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Geopolitics of south caucasus
I. The place of South Caucasus in the global geopolitical schemes
II. The place of South Caucasus in geopolitical triangular USA-EU-Russia
2.1 Interests of USA in South Caucasus
2.2 South Caucasus – challenge to EU
2.3 Interests of Russia in South Caucasus
Geopolitical actors
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GEOPOLITICS OF SOUTH CAUCASUS96


Tomas JANELIŪNAS,

doctor, lector superior

Vilnius University,

Institute of International Relations and political sciences,

Lithuania


Laura KIRVELYTĖ

master,

Vilnius University,

Institute of International Relations and political sciences,

Lithuania


Caucazul de Sud este o regiune ce se află între Europa şi Asia. Din perspectiva interpretării geografice, acest teritoriu este asiatic, iar din perspectiva abordării politice se poate afirma că acest spaţiu este european. Din punct de vedere geografic, Caucazul de Sud se află în punctul de intersecţie a două zone geostrategice – Heartland şi Rimland.

În peroada războiului rece, Caucazul de Sud era una dintre zonele strategice – cheie ce garanta şi asigura Rusiei unele avantaje geopolitice considerabile din perspectiva dominării Rimlandului.

Însă după destrămarea URSS statutul geopolitic al Caucazului de Sud a suferit schimbări radicale, această regiune transformându-se într-o „zonă gri”, unde la moment încă nici o mare putere nu domină regiunea în întregime.

Schimbările statutului geopolitic au creat condiţii pentru apariţia în regiune a intereselor actorilor geopolitici globali, în aranjamentele geopolitice globale, Caucazului de Sud i s-a atribuit funcţia de Platzdarm privind perspectiva răspândirii influenţei.

Istoric, actorii geopolitici globali nu au avut relaţii strânse cu regiunea Caucazului de Sud, actuala cooperare bazându-se pe interese pragmatice - democratizarea regiunii, întărirea securităţii, lupta cu „noile ameninţări şi sfidări”. În acelaşi timp, actorii regionali (Turcia şi Iran) sunt legaţi de Caucazul de Sud prin strânse legături istorice, de aceea se confruntă cu un şir de probleme istorice, Rusia făcând o excepţie de la acestea, ce s-a deosebit prin parametrii săi de putere. Rusia, fiind legată de Caucazul de Sud printr-o istorie lungă, cea mai mare parte a acţiunilor ei actualmente sunt condiţionate de necesitatea restabilirii influenţei în zona sa de interes.

Treptat, nivelul crescând al cooperării dintre Caucazul de Sud, pe de o parte, şi comunitatea internaţională, pe de altă parte, pot fi explicate anume prin specificul relaţiilor dintre actorii globali şi statele din regiune: statele Caucazului de Sud în încercările lor de compensare a relaţiilor încordate cu actorii regionali în paralel cu încercările de intensificare şi de adâncire a relaţiilor cu actorii globali (de ex. SUA, UE).


Южний Кавказ - регион, расположенный между Европой и Азией: с географической точки зрения является Азией, с политической - Европой. На основе геополитического подхода Южний Кавказ находится на пересечении двух геостратегических зон - хартланда и римланда. Во время холодной войны на Южном Кавказе доминировала Россия и он исполнял функцию хартланда – плацдарма для контроля Россией римланда. После расспада Советского Союза геополитический статус Южного Кавказа изменился – регион стал частью "серой зоны", изключительной характеристикой которой являеться вакуум силы. Изменение геополитического статуса создало условия для появления интересов глобальных геополитических акторов в этом регионе. В глобальных геополитических схемах для Южного Кавказа предусматривается функция буферной зоны и плацдарма для распространения влияния на дальнейшие пространства.

