Geum.ru

Курсовой проект

  • 201. PR политических партий в современной России
    Политология

     

    1. Антикризисное управление: учебник. под ред.проф. Э.М. Короткова, - М.: Инфра-М., 2007. 620с.
    2. Бочкова Е.А., Механизмы PR-технологий в имидже современного политика //«Академия Тринитаризма», М., Эл № 77-6567, публ.13822, 25.09.2006
    3. Бурев И. Блогинг в PR-продвижении//Маркетинг и реклама - №4 - 2008
    4. Валеев А.В.Пропаганда: социальный аспект, - М.:Луч, 2005. 355с.
    5. Гуревич П.С. Имиджелогия, - СПб.:Питер, 2004. 202с.
    6. Жировских О.А. Имидж и его составляющие, - Мн.: Веды, - 2007. 654с.
    7. Зверинцев А.Б. Коммуникационный менеджмент: Рабочая книга менеджера PR. М.: Глоссарий, 2002. 403с.
    8. Кабардинская И.С.Имидж в системе маркетинга//Советник - №5 1997
    9. Комаровский В.С. Связи с общественностью в политике и государственном управлении. - М., РАГС, 2001. -520 с.
    10. Королько В.Г. Основы паблик рилейшенз. - М.: Рефл-бук- 2002. - 528 с.
    11. Мараховская М. Разноцветный PR избирательный кампаний//Со-общение - №12 2001
    12. Международный маркетинг: учеб.пособие/И.Л. Акулич, - Мн.:Выш.шк., 2006. 544с.
    13. Мечин В.С. Политический имидж, - СПб.:Питер, 2002. 242с.
    14. Монахов Г. Имидж//Дело - №28 2006
    15. Почепцов Г.Г. Информационные войны. М.: Рефл-бук 2002. - 576 с.
    16. Почепцов Г.Г. Паблик рилейшенз для профессионалов. - К.: Ваклер, 2002. - 624 с.
    17. Синяева И.М. Паблик рилейшенз в коммерческой деятельности. - М., ЮНИТИ, 2004. - 287 с.
    18. Титова Е.В. Имидж политического лидера, - Ростов-на-Дону, 2006. 386с.
    19. Фатхутдинов Р.А. Стратегический менеджмент, - М.:Дело, 2005. 448с.
    20. Шепель В.М. Имиджелогия: секреты личного обаяния, - Ростов-на-Дону: Феникс, 2006. 245с.
  • 202. PR: наука об установлении связей в обществе
    Иностранные языки

    Поскольку одежда человека является основной частью его внешнего имиджа, специалисты по «гардеробной инженерии» дают ряд советов мужчинам и женщинам, занимающим разные социальные позиции, с целью улучшить впечатление о себе. Одна из известных книг даже называется «Одежда для успеха». Основные рекомендации все-таки сводятся к тому, чтобы не выделяться из окружающего вас социума: изучите, как одеты люди, которые вас окружают, и в целом следуйте их образцам одежды. Впрочем, не все высказывают такую точку зрения. Некоторые полагают, что одеваться надо так, как требует место, на которое вы претендуете, а не так, как требует то место, которое вы уже занимаете. Эти советы демонстрируют действие механизма идентификации перенесение свойств других людей на самого себя. Гораздо реже проявляется другой механизм персонификации, перенесения своего «я» на других людей в процессе сравнения себя с ними. Наши отечественные модельеры деловой одежды, особенно мужской, рекомендуют небольшое отставание от моды, то «чуть-чуть», которое заставляет видеть в человеке его серьезность, основательность, исключительно деловую направленность. Можно также воспользоваться следующей классификацией стилей одежды:

    1. традиционный стиль (форменная или национальная одежда) выбор этого стиля свидетельствует о ригидности, стремлении к сохранению единообразия, культурной замкнутости, высокой степени этноцентризма;
    2. однообразный стиль ее носитель не способен на духовные затраты;
    3. консервативный стиль расчетливость, рассудочность;
    4. классический стиль классически одевается тот, кто хочет укрепить свой авторитет и претендует на престижные позиции;
    5. модный стиль свидетельство благоприятного отношения к переменам;
    6. разнообразный свидетельствует о беспокойстве и недостаточной готовности к душевной самоотдаче;
    7. оригинальный стиль раскрывает предприимчивую личность.
    8. экстравагантный стиль подчеркивает свое отличие от других, самоутверждение.
  • 203. Pragmatics: rules of conversation
    Иностранные языки

     

    1. Bach, Kent, "Conversational Impliciture." - Mind and Language -1994 - pp.124-162.
    2. Bach, Kent, "The myth of conventional implicature." Linguistics and Philosophy. - 1999 - pp.262-283.
    3. Bach, Kent, 2004, "Pragmatics and the Philosophy of Language." In Horn and Ward (eds.) 2004 - pp. 463-87.
    4. Blakemore, Diane. Understanding Utterances. Oxford: Blackwell. 1992.
    5. Carston, Robyn. "Implicature, explicature, and truth-conditional semantics." Reprinted in Kasher (ed.) 1998 - pp. 436-79.
    6. Chapman, Siobhan. Paul Grice, philosopher and linguist. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.-2005
    7. Grice, H. Paul, "Logic and conversation.", Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts, New York: Academic Press - 1975 - pp. 41-58.
    8. Grice, H. Paul "Further notes on logic and conversation." In P. Cole (ed.) 1967.
    9. Grice, H. Paul "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," Philosophical Rework - 1969 - pp.147-177.
    10. Grice, H. Paul "Presupposition and Conversational Implicature." In P. Cole (ed.), Radical Pragmatics, New York: Academic Press - 1981- pp. 183-97.
    11. Horn, Laurence R. and Gregory Ward (eds.) The Hanbook of Pragmatics. Oxford: Blackwell. 2004.
    12. Kempson, Ruth M. "Grammar and Conversational Principles." In F. Newmeyer (ed.) Linguistics: The Cambridge Survey, Vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988 - pp. 139-163.
    13. Levinson, Stephen. Presumptive Meanings. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press/Bradford Books- 2000.
    14. Neale, Stephen "Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Language," Linguistics and Philosophy - 1992 pp.509-559.
    15. Searle John "Indirect speech acts." ibid. Reprinted in Pragmatics: A Reader, ed. S. Davis, Oxford: Oxford University Press. -1991- pp. 265277.
    16. Thomason, R. Accommodation, meaning, and implicature: Interdisciplinary foundations for pragmatics. In Intentions in Communication, ed. P. R. Cohen, J. L. Morgan & M. Pollack, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press -1990 - pp. 32563.
    17. Van Kuppevelt, J. (1996) Inferring from topics: Scalar implicatures as topic dependent inferences. Linguistics and Philosophy 1996 pp. 393443
    18. Wilson, D., and Sperber, D. On Grice's theory of conversation. In Conversation and Discourse, ed. P. Werth, New York: St. Martins Press -1981- pp. 15578.
  • 204. Private sector and human-resource development in Georgia
    Экономика

    RecommendationsObjectives to be AchievedPerformance IndicatorsResponsible AgenciesDurationComment

