the ссылка скрыта, the Joint Control Commission was established on the initiative of Russian president ссылка скрыта by the signing of a ссылка скрыта agreement on ссылка скрыта, ссылка скрыта. It consists of soldiers from the armed forces of Moldova, the PMR and ссылка скрыта, originally with a numerical underrepresentation of the PMR. In 1998, it was enlarged by the addition of 10 Ukrainian military observers. Moreover, ссылка скрыта also has a Transnistria-based observation mission and participates in all JCC meetings. The current peacekeeping mechanism is a multi-state mission equipped with an international mandate, which began deployment on 29 July 1992. Of the three original sides supplying troops, Russia has traditionally provided the most with Moldova second and the smallest contingent provided by Transnistria. As of 2006, however, both Moldova and the PMR participate with more soldiers than Russia: Moldova currently supplies 403 men to the force, the PMR 411 men and Russia up to 385 men.

After the "peace making" forces had been introduced, the parties in conflict started to withdraw military staff and equipment from the positions, started to unblock the roads and clear the mines of the territory, a part of the refugees began to return to their homes. By July 21, 1993 sapper units of the peace maintaining forces have cleared the mines from the majority of objectives and fields (over 11 thousand of mines and explosive objects have been put out of action), have confiscated from the population over 600 illegally kept weapons, as well as over 1000 grenades and more than 100 thousand bullets. These results, as well as the actions taken by JCC, initially created the impression that by accepting Russian "peace making" forces in Transnistria the Government of the Republic of Moldova made a successful step on the way towards the Transnistrian conflict resolution, and the problem was expected to be solved quickly.

However, the hopes of Chisinau have proved to be unjustified. After the introduction of Russian "peace making" forces, Tiraspol authorities began to use the Security Zone and Russian "peace making" forces as a shield for consolidating the existent anti-constitutional structures and creating new ones.

In spite of Russian propaganda presenting the "peace making" operation as a success, it did not even start to contribute to the conflict resolution. Russian "peace making" troops were the shield behind which separatist authorities consolidated the state structures and transformed the region into a zone of organized crime, guns, drugs and human beings trafficking.

Speaking in New York, Moldovan Foreign Minister Andrei Stratan called for closing down the Transdniester peacekeeping operation. In his words, the current mission is "inefficient". Active for 14 years, it boasts a 100% success rate in preventing new bloodshed.

Moldovan parliament speaker Marian Lupu believes that Pridnestrovie, or Transnistria as he calls it, can only "really be democratized" after Russian troops withdraw, the region "is demilitarized" and certain unnamed structures "suppressing democratic values are closed". In his statement, Parliamentary Speaker Lupu also insisted that the conflict should be solved through political and civil dialogue rather than through force. In conclusion we can state:

1. The peacekeeping forces in Moldova are illegal, since it is not carried on in accordance with the international law norms, under a mandate of an international or regional security organization.

2. The peacekeeping operation in the Eastern region of the country contravenes the international law norms and international organizations provisions (UN/OSCE):

a) impartiality of peacekeeping forces;

b) non-involvement of conflicting parties in the operation;

c) multinational character of these forces;

d) a temporary character of such operations.

3. The current peacekeeping forces has a negative influence on the domestic situation, since it does not support the efforts of a sustainable peaceful settlement of the conflict and on the contrary, strengthen the Russian Federation’s position of preserving the division of Moldova and strengthen the position of the separatist regime itself.

4. The peacekeeping forces does not only contravene the international law, but also is inefficient. The deployment in the security zone of military contingents and equipment, restrictions for military observers, etc. imposed by Tiraspol regime come to support this affirmation and contravene both the essence of peacekeeping operations and the provisions of the 1992 Convention and other related documents.


Bibliography:
  1. Vlad Grecu. O viziune din focarul conflictlui de la Dubăsari. Prut International, 2005.
  2. Luciana Alexandra Ghica, Zulean Marian. Politica de Securitate Naţională: concepte, instituţii, procese. -Iaşi, 2007.
  3. Joseph S. Nye, Jr.Understanding International Conflicts. -New York, 2003.
  4. Vladimir Socor. A chance to civilianize Russia’s “peacekeeping” operation in Moldova, June 11, 2007.
  5. Vladimir Socor. Ways to transform Russia’s “peacekeeping” operation in Moldova, June 08, 2007. "Peace Consolidation Mission Moldova" - Parties and Interests, ссылка скрыта, August 15, 2003.



INFLUENŢA FACTORULUI GEOPOLITIC

ASUPRA FENOMENULUI DE STAT SLAB

ÎN REPUBLICA MOLDOVA22


Victoria STOICIU,

MA

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, România


Moldova was often described as a weak state that failed to provide to its citizens the public goods, such as security, justice and education, and to impose the control over a society that has developed independently into large uncontrolled and decentralized groups. A whole region of the national territory is under the control of a separatist regime and the Moldovan law cannot be enforced in the secessionist area. The article tries to explain the influence of the external factors over the phenomenon of state weakness, such as Russian geopolitical interests in Moldova and the partial neglect of the country by the western policies. The analyses focuses on the way that Russia used the Russian minority from Moldova and its economical dominance for taking interventionist actions against the national security and interests of the Moldovan state.


Context general

După 1990, în afară de statele baltice, Republica Moldova avea cele mai dinamice şi competitive politici în raport cu alte ex-republici unionale, apropiindu-se de atingerea unor standarde minime ale democraţiei. Alegerile, atât cele prezidenţiale, cât şi cele parlamentare, au fost extrem de competitive. În ultimii zece ani, doi dintre preşedinţii aleşi, care au candidat pentru a doua oară la preşedenţie, au pierdut conform unor reguli democratice ale jocului – mai mult decât în orice altă republică ex sovietică non-baltică. Cu toate acestea, victoria Partidului Comunist în alegerile din 2001 a marcat o turnură accentuată către un regim de tip autoritar, fără a se ajunge, totuşi, la un regim de tipul celui instalat în Belarusi23.

Deşi a înregistrat un scor înalt la capitolul “pluralism politic”, în 1992 Republica Moldova s-a confruntat cu un război civil, în urma căruia a ajuns să piardă de sub control aproape o treime din teritoriul său – regiunea Transnistria.

Conjugarea tuturor acestor factori a dus la o deteriorare constantă şi vertiginoasa a economiei Republicii Moldova şi transformarea sa într-un „stat slab” (weak state).

Întrebarea la care vom încerca să răspundem pe parcursul acestui articol este: Care sunt factorii ce au determinat apariţia fenomenului de “stat slab” în Republica Moldova?

Ipoteza noastră este următoarea: factorul principal care explică fenomenul de “stat slab” în RM este unul de natură externă şi rezidă în poziţia geopolitică a RM şi situaţia ei în subsistemul relaţilor internaţionale din zonă, în speţă vecinătatea cu Rusia şi aflarea în orbita intereselor ruseşti. Toţi ceilalţi factori care au influenţat, într-un fel sau altul, incapacitatea statului moldovenesc sunt secundari sau subordonaţi factorului geopolitic.