С исторической точки зрения глобальные геополитические акторы не имели тессных связей с Южно-Кавказким регионом, а нынешнее сотрудничество основано на прагматических интересах – демократизации региона, укреплении безопастности и стабильности, борьбе с угрозами "нового поколения". В то же время региональные геополитичесские акторы (Турция, Иран) связаны со странами Южного Кавказа тесными историческими узлами, конфликтность которых представляет собой довольно комплексную систему взаимоотношений. Исключение представляет Россия, которая сильно отличаетсья от региональных деятелей по параметрам силы и которая также исторически связана с Южно-Кавказким регионом, поэтому большинство политических поступков основаны на необходимости восстановления влияния в "историческом пространстве интересов".

Постепенно возростающий уровень сотрудничества между странами Южного Кавказа - Арменией, Азербайджаном и Грузией - и глобальными центрами силы объясняется различием подходов к взаимодействию глобальных акторов в сравнении с подходами региональных акторов: Южно-Кавказкие страны стремятся компенсировать натянутые отношения с региональными государствами, более заинтересованы в углублении отношений с глобальными акторами, такими как США и ЕС.


Introduction

South Caucasus – exceptional region, where East and West, North and South, Europa and Asia, Christianity and Islam meets97. Region of South Caucasus, which is composed of three small states – Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, is located between Black Sea and Caspian Sea, in the North bounded by The Great Caucasus Range. In the North region of South Caucasus borders Russia, in the West – Turkey, in the South – Iran.

South Caucasus is lying on the intersection line between two geostrategic zones – heartland and rimland (discontinental zone), what determines strategic importance of this region to the global powers. States, belonging to heartland zone (Russia, by the smaller amount – China), are highly interested in geopolitical orientation and gravitation of the South Caucasus to heartland to get wider passage to the warm seas (Black sea and Caspian sea). States, belonging to the Atlantistic geostrategic zone (USA and Turkey), are interested in belonging of South Caucasus to rimland geostrategic zone not to let heartland to expand beyond it‘s natural borders – The Great Caucasus Range.

According to Saul Bernard Cohen, after the disintegration of USSR, the status of South Caucasus like the periphery of heartland shifted: if during Cold War South Caucasus acted like a platform of Russia, which enabled Russia to control rimland of Eurasia, after the collapse of USSR South Caucasus became the space, which could be used to block the spreading of Russia‘s influence98.


I. The place of South Caucasus in the global geopolitical schemes

Analysis of the place of South Caucasus in the global geopolitical schemes is of primary importance, because global geopolitical schemes are used as geopolitical codes of grand powers. The scheme of Zbignev Brzezinsky is considered to be contemporary geopolitical ode of USA. At the same time, scheme of eurasist Aleksandr Dugin serves like an alternative geopolitical code of Russia.

Z. Brzezinsky ascribes South Caucasus to the wider region, called „Eurasian Balkans“, to which belongs six states more – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan, with exceptions – Turkey and Iran. The first key feature of „Eurasian Balkans“ – permanent political instability of states, followed by ethnic clashes. The latter point is wll reflected in South Caucasus, afflicted by three “frozen“ conflicts, having ethnical character – South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and Nagorno Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The second key feature of „Eurasian Balkans“ is the vacuum of power. After the collapse of USSR, the region was left without a dominant power. What is more, global and regional powers (USA, Russia, Turkey, Iran) are permanently striving to close the way to the domination of one of them in the region.99

Russia is still seeing post-soviet republics as an exceptional space of interests, but nowadays Russia is too weak to dominate „Eurasian Balkans“ region, at the same time - too close that it’s influence in named region could be eliminated. So, we come to the paradox, that neither Russian domination, nor withdrawal from “Eurasia Balkans”, at the same time – and from South Caucasus, is geopolitically possible.

According to Z. Brzezinsky, openness of South Caucasus region to the influences of main geopolitical actors directly depends on the routes of pipelines, crossing named region. If main export pipelines opens to the Russian Novorossiysk port, Russia will have all necessary condition to get maximal influence in South Caucasus. And vice versa - if main export pipelines will open westwards (towards Turkey), Russia will loose it‘s influence and the balance of power in South Caucasus will be maintained. The main goal of USA – to maintain pluralism of powers in South Caucasus and not to let Russia dominate this region.