    • Conduct the 2nd round of the privatization process through GSE;
    • Involve the Investment Funds into the privatization process.
    • Privatization process is improved (Objective 13);
    • Potential of the capital market is increased (Objective 2).
    • The companies included in the privatization list of the 2nd round should be privatized through GSE;
    • A number of (at least 3-5) Investment Funds take part into the privatization process.DSPM
      • NSCG
    GSE
    • 1-2 years
    • With the technical assistance of the WB.
    • About 80% of the leading Georgian companies, which currently are not traded at GSE, have to be included into the list of the securities traded at GSE;
    • Government of Georgia (GoG) must introduce some incentives (e.g. simplified tax regime) for those corporations that decide to be listed at GSE.
    • Majority of leading companies are traded at GSE (Objective 4);
    • Potential of the capital market is increased (Objective 2).
    • Majority of leading Georgian companies are listed at GSE;
    • Simplified tax regime is introduced for the corporations traded at GSE.PoG
      • MoF NSCG
    GSE
    • 1-2 years
    • With the technical assistance of the WB
    • Prepare and adopt the amendments into the Tax Code of Georgia (TCG);
    • Conduct the tax administration reform.
    • The tax system is simplified (Objective 7);
    • There is an adequate tax code (Objective 6);
    • Incentives for paying bribes/Hiding profits are reduced (Objective 11);
    • The level of corruption is reduced (Objective 10);
    • Transparency of corporate disclosure is increased (Objective 12);
    • Reliability of financial disclosure is increased (Objective 28);
    • Corporate governance practice is improved (Objective 17).
    • Business-friendly tax code is in place;
    • Simplified tax regime for securities and corporations are established;
    • No frequent changes into the tax code are made;
    • Collection of taxes is increased;
    • Companies file more reliable information about their profits;
    • Companies increase the transparency and quality of corporate disclosure. PoG
      • MoF STD
    • 6 months
    • Ongoing
    • With the technical assistance of the WB;
    • In consultations with NSCG.
    • Make amendments into Law on Audit Activity (LAA) to adopt International Standards on Auditing (ISA);
    • Ministry of Finances (MoF), together with Parliamentary Council on Audit Activity (PCAA), requires audit companies to conduct audits in compliance with the International Standards on Auditing (ISA).
    • ISA is adopted into the law (Objective 34);
    • There are adequate auditing standards (Objective 33);
    • Incentives for paying bribes/Hiding profits are reduced (Objective 11);
    • The level of corruption is reduced (Objective 10);
    • Transparency of corporate disclosure is increased (Objective 12);
    • Reliability of financial disclosure is increased (Objective 28);
    • Corporate governance practice is improved (Objective 17).
    • International Standards on Auditing is adopted into law;
    • Audits are conducted in compliance with International Standards on Auditing;
    • Companies file more reliable information about their profits;
    • Companies increase the transparency and quality of corporate disclosure.PoG
      • PCAA
    MoF
    • 6 months
    • Ongoing
    • With the technical assistance of the WB;
    • In consultations with NSCG and GSIA.
    • National Securities commission of Georgia (NSCG) requires reporting companies to prepare their financial accounts in compliance with the International Accounting Standards (IAS).
    • IAS is enforced (Objective 9);
    • There are adequate accounting standards (Objective 8);
    • Incentives for paying bribes/Hiding profits are reduced (Objective 11);
    • The level of corruption is reduced (Objective 10);
    • Transparency of corporate disclosure is increased (Objective 12);
    • Reliability of financial disclosure is increased (Objective 28);
    • Corporate governance practice is improved (Objective 17).
    • Reporting companies prepare their financial accounts in compliance with the International Accounting Standards;
    • Companies file more reliable information about their profits;
    • Companies increase the transparency and quality of corporate disclosure.NSCG
      • MoF
    • 3 months
    • Ongoing
    • In consultations with GSIA.
    • National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Georgia (NACB) conducts the assessment of the activities carried out by the tax administrations.
    • The level of corruption is reduced (Objective 10);
    • Transparency of corporate disclosure is increased (Objective 12);
    • Reliability of financial disclosure is increased (Objective 28);
    • Corporate governance practice is improved (Objective 17).
    • Index of corruption is lowered;
    • Companies file more reliable information about their profits;
    • Companies increase the transparency and quality of corporate disclosure.NACB
    • Ongoing
    • With the technical assistance of the WB.
    • Georgian Securities Industry Association (GSIA) should conduct training courses, seminars, workshops, etc. amongst shareholders, company directors and members of supervisory boards on the best practices of corporate governance;
    • NSCG enforces the corporate governance standards.
    • Educational campaign is conducted (Objective 27);
    • Shareholders have sufficient knowledge about their rights (Objective 26);
    • Entrenched culture of abusive self-dealing is lessened (Objective 16);
    • Shareholders' meetings are held regularly (Objective 29);
    • The role of supervisory boards is increased (Objective 35);
    • Corporate governance practice is improved (Objective 17).
    • Majority of company directors and members of supervisory boards, as well as interested shareholders take part in training courses;
    • NSCG conduct quarterly/annual audits of JSCs;
    • Shareholders' meetings are held annually;
    • Supervisory boards' meetings are held on a quarterly basis.NSCG
      • GSIA
    • 1 year
    • Ongoing
    • With the financial and technical assistance of the USAID.
    • Prepare and adopt the regulations for Pension Funds;
    • Prepare and adopt the regulations for Mutual Funds.
    • Legislation for financial intermediaries is adopted (Objective 23);
    • Financial intermediaries are well-developed (Objective 21);
    • Large domestic institutional investors are present at GSE (Objective 20);
    • Larger volumes of capital resources are directed to GSE (Objective 18);
    • There is a competition at GSE (Objective 22);
    • There is a strong market for corporate control (Objective 30).
    • Private Pension Funds start functioning in the country;
    • Mutual Funds start functioning in the country;
    • Large domestic institutional investors take part in trading at GSE;
    • Volume of trades at GSE is increased substantially;
    • Number of participants in trading at GSE is increased;
    • Investment funds take active role in the work of supervisory boards/shareholders meetings.PoG
      • MoF NSCG GSE
    • 1 year
    • With the technical assistance of the WB.
    • Adopt the investment compensation schemes;
    • Strengthen the bankruptcy system;
    • Adopt the rules for takeovers.
    • Adequate legislation for investor protection is adopted (Objective 24);
    • Financial intermediaries are well-developed (Objective 21);
    • Large domestic institutional investors are present at GSE (Objective 20);
    • Larger volumes of capital resources are directed to GSE (Objective 18);
    • There is a competition at GSE (Objective 22);
    • There is a strong market for corporate control (Objective 30).
    • Investment compensation schemes are in place;
    • Regulations for the bankruptcy system are in place;
    • Rules for takeovers are in place;
    • Large domestic institutional investors take part in trading at GSE;
    • Volume of trades at GSE is increased substantially;
    • Number of participants in trading at GSE is increased;
    • Investment funds take active role in the work of supervisory boards/shareholders meetings.MoF
      • NSCG GSE
    • 1 year
    • With the technical assistance of the WB.
    • Assign an adequate Inspection, Investigation and Enforcement power, including the criminal prosecution authority to the National Securities Commission of Georgia (NSCG);
    • Increase the budgetary support of the NSCG;
    • Make the NSCG accountable to the President of Georgia;
    • Develop the code of ethics for NSCG;
    • Develop the program to supervise SelfRegulatory Organizations (SROs);
    • NSCG installs the market surveillance and stock watch system.
    • Power of the NSCG is increased (Objective 40);
    • Budgetary support of the NSCG is increased (Objective 37);
    • Accountability of the NSCG is increased (Objective 36);
    • Code of ethics for the NSCG staff is developed (Objective 38);
    • Program to supervise Self Regulatory Organizations (SROs) is developed (Objective 39);
    • The NSCG does function in an effective manner (Objective 39);
    • Regulations are enforced in an effective manner (Objective 42);
    • Trading transparency is enforced (Objective 43);
    • Unfair trading is deterred (Objective 44);
    • Fairness of Market is ensured (Objective 45).
    • NSCG has the criminal prosecution authority;
    • Budget allocations to NSCG is increased;
    • Rules are in place that make the NSCG accountable to the President of Georgia;
    • The code of ethics for NSCG is in place;
    • The program to supervise SROs is in place;
    • Trades are conducted in a transparent manner/information is easily available;
    • Facts of unfair trading are detected and/or deterred.PoG
      • NSCG GSE
    • 6 months 1 year
    • In consultation with the IOSCO.
    • Special training courses are conducted for the judges dealing with corporate disputes/ protection of shareholders rights.
    • Georgian court system is improved (Objective 32);
    • Shareholders rights are enforced adequately (Objective 31);
    • Fairness of Market is ensured (Objective 45).
    • Judges have sufficient knowledge of corporate/securities laws;
    • Number of complaints against judges is reduced.
      • MoJ NSCG GSIA
    • 6 months