The geopolitical center of „Eurasian Balkans“, according to Z. Brzezinsky, is considered to be Azerbaijan. First, Azerbaijan by the greatest part is controlling the exit to warm Caspian sea and it‘s rich hydrocarbon deposits. Second, Azerbaijan serves both as geographical and cultural bridge to the Central Asia region. So, the importance of Azerbaijan in the context of „Eurasian Balkans“ can be concluded by rephrased formula „who controls Azerbaijan, controls „Eurasia Balkans“ region“.

Still the author of the article is deeply doubting, that this formula can be applicable to the strategy of Russia in South Caucasus. There are two key reasons, which let us doubt this. First, Russia is interested only in the control of pipelines routes, but not in the control of hydrocarbon resources itself. At the same time, Western geopolitical actors are interested directly in the oil and gas of Azerbaijan. Second, key pillar of influence of Russia in post-soviet space - military presence. Azerbaijan was the first post-soviet republic, from which Soviet troops were withdrawn. So, according to the reasons stated, the central point of Russia‘s strategy in South Caucasus should be Armenia, not Azerbaijan.

The strategic importance of Armenia is recognized in the geopolitical scheme of eurasist Aleksandr Dugin. According to the conception of A. Dugin100, the main task of Russia – to minimize the zone of rimland to the South of it‘s borders to as narrow strip as possible. South Caucasus belongs to this „problematic“ zone, wich is considered in future to be “Russia‘s South“. What is more, South Caucasus is bordering atlantistic Turkey, what increases the necessity for Russia to intensify it‘s influence in this region even more. According to A. Dugin, looking historically, frequent wars between Russia and Turkey were caused by the strive to redraw borders between heartland and rimland.

A. Dugin emphasized the strategic role of Armenia in the context of South Caucasus. Firstly, Armenia acts like a buffer zone or platform of Russia against the flow of influence of Turkey into the muslim Central Asia. It is important, that many of Armenian cultural heritage, as well as saint Ararat mountain, is in the territory of Turkey, what „encodes“ long-term conflicts between those states. Second, Armenia is a prerequisite to the formation of axis Moscow-Yerevan-Teheran, throw which eurasian impulse would be transferred to Iran.

So, as it can be seen from the schemes presented, in both of them the strategic importance of different states is emphasized. It is logical, because the scheme of Z. Brzezinsky, emphasizing the importance of Azerbaijan, presents the view from USA. At the same time, the scheme of A. Dugin, in which exceptional importance is given to Armenia, represents the view from Russia‘s positions. But it is worth to mention, that none of these schemes emphasized the strategic importance of Georgia in the context of South Caucasus. First, looking geographically, Georgia acts like a gateway to South Caucasus. Second, it is the only South Caucasian state, having good relations to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. So, Georgia can be considered the only state of South Caucasus through which the influence in all region can be consolidated.


II. The place of South Caucasus in geopolitical triangular USA-EU-Russia

Even though historically global geopolitical actors had no close ties with the states of South Caucasus, in the last few years unprecedented increase of attention and intensification of mutual relations is being observed101. On the one had, today the world encounters with threats of „new type“: challenges to energy security, terrorism, drug trade and other illegal actions. On the other hand, increase of attention to South Caucasus can be explained by the increase of importance of global trade and communication, as well as the need of dialogue among cultures.


2.1 Interests of USA in South Caucasus

Global dominance in international arena lets USA to fulfill it‘s moral mission – to spread worldwide democracy, the principles of political and civil freedoms and market economy – key principles, on which fundaments of USA were built.

USA are exceptionally interested to consolidate democracy and strengthen respect to the principles of market economy in South Caucasus – region, surrounded by non-democratic states. If democracy in the states of South Caucasus would be consolidates successfully, this could cause so called „domino effect“ further eastwards. So, South Caucasus could potentially fulfill the function of platform for USA. Nevertheless, if the spread of democracy will not be successful, stable, secure and democratic South Caucasus could serve as a buffer zone, separating undemocratic Russia and Iran.