  • 205. Problem of sraff (personnel) adaptation
    Иностранные языки

    As possible organizational decisions of a problem of structural fastening functions of management by adaptation the following can be offered:

    1. Allocation of corresponding division (a group, a department) in structure of control systems of the personnel. More often functions on management of adaptation are a part of division on training the personnel.
    2. Distribution of the experts who engaged in management of adaptation, on divisions (to shops, departments) or to groups of divisions. In this case the expert on the personnel becomes the curator of the certain divisions. It is necessary to notice, that the expert on management of adaptation can be as the employee of one of divisions of a control system of the personnel, and the employee of other functional division prepared for this role.
    3. ) Development of preceptor ship which is forgotten in the domestic organizations last years. Foreign firms consider the preceptor ship as actively application of the form of trust to the skilled employee, and also as the certain stage in its service promotion. Thus preceptor ship is supported by material stimulus. . As instructors can heads, and the young employees who worked of some years and have positively proved can act as skilled workers with the experience. This experience originating in Japan, successfully develops in last years in the European firms.
    4. Development of structural interrelations of a control system by the personnel (in particular, divisions of management of adaptation) with service of the organization of management. In many foreign firms this service is structurally included in system of controlling. A subject of functional interrelations between divisions of management of adaptation and the organizations of management are mainly questions of forms and principles of the organisation of work, system of introduction of innovations, etc.[4;68-69]
  • 206. Product Placement в российском книжном бизнесе
    Маркетинг

    Сам роман это сплошные бренды, марки, сорта, эпиляция ног, косметика, алкоголь. Первые 100 страниц мы ищем коричневый свитер Etro главного героя Андрея Миркина. Именно Etro. Именно коричневый. После 95-й страницы книга заинтересовывает, но мучения продолжаются. Теперь уже бренды терзают не читателя, а самого Миркина. Героя мучает мир витрин. Миркин напивается и жестоко избивает плюшевую промо-игрушку Медведа с человеком внутри. «Осталось, - мечтает он, - только трахнуть манекен в витрине ЦУМа…» Кусок этот остался за кадром, но одно понятно: страдает мужчина. Сам автор рассуждает, что эти 100 страниц подробного описания нужны, «чтобы показать бесполезность существования человека вокруг марок машин, брендов, сортов выпивки, лейблов. Это не жизнь, а рекламный журнал». Автор замечает, что для Андрея Миркина люди значат гораздо меньше, чем бренды. Вот он описывает девушку в первой главе: «Ездит Лена на шестой Mazda, взятой в кредит. Ну, это вы и без меня поняли ». Это характеристика времени. Все, понятно, с кем мы имеем дело. Если раньше мужчина на иномарке был мужчиной на иномарке, то сейчас это просто человек, на котором висит невыплаченный пятилетний кредит. Вот, например, как Миркин описывает своего друга и коллегу по группе «Московский первый» Ваню: «На Ване черная футболка, часы «Longines», прямые джинсы глубокого синего, почти черного цвета, черные кроссовки на трех липучках все «Y-3». Ваня пьет минеральную воду «Evian» и постоянно приглаживает волосы». В этом перечислении брендов нет идеи. Они заменили сущности. В какие-то моменты бренды опережают личность.

  • 207. Project of glucoamylase production by submerged cultivation of Aspergillus awamori
    Химия

    equipment scheme of the production of glucoamylase by submerged cultivation of Asp. awamori is shown on figure 6.saccharified corn mash enters collecting tank 1 from where by a centrifugal pump 2 it is pumped to the agitation tank 8 for preparation of nutrient medium. Other components for medium such as water and salts such as potassium phosphate and ammonium sulphate is supplied from collecting tank 3 are added in agitation tank 8.agitation tank components of nutrient medium is carefully mixed and рН of solution bring to 4.8 with sodium hydroxide. A medium is sterilized then, for what by a pump 9 it is given in a contact head 10, heat from 75-80 °C to 125°C, maintain in a pipe-type holder 11 during 30-40 mines and cool to 30-32 °C in surface heat-exchanger 12.sterilized and cooled medium enters fermenter 13 that is a vertical cylindrical vessel with radial aerators or with two-level turbine stirrer and bubbler for air supply.the process of filling of fermenter an excess pressure 0,25 MPа is supported in it by a steam, supplied through the air duct through an aerating device. Fillfactor of fermenter is 0,75-0,85. At its less value a volume is taken to the norm by the supply of medium from agitation tank 8 through the system of sterilization. After filling of fermenter all system is released from a medium, water is pumped and sterilize with sharp steam. A nutrient medium in fermenter is cooled to 33-35°С.fermenter medium is inoculated by the culture of molds from manifold 14. Before inoculation from fermenter take samples through the sampler for microbiological control and biochemical analyses. Inoculation is carried out through a pressing line preliminary sterilized from manifold to fermenter by sharp steam during 1 hour. For this purpose valve on an output airline of manifold close and lift in it pressure to 0,06-0,08 MPa, leaving in fermenterе pressure 0,02-0,03 MPa, whereupon open a valve on the pressing line in manifold and fermenter and in result of pressure differences inoculum from manifold is pressed into a fermenter. After this close valves on the pressing line, in fermenter drive to the rotation a stirrer and begin the process of growing of culture.pressing of all inoculum culture from manifold let the air out, open a lid and carefully wash internal surface. Then manifold is sterilized and fill with a nutrient medium for the next cycle of preparation of inoculum.medium for manifold is prepared in an agitation tank 5, equipped with a stirrer. In the beginning in agitation tank add water, then turn stirrer and gradually supply salts and corn wort and vegetable oil if necessary. Stirring of medium is made not only by a stirrer, but also as a result of its circulation by pump 6.the same pump medium is given through a contact head 7 into manifold, where it is maintained during 1,5-2 h at 125оС, cool to 33-35°C and inoculate with Asp. awamori spores, through sowing actuator acces with the maintenance of sterility and at minimum motion of air in a workshop. After inoculation open valves for inlet and outlet of air. Expense of air 30-60 m3/(m3-h), its temperature 35-40°С. Duration of cultivation 36 h.of air, supplied in manifold and fermenters, conduct as follows. Before pumping to the rotary liquid-packed ring compressor 17 air is purified from mechanical admixtures on a viscin filter 16, and after a compressor is released from moisture consequently in dehydrator 18 and moisture separator 19. The compressed and dried air is heated in heat-exchanger 20 to the temperature 60-80°C and then purify from a microflora on a general head filter 22, filled with a basaltic fibre. After a head filter air is additionally purified on individual filters 22 at manifold and 23 at fermenter, which are also filled with a basaltic fibre.filters sterilize simultaneously with manifolds and fermenters by sharp steam during 2 h at excess pressure about 0.2 - 0.3 MPa. Moisture is removed from filters by blowing air through them.cultivation of molds in fermenter temperature of nutrient medium 35 °C is supported by automatic control of water supply in the shirt of apparatus. Aeration and agitation with stirrer (frequency of rotation about 150 - 170 rotations/minute) is conducted continuously from the moment of inoculation completion and to the end of fermentation. Amount of the air supplied is 30-60 m3/(m3-h). Sampler and lower draining communication are under steam defence. Duration of the fermentation is 120-160 h.

  • 208. Project Work in Teaching English
    Иностранные языки

    Project work leads to purposeful language use because it requires personal involvement on the part of the students from the onset of a project, students, in consultation with their instructor, must decide what they will do and how they will do it, and this includes not only the content of the project, but also the language requirements. So from this point project work emerges as a practical methodology that puts into practice the fundamental principles of a communicative approach to language teaching. It can thus bring considerable benefits to our language classroom, like:

    • Increased motivation - learners become personally involved in the project.
    • All four skills, reading, writing, listening and speaking, are integrated.
    • Autonomous learning is promoted as learners become more responsible for their own learning.
    • There are learning outcomes -learners have an end product.
    • Authentic tasks and therefore the language input are more authentic.
    • Interpersonal relations are developed through working as a group.
    • Content and methodology can be decided between the learners and the teacher and within the group themselves so it is more learner centred.
    • Learners often get help from parents for project work thus involving the parent more in the child's learning. If the project is also displayed parents can see it at open days or when they pick the child up from the school.
    • A break from routine and the chance to do something different.
    • A context is established which balances the need for fluency and accuracy.[1,40]
  • 209. PR-деятельность в шоу-бизнесе: понятие, характеристика, используемые технологии (на примере группы Мумий Тролль)
    Маркетинг

    http://advertology.ru/index.php?name=Book&bid=4179369/msglist?folder=0&2051827647

    1. Липпман У. Общественное мнение. - М.: Институт фонда «Общественное мнение», 2004.
    2. Мумий Тролль. Материал из Википедии - свободной энциклопедии. [Электронный ресурс]. Режим доступа: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Мумий Тролль
    3. Пригожин И. «Политика-вершина шоу-бизнеса», Алкигамма, М.: 2001
    4. Разговор с Ильёй Лагутенко на «Радио Студии 1». [Электронный ресурс]. Режим доступа: http://www.studio1.ru/index/?node_id=1683
    5. Сайт группы Мумий Тролль: www.mumiytroll.com
    6. Сайт компании МегаФон: www.megafon.ru
    7. Сайт компании SonyEricsson: www.SonyEricsson.ru
    8. Сайт “Music Business Solutions” www.mbsolutions.com
    9. Сайт “New Media Music Business Edition” www.newmediamusic.com
    10. Сайт журнала PRonline: www.pronline.ru
    11. Слободянюк Э. PеRсональный имидж. Имиджмейкинг в системе public relations // Зеркало рекламы. - 2004. - № 5.
    12. Словарь рекламных терминов. [Электронный ресурс]. Режим доступа: http://pr-life.ru/?part=University&dictionary=1
    13. Тролль - инопланетянин. / Немзер А. // Русский репортер. 2008. №34. С.48-54.
    14. PR в шоу-бизнесе. [Электронный ресурс]. Режим доступа: http://www.pronline.ru/shownews.php?ID=220 (22.01.2004)
  • 210. PR-кампании: понятие, организация, проведение
    Маркетинг

    К средствам общественных отношений также относятся передачи на радио и телевидении, рекламирующие не услуги турфирмы, а ее достижения в социальной сфере, в деле охраны окружающей среды и т.д.

    1. Пресс-конференции осуществляются по заранее разработанному сценарию. Сценарий включает в себя следующее:
    2. презентацию гостям нового тур продукта S7 Tour;
    3. ответы представителей S7 Tour на вопросы присутствующих с рассказом об истории создания турфирмы, ее деятельности и т.д.;
    4. общение собравшихся в обстановке коктейля и дружеского ужина.
    5. Иллюстрированные рассказы это способ предоставления наиболее полной информации в печатном издании о деятельности S7 Tour.
    6. Ярмарки и другие организационные мероприятия. Данный вид воздействия на общество определен концентрацией большого числа потенциальных клиентов в одном месте. Это могут быть национальные и международные торговые ярмарки, международные конференции и конгрессы, представление туристического продукта в универсальных магазинах. Здесь все способы рекламы имеют особо важное значение. Экспонирование слайдов, показ фрагментов фильмов; демонстрация изделий местных промыслов и т.д. Удачный выбор способов рекламы играет определяющую роль в успехе данных мероприятий.
    7. Спонсорства и благотворительность запланированное вложение денежных средств в некоммерческую деятельность, в результате которого ожидается улучшение имиджа фирмы и увеличение объема продаж тур услуг. Главным критерием выбора мероприятий и объектов для спонсорства и благотворительности является их общественная значимость и известность. Престижно поддерживать, например, культуру, спорт, здоровье граждан и т.д.
  • 211. PR-кампания в туристическом агентстве как инструмент продвижения нового торгового предложения
    Маркетинг

     

    1. Алёшина И. Корпоративный имидж.Маркетинг/ Алёшина И- 2003, №1,С.50-57
    2. Батра Раджив .Региональный менеджмент./ Батра Раджив -М.;СПб.; Киев: Вильямс, 2005.-700с.
    3. Блэк С. Паблик рилэйшнз. Что это такое?/ Блэк С. -М.:Новость,2000.-240с.
    4. Борисов Б.Л. Технологии рекламы и PR./ Борисов Б.Л. М.:ФАИР-ПРЕСС, 2001.-624с.
    5. Викентьев И.Л. Приёмы рекламы и public relations.ч.1./ Викентьев И.Л. -СПб.:ООО «Приз-Шанс»:Изд. Дом «Бизнес-Пресса»,2006.-256с.
    6. Гермогенова Л.Ю. Эффективная реклама в России. Практика и рекомендации./ Гермогенова Л.Ю. -М.:Рус Партнер Лтд.,2005.-252с.
    7. Гольман И.А. Реклама плюс. Реклама минус./ Гольман И.А. М.: «Гелла-Принт», 2004.- 240 с.
    8. Гольман И.А. Рекламное планирование…/ Гольман И.А. -М.:Гемма-Принт.-2006.-320c.
    9. Дейен А. Реклама. Пер. с фр / Дейен А. ./общ. ред. В.С.Загашвиян М.:А/О издат. Группа «Прогресс», 2003.-176с.
    10. Делл Д., Учебник по рекламе./ Делл Д., Линда Г. Мн.:ИООО «Совр.слово», 2007.-320с.
    11. Катлип С.М., Паблик рилейшенз. Теория и практика,8-е изд./ Катлип С.М., Сентер А.Х., Брум Г.М. - М.: Издат. дом «Вильямс», 2001.- 624 с.
    12. Картер Гарри. Эффективная реклама: путеводитель для малого бизнеса./ Картер Гарри. -М.:Бизнес-Информ.-2008.-244с.
    13. Коган А.Ф. Реклама в малом бизнесе./ Коган А.Ф. - Харьков:ИМП «Рубикон»: РИП «Оригинал».-2004.-80с.
    14. Музыкант В.Л. Реклама: функции, цели, каналы распространения. Ч.I/ Музыкант В.Л. -М.:Изд-во МНЭПУ, 2006.-45с.
    15. Орлова Т.М. Паблик рилэйшнз и реклама в системе маркетинга.//Маркетинг в России и за рубежом/ Орлова Т.М.-1997 г., №7-8, стр. 20-29.
    16. Панкратов Ю.К.Рекламная деятельность./ Панкратов Ю.К.-М.:Информационно-внедренческий центр «Маркетинг»,2006 г.-364с.
    17. Пашенцев Е.Н. Связи с общественностью/ Пашенцев Е.Н. -М.: Дело, 2004.-271 с.
    18. Почепцов Г.Г. Паблик рилейшнз для профессионалов./ Почепцов Г.Г.- М.: «Рефл-Бук», «Ваклер» - 2003.-624с.
    19. Рожков И.Я. Реклама: планка для «профи»./ Рожков И.Я. М.: Юрайт, 2007. 208с.
    20. Росситер Д.Р. Реклама и продвижение товаров./ Росситер Д.Р. - СПб.; М.; Харьков; Минск: Питер, 2004.-651 с.
    21. Старобинский З.Е. Самоучитель по рекламе./ Старобинский З.Е. -М.: «Бизнес-школа», 2006г.-352с.
    22. Толстов Л.Н. Реклама и паблик рилейшнз: тексты, лекции./ Толстов Л.Н. -Чуваш.Ун-т, Чебоксары, 2006.-64с.
    23. Уткин Э.А. Рекламное дело: учеб./ Уткин Э.А. -ассоц. авт. и изд «Тандем».-М.: «Экмос», 2007.-271с.
    24. Ученова В.В. Реклама: палитра жанров./ Ученова В.В. -М.:РИП-холдинг, 2004.-100с.
    25. Уэллс Уильям. Реклама: теория и практика/У.Уэллс -СПб.:Питер, 2003.-735с.
    26. Феофанов О.А. Реклама: новые технологии в России./ Феофанов О.А. - М.; Харьков; Минск, 2005.- 377 с.
    27. Хромов Л.Н. Рекламная деятельность: искусство, теория, практика./ Хромов Л.Н. -Петрозаводск:АО «Фолиум», 2004.-308с.
    28. Чумиков А.М. Креативные технологии «паблик рилейшнз»./ Чумиков А.М -М.;2007
    29. Эриашвили Н.Д. Маркетинг./ Эриашвили Н.Д. -М.: ЮНИТИ, 2006. 623с.
    30. Яковлев И. Паблик рилейшнз в организациях./ Яковлев И. - СПб.,2005 г.
    31. Яновский А.Н. Влияние на потребителя с помощью непрямой рекламы // Маркетинг/ Яновский А.Н.- 2004, №6, с.50-60.
    32. Пономарёва Е. PR-кампания.// Рекламные технологии./ Пономарёва Е. -2002.-№1.С.10-12.
    33. Сорокина Е. Реклама и PR слияние или дифференциация.//Рекламные технологии./ Сорокина Е. -2005.-№2. С.25-28.
    34. Тотьмяница Ю. Исследование как фундамент PR-кампании./ Тотьмяница Ю. -Советник.-2006.-№12.-С.13-15.
    35. Тотьмяница Ю. Теперь PR можно просчитать точнее. Ещё раз об отношениях Public Relations, рекламы и маркетинга./ Тотьмяница Ю. -Советник.- 2002.-№ 2. С.24-26.
    36. Мымшец М. Как распознать успешный PR? / Мымшец М. -Советник.-2004.-№4. С.16-17.
  • 212. PR-кампания на примере Высшего учебного заведения
    Разное