Alongside ideological motives, involvement of USA into the South Caucasus is fostered by the geoenergetic causes too. USA is especially interested in importing hydrocarbons (oil and gas) from Azerbaijan to decrease the level of energy dependence from unstable Middle East region102. In this context, the implementation of oil pipeline project Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) was a great political103 win of USA. South Caucasus in the geoenergetic pattern is important to USA not only for big reserves of hydrocarbons of Azerbaijan, but also for the strategic geographical location - rich hydrocarbon reserves from the states of Central Asia (Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan), can reach global markets only through “unpredictable” Russia or through South Caucasus104. Needless to say, the second route is more acceptable to USA.

The last, but not the least reason of involvement of USA in the South Caucasus – fight against terrorism. After 9/11, South Caucasus became the platform for USA to project it‘s influence into the Northern part of Middle East (Afghanistan and Iran). Azerbaijan backed action of USA during the intervention to Afghanistan: Azerbaijan let military forces of USA use it‘s air space and airports105. Strategic importance of Azerbaijan for USA increases even more for the fact, that Azerbaijan is secular muslim state, which can act like a bridge between muslim East and West106.

At the time cooperation of all states of South Caucasus with USA/NATO is institutionalized: Armenia and Azerbaijan cooperates with NATO in the frameworks of Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), Georgia is looking forward to sign Membership Action Plan (MAP) in the nearest future. What is more, in the frames of mutual agreement for military cooperation all three states of South Caucasus annually gets donations from the budget of USA to implement reforms of military and security sector.


2.2 South Caucasus – challenge to EU

Region of South Caucasus is important to EU primary for it’s geographical and geopolitical situation, enforcing it to fulfill function of link between Europe and Asia. South Caucasus, depending on circumstances, can maintain function of buffer zone (negative function) and of bridge/linkage (positive function).

On the one hand, South Caucasus is threat for EU, because it is permeable to illegal actions of organized crime: drugs, human trade, smuggling and trade of armaments. So, even if there are no big entities of organized crime in South Caucasus itself, this region is not capable to resist these trends from outside. The main reasons, why South Caucasus is so permeable to the actions of organized crime, are weak state institutions and rule of man instead of rule of law, unresolved territorial conflicts (also known as “frozen”) borders of which are mostly uncontrolled, low level of living (small salaries, high prices, what attempts state servants to search for an alternative source of income) and pervasive corruption, which can be described as “tradition” of South Caucasus. Promoting further democratization and consolidation of democracy, reforms of public and defense sectors, enhancing rapid process of resolving of territorial conflicts could create conditions for South Caucasus to become a buffer zone from the threats mentioned above, spreading from unstable regions (mostly – Middle East) to EU.

On the other hand, South Caucasus could fulfill function of bridge, connecting Europe and Asia. It is interesting, that geographically South Caucasus is ascribable to Asia, but politically all three states belongs to Europe (all of them – members of Council of Europe).

The role of South Caucasus as communicational bridge is confirmed by the implementation of project of transport corridor TRACECA (Europe-Caucasus-Asia), which takes former route of “Silk Road”. Project, implementation of which provides wide opportunities to develop sea, railway and road net, in the South Caucasus still remains of limited efficiency because of territorial conflicts and tense relations between states (Armenia and Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey) 107.

Finally, EU is deeply interested in transporting hydrocarbons of South Caucasus and Central Asia towards Europe. These days Black Sea-Caspian region (nucleus of which – South Caucasus) is considered to be one of the most important potential energy alternatives for EU.

At the moment all three states of South Caucasus cooperates with EU in the framework of European Neighborhood Policy program (ENP program): in year 2004 Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were included in the ENP program, and in November of 2006 Action Plans between all three states of South Caucasus and EU were signed.


2.3 Interests of Russia in South Caucasus

In the case of South Caucasus, global and regional geopolitical actors differ by one feature: global geopolitical actors does not have close historical ties with the region, and their inclusion in South Caucasus is motivated by rational interests only. At the same time regional geopolitical actors had close historical ties with the states of South Caucasus, and their politics towards South Caucasian states are determined by historical “emotions” more than by rational interests. For this reason regional geopolitical actors are likely to do a distinction between states of South Caucasus and to hold interstate relations at different level with each South Caucasian state separately. At the same time global geopolitical actors treats South Caucasus as a region.

In this context, Russia is an exception: it is at the same time both regional and global geopolitical actor in South Caucasus. Russia, bordering South Caucasus region, always had close ties with the states of region. What is more, the “political style” of relations with the states of South Caucasus fits more the pattern of regional actors than of global. Nevertheless, Russia, by the parameters of structural and relational strength, noticeably bypass other regional actors – Turkey and Iran. What is more, politics of Russia in South Caucasus may influence actions of EU and USA in this region.

Involvement of Russia in South Caucasus is catalyzed by three main reasons. First, Russia is constantly trying to restore its dominance in South Caucasus, because, for the deep historical ties, Russia is still considering this region as a zone of exceptional interests. Second, Russian politics in South Caucasus is also shaped by energy aspect: Russia is interested that main transport routes of hydrocarbons were controlled itself (Russia), what would give Russia economical as well as political dividends. But the most contradictious factor, determining involvement of Russia in South Caucasus, is the question of security of Russia. Russia sees North Caucasus and South Caucasus as a common system of security. Secure and stable South Caucasus, supporting Russian political course, would create wider opportunities to resolve problems with North Caucasus. Instabilities in Russia’s North Caucasus regions causes many tensions in relations of Russia with South Caucasian states (especially – Georgia). For example, at the time of Second Chechen War, Russian armed forces “miscalculated” and bombed several border villages of Georgia108. On the other hand, Russia always accuses Georgia of hiding Chechen terrorists in Pankisi gorge, even though there are no evidence of such actions of Georgia.

Russian strategy in South Caucasus is full of dilemmas. On the one hand, Russia is interested in stability of this region, but is aware, that South Caucasus might become more prosperous than Russia and become a magnet for rebelling regions of Russia. On the other hand, Russia is not likely to loose the influence in this region and let other geopolitical players enter it, but Russia itself is too weak to provide South Caucasian states with the help necessary. So, according to these circumstances, Russia have chosen tactics of waiting: holding interstate and territorial conflicts „frozen“ to preserve it‘s influence in the region and to make additional barriers for other geopolitical actors to enter South Caucasus.

The conclusion can be made that all global geopolitical actors have interests in South Caucasus (summarized in table below). At the time bigger clashes between interests of global geopolitical players in South Caucasus are not observed, but in the future clash of interests is possible. The potential for such a clash lies in the disproportion of ambitions and possibilities of Russia. Nevertheless South Caucasus is strategically important region for all global geopolitical actors, for West it is not of vital importance, so it is hardly possible, that EU and USA would be likely to go to an open conflict with Russia for South Caucasus. If in the nearest future South Caucasus would become the arena of conflict rather that cooperation between global geopolitical actors, it would highly harm the development of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Table 1

Configuration of the interests of global powers in South Caucasus

Geopolitical actors
Coherent interests
Intersecting interests

USA

and EU
* Democratization of the states of South Caucasus;

* Widening the zone of stability and security eastwards;

* Maintenance of pro-Western orientation in the states of South Caucasus.

* Potentially – geoenergetics (the amount of hydrocarbons from South Caucasus is limited, but both USA and EU have a big demand for them).


USA

and Russia
* Fighting against terrorism.
* Geoenergetics (routes of pipelines);

* Democratization of the states of South Caucasus;

* Maintenance of pro-Western orientation in the states of South Caucasus.

Russia

and EU
Fighting the organized crime.

* Table is done by the author of this article