     

    1. Алешина И.В. Паблик рилейшнз для менеджеров: Курс лекций.-М.:ЭКМОС, 2002.-480 с.
    2. Багиев Г.А. Маркетинг. Информационное обеспечение. Бенчмаркинг. СПб.: СПбУЭиФ, 1998.-380с.
    3. Бортник Е.М. Управление связями с общественностью: Учеб. пособие.-М.: ФБК-Пресс, 2002.-128с.
    4. Василенко А.Б. ПИАР крупных российский корпораций. М.: ГУ-ВШЭ, 2001.
    5. Дашевская О. В. Внутренний PR. Профессиональные рекомендации / Особенности корпоративного PR. М.: Квадрат, 2002.
    6. Калиберда Е.Г. Связи с общественностью: вводный курс: Учеб. пособие.-М.: Логос,2003.-120с.
    7. Катлип Скотт М., Сетнер Ален Х. Брум Глен М..Паблик рилейшнз: Теория и практика / Пер. с англ.-8-е изд.-М.: Вильямс, 2001.- 624с.
    8. Королько В. Основы паблик рилейшнз: Учебник .-М.: Рефл-бук, 2001.-528с.
    9. Моисеев В.А. Паблик рилейшнз средство социальной коммуникации: Теория и практика.- Киев: Дакор, 2002.-506с.
    10. Ньюсом Д. Все о PR: Теория и практика паблик рилейшнз / Пер. с англ..-7-е изд.-М.: Инфра-М,2001.- 628с.
    11. Почепцов Г.Г. Паблик рилейшнз, или как успешно управлять общественным мнением.-2-е изд., испр. и доп.-М.: Центр, 2003.-320с.
    12. Сборник нормативных актов, регулирующих деятельность в области печати и телерадиовещания и средств массовых коммуникаций. М., 2000.
    13. Синяева И.М., Земляк С.В. Развитие PR в системе бенчмаркинга//Маркетинг.- 2000. - №4
    14. Управление общественными отношениями: Учебник/ Под общ. ред. В.С. Комаровского.-М.: Изд-во РАГС, 2003.-400с.
    15. Уткин Э.А. Управление связями с общественностью: PR.-М.: Теис, 2001.-296с.
    16. Хейвуд Р. Все о Public Relation: Как добиться успеха в бизнесе, используя связи с общественностью / Пер. с англ. М.: Лаб. Базовых знаний, 1999.-232с.
    17. Чумиков А.Н., Бочаров М.П. Связи с общественностью. Теория и практика: Учебное пособие. М.: Дело, 2003. 496с.
    18. Интернет сервис: http:// www.regionpr.ru/
    19. Интернет сервис: http:// www.wciom.ru/
    20. Интернет сервис: http:// www.rupr.ru/
    21. Интернет сервис: http:// www.mgou.infanet.ru/
    22. Интернет сервис: http://www.rian.ru/
  • 213. PR-подготовка призыва в вооруженные силы Российской Федерации
    Разное

    В военной среде существует следующий термин, актуальный, впрочем, и для государства в целом, морально-психологическое обеспечение. На государственном уровне он представляет собой комплекс согласованных мероприятий, проводимых государством и военным руководством, органами военного управления, должностными лицами армии и флота в целях достижения такого морально-психологического состояния личного состава и населения, который необходим для выполнения задач, поставленных в мирное время и достижения победы в войне (конфликте). На этом уровне МПО охватывает политический, экономический, военный аспекты и осуществляется всеми государственными и военными организациями, командирами, штабами и организациями воспитательной работы с активным использованием СМИ, достижений науки, литературы и искусства, других возможностей воздействия на сознание и поведение населения страны. Таким образом, всё гражданское население страны, а особенно та его часть, которая составляет мобилизационные ресурсы ВС, должна рассматриваться как целевая аудитория мероприятий по связям с общественностью, проводимых военным и государственным аппаратом. Каждому гражданину должна быть понятна идея защиты Отечества, смысл военной службы. Каждый военнослужащий должен понимать и вырабатывать в себе такие элементы: дисциплина, боевой дух, воля к победе, самообладание, чувство собственного достоинства, честность, преданность воинскому долгу, чувство солдатской и воинской чести. Только общество, сам народ могут придать армии соответствующую духовную энергию. В настоящее время катастрофически нарастает бездуховность и безнравственность. Отечественной культуре, истории, нашим нравам и обычаям, вековой мудрости народов России противопоставляется культ насилия, мести, цинизма, откровенного невежества и глупости. Девальвируются такие понятия как долг, честь, служба Отечеству, другие составляющие мотивации военной службы. Среди значительной части населения, особенно молодёжи, растут экстремистские, националистические, антиармейские настроения. Мировоззренческий, идеологический, морально-психологический кризис, в котором оказалась Россия, реальная угроза её будущему, её государственности, положению и роли в мировой цивилизации. Если общество и государственные власти не формируют в народе чувство любви и уважения к военному человеку, плохо заботятся об армии (а кое-кто из политических деятелей и представителей СМИ считает её обузой для государства), то такое общество и такая власть никогда не смогут вдохновить воинов на подвиг, а значит, и не вправе ждать от них побед. Всё это свидетельствует о необходимости коренных перемен в отношении государственных органов, СМИ к ВС, усиления работы по формированию в народе, особенно у молодёжи патриотического сознания, понимания важности военной службы и готовности к защите Отечества, развития и укрепления единства армии и народа.

  • 214. PR-технологии в гостиничном бизнесе
    Медицина, физкультура, здравоохранение

    Жесткая конкуренция на рынке гостиничных услуг вынуждает менеджеров прибегать к различным PR-технологиям. Как правило, серьезные PR акции проводятся отелями, входящими в гостиничную цепь и финансируемыми иностранными инвесторами. Борясь с пережитками прошлого, приходится конструировать новый образ, отвечающий требованиям рынка. Нехватка финансовых ресурсов определенно тормозит осуществление PR деятельности. Не все гостиницы способны выделить необходимые для работы в этом направлении средства и прибегнуть к помощи специализированных PR агентств. На практике в этом направлении работают 2-3 человека в зависимости от величины отеля. Именно поэтому хочется отметить, что PR в гостиничном бизнесе - еще неосвоенная, многогранная и исключительно перспективная сфера. Задача PR состоит в том, чтобы наладить взаимопонимание, положительное отношение и доверие клиента к предложению предприятия гостинично-туристского бизнеса на длительную перспективу. Речь идет о формирование в глазах общественности положительного имиджа, хорошей репутации и уважения к предприятию. В настоящее время в отеле "де Пари" сложилось противоречие между многообразием ПР технологий на современном рынке гостиничного бизнеса города Екатеринбурга и не использование их в достаточном количестве. Актуальность и выявленное противоречие позволили сформулировать тему дипломной работы: "Использование PR-технологий для повышения лояльности потребителей в гостиничном бизнесе (на примере отеля "де Пари")". Проблемой, поставленной при исследовании является поиск современных методов продвижения отеля "де Пари" для повышения лояльности потребителя, отсутствие обратной связи между руководством отеля "де Пари" и гостями отеля.

  • 215. PR-технологии в деятельности МЧС по Свердловской области как органа государственной власти
    Юриспруденция, право, государство

    «Паблик рилейшнз» побуждает людей верить в сердечные, добропорядочные цели организации, показывается, как те в свою очередь ищут доверия и доверительных отношений с публикой, общественностью». Ситуация, сложившаяся на российском рынке PR, позволяет условно разделить функционирующие на нем фирмы на две группы: специализирующиеся на политическом PR и коммерческом. Третье направление - государственный PR - в нашей стране практически не развито. По оценкам самих фирм доля государственных заказов составляет всего 3-5 % (за вычетом выборных кампаний). В качестве первой причины выступает отсутствие финансовых ресурсов у государства на подобную деятельность, отсутствие в бюджете страны строчки, касающейся "информационной поддержки". Данную ситуацию можно преодолеть, привлекая вместе с заинтересованными ведомствами внебюджетные источники. Другая причина - неготовность специализированных PR- агентств переориентироваться. По оценкам аналитических центров в ближайшее 3-4 года ожидается увеличение количества предложений по PR - поддержке экономической деятельности государства. Правительственным структурам нужны информационные кампании по пропаганде принимаемых решений. Если в 2003 году информационная кампания в поддержку приватизации рассматривалась как уникальное событие в экономической жизни государства, за ее реализацию давали государственные премии, то в настоящее время подобных кампаний, но несколько меньшего масштаба, в стране проходит 5-6 в год.

  • 216. Public Relations в ОАО "Мегафон"
    Маркетинг

    Деятельность службы PR направлена на:

    • Подготовку спикера к публичному выступлению перед журналистами и другими аудиториями.
    • Взаимодействие со СМИ по текущей деятельности компании (пресс-конференции, мероприятия, комментарии, интервью, etc.). Согласование комментариев для прессы.
    • Организация и информационная поддержка выступления спикера на конференциях, круглых столах.
    • Предоставление актуальной информации о компании.
    • Предоставление свежей аналитической информации о рынке сотовой связи.
    • Коммуникации со СМИ во время кризисных ситуаций.
    • Подготовка информационных корпоративных материалов (новостные сообщения, пресс-релизы, статьи, презентации, буклеты, корпоративные фильмы, подкасты, etc.).
    • Участие компании в ассоциациях, рейтингах.
    • PR-поддержка выхода компании в новые регионы, страны.
    • Проведение мониторинга и аналитика СМИ, возможность проведения мониторинга любой интересующей темы по запросу.
    • Оказание благотворительной помощи нуждающимся (Благотворительный Комитет).
    • Публичнаяпрезентация проектов компаниина внутренних и внешних встречах.
    • Реализация социальной политики Компании.
  • 217. Recruitment and selection
    Менеджмент

    %20is%20not%20experienced%20enough%20in%20the%20techniques%20of%20the%20job%20market%20analysis%20<http://hrmadvice.com/hrmadvice/hr-processes/recruitment-and-selection/external-recruitment/job-market-analysis.html>%20and%20the%20money%20invested%20in%20the%20job%20brand%20name%20can%20be%20lost%20easily.the%20HRM%20Function%20has%20no%20proper%20arguments%20for%20the%20job%20advertisement%20campaigns,%20the%20HRM%20Function%20operates%20with%20a%20limited%20recruitment%20advertisement%20budget%20and%20the%20impact%20can%20be%20very%20low,%20which%20leads%20the%20organization%20to%20decide%20about%20canceling%20the%20job%20advertisement.%20In%20reality,%20the%20critical%20mass%20was%20not%20reached%20to%20make%20a%20huge%20impact%20on%20the%20job%20market.%20The%20HR%20Marketing%20has%20to%20be%20strengthened%20to%20deliver%20the%20right%20arguments%20to%20support%20the%20external%20recruitment%20process.organizations%20tend%20to%20spend%20their%20external%20job%20recruitment%20advertisement%20campaigns%20at%20the%20same%20time.%20As%20the%20budgets%20are%20limited,%20the%20impact%20and%20the%20success%20rate%20of%20the%20advertisement%20campaigns%20is%20limited.%20The%20HR%20Marketing%20and%20HRM%20Recruiters%20should%20find%20the%20best%20time%20to%20advertise%20the%20job%20vacancies%20with%20the%20organization.%20The%20organization%20should%20differ%20itself%20from%20the%20others%20on%20the%20job%20market%20to%20be%20the%20winner.successful%20recruitment%20process%20is%20also%20about%20targeting%20the%20right%20target%20group%20of%20the%20potential%20best%20job%20candidates.%20The%20HRM%20Function%20without%20a%20proper%20measurement%20can%20invest%20huge%20amounts%20of%20money%20to%20the%20recruitment%20channels,%20which%20do%20not%20work%20for%20the%20organization.%20The%20recruitment%20measurement%20<http://hrmadvice.com/hrmadvice/hr-processes/recruitment-and-selection/external-recruitment/basic-external-recruitment-measures.html>%20can%20help%20a%20lot%20in%20targeting%20the%20job%20advertisement%20to%20attract%20the%20right%20potential.of%20the%20Recruitmentrecruitment%20process%20is%20not%20cheap%20for%20the%20organization.%20The%20HRM%20Function%20reports%20the%20cost%20of%20the%20external%20recruitment%20agencies,%20but%20the%20real%20cost%20of%20the%20recruitment%20process%20is%20more%20significant%20for%20the%20organization.visible%20cost%20of%20the%20external%20recruitment%20is%20about%20the%20invoices%20from%20the%20recruitment%20agencies%20and%20external%20job%20websites,%20but%20the%20internal%20damages%20and%20costs%20of%20the%20vacancy%20can%20be%20much%20higher%20to%20the%20organization.organization%20usually%20decides%20about%20the%20acceptable%20cost%20of%20the%20vacancy%20and%20it%20does%20not%20have%20to%20be%20expressed,%20but%20it%20can%20be%20tolerated.%20Many%20organizations%20decide%20to%20pay%20a%20lower%20salary%20and%20they%20accept%20the%20cost%20of%20the%20vacancy%20and%20the%20managers%20have%20to%20agree%20with%20that.organization%20makes%20a%20decision%20about%20the%20lost%20additional%20income%20each%20vacancy%20could%20produce.%20This%20is%20more%20easy%20for%20the%20sales%20function%20to%20have%20a%20clear%20work%20about%20the%20real%20damage%20made%20to%20the%20sales%20function,%20for%20the%20supporting%20staff%20the%20calculation%20is%20much%20heavier%20as%20the%20other%20members%20of%20the%20team%20can%20produce%20almost%20the%20same%20result.%20The%20most%20visible%20damage%20is%20the%20error%20rate%20of%20the%20team.organization%20decides%20by%20the%20proper%20setting%20of%20the%20compensation%20policy%20about%20the%20potential%20cost%20of%20the%20recruitment.%20The%20organization%20makes%20a%20decision%20between%20the%20visible%20cost%20of%20the%20external%20recruitment%20and%20invisible%20costs%20of%20the%20vacancy%20in%20the%20organization.Recruitment%20Benefitsinternal%20recruitment%20process%20has%20a%20lot%20of%20benefits%20and%20it%20is%20always%20difficult%20to%20decide%20whether%20to%20use%20internal%20or%20external%20recruitment%20process%20<http://hrmadvice.com/hrmadvice/hr-processes/recruitment-and-selection/internal-or-external-recruitment.html>.%20The%20internal%20recruitment%20is%20a%20right%20recruitment%20process%20for%20the%20large%20organization,%20which%20promote%20friendliness%20in%20their%20corporate%20culture.corporate%20culture%20<http://hrmadvice.com/hrmadvice/hr-strategy/corporate-culture.html>,%20which%20supports%20the%20employees%20to%20look%20for%20the%20opportunities%20in%20the%20organization,%20is%20well%20designed%20for%20the%20internal%20recruitment%20process%20and%20the%20process%20can%20be%20a%20big%20benefit%20for%20the%20organization.%20The%20corporate%20culture,%20which%20is%20focused%20on%20a%20strong%20competition%20among%20employees%20and%20with%20the%20external%20environment,%20this%20corporate%20culture%20does%20not%20support%20the%20internal%20recruitment%20process.corporate%20culture%20should%20drive%20the%20decision%20process.%20In%20case%20of%20two%20candidates%20for%20the%20position,%20the%20corporate%20culture%20should%20navigate%20the%20HRM%20Function%20and%20the%20hiring%20manager%20to%20decide%20correctly%20about%20the%20winning%20job%20candidate.%20The%20corporate%20culture%20has%20to%20provide%20a%20guidance%20for%20the%20last%20decision%20about%20the%20winning%20candidate.cost%20side%20is%20a%20clear%20internal%20recruitment%20benefit.%20The%20internal%20recruitment%20can%20be%20quicker%20and%20cheaper%20than%20the%20external%20recruitment.%20The%20employee%20who%20works%20with%20the%20organization%20usually%20does%20not%20ask%20a%20huge%20salary%20and%20is%20available%20for%20a%20transfer%20much%20quicker.internal%20recruitment%20benefit%20is%20a%20smaller%20pressure%20for%20the%20compensation%20and%20benefits.%20The%20moving%20employees%20get%20promoted%20and%20they%20do%20not%20press%20for%20a%20higher%20salary%20for%20just%20being%20with%20the%20organization.Recruitment%20Process%20WeaknessesInternal%20Recruitment%20Process%20does%20not%20have%20just%20benefits,%20this%20process%20has%20some%20disadvantages%20as%20well.%20The%20Internal%20Recruitment%20Process%20is%20a%20very%20powerful%20tool,%20but%20it%20can%20be%20misused%20in%20hands%20of%20some%20employees%20and%20managers.Internal%20Recruitment%20Process%20is%20not%20a%20process%20to%20steal%20the%20best%20employees%20from%20their%20departments.%20These%20employees%20should%20be%20treated%20as%20a%20very%20scarce%20resource%20and%20the%20internal%20recruitment%20procedures%20should%20work%20differently%20for%20them.managers%20use%20the%20internal%20recruitment%20process%20as%20a%20tool%20to%20transfer%20their%20own%20issues%20to%20the%20other%20departments.%20This%20is%20very%20dangerous%20as%20other%20managers%20will%20not%20trust%20the%20internal%20recruitment%20process%20and%20will%20block%20the%20ambitions%20of%20employees%20to%20be%20transferred.employees%20can%20misuse%20the%20internal%20recruitment%20process,%20when%20there%20are%20no%20clear%20rules%20and%20procedures%20applied.%20The%20organization%20can%20support%20internal%20rotations%20of%20employees,%20but%20the%20rules%20must%20be%20clear%20about%20the%20length%20of%20the%20stay%20of%20the%20employee%20in%20one%20department.employee%20can%20enjoy%20the%20benefit%20of%20quick%20internal%20job%20hopping%20and%20the%20results%20achieved%20are%20very%20difficult%20to%20be%20recognized%20by%20the%20organization.%20No%20manager%20is%20able%20to%20make%20a%20full%20performance%20appraisal%20as%20the%20whole%20year%20in%20one%20department%20is%20unique%20then.%20The%20employee%20is%20just%20focused%20on%20his%20or%20her%20promotion%20in%20the%20organization%20and%20the%20salary%20can%20be%20increased%20in%20every%20step.internal%20recruitment%20can%20be%20sometimes%20taken%20as%20an%20obligatory%20option%20by%20the%20organization.%20The%20employees%20suppose%20to%20be%20first%20in%20the%20queue%20before%20any%20applicant%20from%20the%20external%20job%20market.%20But%20this%20approach%20is%20very%20dangerous%20for%20the%20organization.%20The%20external%20candidates%20bring%20know%20how%20and%20external%20knowledge,%20which%20can%20help%20to%20the%20organization%20to%20perform%20even%20better.internal%20recruitment%20process%20cannot%20solve%20all%20the%20recruitment%20issues%20in%20the%20organization,%20but%20there%20should%20be%20a%20right%20mixture%20of%20the%20internal%20and%20external%20recruitment%20to%20keep%20the%20organization%20in%20a%20healthy%20shaInternal%20versus%20External%20Job%20Candidateselection%20of%20the%20winning%20internal%20or%20external%20job%20candidate%20is%20a%20common%20dilemma%20of%20the%20internal%20recruitment%20process.%20Many%20times,%20the%20external%20and%20the%20internal%20final%20candidates%20compete%20for%20the%20job%20position.%20The%20HRM%20Function%20and%20the%20hiring%20manager%20have%20to%20make%20a%20correct%20decision.efficient%20internal%20recruitment%20needs%20clear%20rules%20for%20the%20decision%20about%20the%20winning%20candidate.%20The%20organization%20has%20to%20clearly%20define%20the%20condition%20for%20the%20final%20decision%20based%20on%20the%20corporate%20culture%20and%20habits%20inside%20the%20organization.corporate%20culture%20should%20be%20the%20main%20driver%20of%20the%20final%20decision.%20The%20internal%20candidate%20has%20to%20be%20sure%20about%20the%20evaluation%20not%20to%20become%20de-motivated.%20The%20clear%20rules%20for%20the%20preference%20of%20the%20internal%20candidate%20over%20the%20external%20candidate%20will%20help%20to%20set%20the%20clear%20expectations.common%20rule%20is%20the%20">The HRM Function usually has a lack of the job market knowledge and the organization suffer from the bad competition on the job market. The organization usually know excellently the market with its products and services, but they lack the knowledge about the job market and they do not use proper marketing channels to bring the best job potential to the organization. The HR Marketing <http://hrmadvice.com/hrmadvice/hr-marketing.html> is not experienced enough in the techniques of the job market analysis <http://hrmadvice.com/hrmadvice/hr-processes/recruitment-and-selection/external-recruitment/job-market-analysis.html> and the money invested in the job brand name can be lost easily.the HRM Function has no proper arguments for the job advertisement campaigns, the HRM Function operates with a limited recruitment advertisement budget and the impact can be very low, which leads the organization to decide about canceling the job advertisement. In reality, the critical mass was not reached to make a huge impact on the job market. The HR Marketing has to be strengthened to deliver the right arguments to support the external recruitment process.organizations tend to spend their external job recruitment advertisement campaigns at the same time. As the budgets are limited, the impact and the success rate of the advertisement campaigns is limited. The HR Marketing and HRM Recruiters should find the best time to advertise the job vacancies with the organization. The organization should differ itself from the others on the job market to be the winner.successful recruitment process is also about targeting the right target group of the potential best job candidates. The HRM Function without a proper measurement can invest huge amounts of money to the recruitment channels, which do not work for the organization. The recruitment measurement <http://hrmadvice.com/hrmadvice/hr-processes/recruitment-and-selection/external-recruitment/basic-external-recruitment-measures.html> can help a lot in targeting the job advertisement to attract the right potential.of the Recruitmentrecruitment process is not cheap for the organization. The HRM Function reports the cost of the external recruitment agencies, but the real cost of the recruitment process is more significant for the organization.visible cost of the external recruitment is about the invoices from the recruitment agencies and external job websites, but the internal damages and costs of the vacancy can be much higher to the organization.organization usually decides about the acceptable cost of the vacancy and it does not have to be expressed, but it can be tolerated. Many organizations decide to pay a lower salary and they accept the cost of the vacancy and the managers have to agree with that.organization makes a decision about the lost additional income each vacancy could produce. This is more easy for the sales function to have a clear work about the real damage made to the sales function, for the supporting staff the calculation is much heavier as the other members of the team can produce almost the same result. The most visible damage is the error rate of the team.organization decides by the proper setting of the compensation policy about the potential cost of the recruitment. The organization makes a decision between the visible cost of the external recruitment and invisible costs of the vacancy in the organization.Recruitment Benefitsinternal recruitment process has a lot of benefits and it is always difficult to decide whether to use internal or external recruitment process <http://hrmadvice.com/hrmadvice/hr-processes/recruitment-and-selection/internal-or-external-recruitment.html>. The internal recruitment is a right recruitment process for the large organization, which promote friendliness in their corporate culture.corporate culture <http://hrmadvice.com/hrmadvice/hr-strategy/corporate-culture.html>, which supports the employees to look for the opportunities in the organization, is well designed for the internal recruitment process and the process can be a big benefit for the organization. The corporate culture, which is focused on a strong competition among employees and with the external environment, this corporate culture does not support the internal recruitment process.corporate culture should drive the decision process. In case of two candidates for the position, the corporate culture should navigate the HRM Function and the hiring manager to decide correctly about the winning job candidate. The corporate culture has to provide a guidance for the last decision about the winning candidate.cost side is a clear internal recruitment benefit. The internal recruitment can be quicker and cheaper than the external recruitment. The employee who works with the organization usually does not ask a huge salary and is available for a transfer much quicker.internal recruitment benefit is a smaller pressure for the compensation and benefits. The moving employees get promoted and they do not press for a higher salary for just being with the organization.Recruitment Process WeaknessesInternal Recruitment Process does not have just benefits, this process has some disadvantages as well. The Internal Recruitment Process is a very powerful tool, but it can be misused in hands of some employees and managers.Internal Recruitment Process is not a process to steal the best employees from their departments. These employees should be treated as a very scarce resource and the internal recruitment procedures should work differently for them.managers use the internal recruitment process as a tool to transfer their own issues to the other departments. This is very dangerous as other managers will not trust the internal recruitment process and will block the ambitions of employees to be transferred.employees can misuse the internal recruitment process, when there are no clear rules and procedures applied. The organization can support internal rotations of employees, but the rules must be clear about the length of the stay of the employee in one department.employee can enjoy the benefit of quick internal job hopping and the results achieved are very difficult to be recognized by the organization. No manager is able to make a full performance appraisal as the whole year in one department is unique then. The employee is just focused on his or her promotion in the organization and the salary can be increased in every step.internal recruitment can be sometimes taken as an obligatory option by the organization. The employees suppose to be first in the queue before any applicant from the external job market. But this approach is very dangerous for the organization. The external candidates bring know how and external knowledge, which can help to the organization to perform even better.internal recruitment process cannot solve all the recruitment issues in the organization, but there should be a right mixture of the internal and external recruitment to keep the organization in a healthy shaInternal versus External Job Candidateselection of the winning internal or external job candidate is a common dilemma of the internal recruitment process. Many times, the external and the internal final candidates compete for the job position. The HRM Function and the hiring manager have to make a correct decision.efficient internal recruitment needs clear rules for the decision about the winning candidate. The organization has to clearly define the condition for the final decision based on the corporate culture and habits inside the organization.corporate culture should be the main driver of the final decision. The internal candidate has to be sure about the evaluation not to become de-motivated. The clear rules for the preference of the internal candidate over the external candidate will help to set the clear expectations.common rule is the winner takes it all. This rule can be applied in the organizations focused on the internal and external competition. The organization makes no difference between internal and external candidates. This approach looks fair to the employees, but it can bring a lot of confusion as the employees feel no preference of the internal and existing employees and they feel no interest of the organization in their own personal career development.

  • 218. Reminiscences of Janet A. Mattei, former director of the American Associations of Variable Star Observers (AAVSO)
    Иностранные языки

    Janet also faced some fairly intimidating technical challenges as well as the early administrative and political problems. One type of request from professional astronomers for technical support seemed to her to offer exceptional opportunities, coordinating observing programs with orbiting observatories. Professional astronomers managing orbiting observatories needed both predictions of events in cataclysmic variables (CVs) and real-time alerts when a brightening did occur. With some help from John Bortle, Janet quickly became skilled in predicting eruptions. By recruiting observers to provide real-time alerts and by making herself available to receive their notification calls at all hours of the day and night, Janet fashioned an active support program that continues to function well to this day. Her success in this program was largely responsible for the increased awareness and acceptance of the AAVSO within the professional community that we now enjoy. France Cordova announced to the world at the 1979 AAVSO annual meeting that an SS Cygni maximum that had been predicted by Janet, and then detected by AAVSO observers, had been observed in X-rays-the first time the observation of X-rays coincided with a transient event in a visually observed astronomical object. No one who was present will likely forget the electrifying excitement felt by proud AAVSO members, most of all by Janet, when that announcement was made.

  • 219. Remote Access Server, удаленный доступ модема к серверу
    Компьютеры, программирование

    Remote Access Server, удаленный доступ модема к серверу

  • 220. Russian Foreign Policy
    Экономика

    after the collapse of the Soviet Union a young Russian diplomacy could not boast with the experience of designing doctrines regarding international policies. The first conceptual constructions in the area of foreign policy were in fact derived from the theoretical framework that was available in the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. Of course, it was necessary to change the words and ideas in order to form a decent policy. But it was easier than to change the logic of professionals and politically active public, which had been educated largely on the basis of a Soviet model. Perhaps this is why the ideological baggage of the first generation of Russian foreign policy doctrine is a reinterpretation of a selected Soviet ideas regarding this matter. First of all, there were two ideas: one of Lenin's time, the second from Gorbachev's era. The first thesis, adopted by the new Russian government and easily assimilated by the public, sounded as "the provision of a favorable international environment for building democracy in Russia" (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation," 1992 / / Foreign and Security Policy of Contemporary Russia (1991-1998). Chrestomathy in two volumes. T. 2. Documents / Comp. TA Shaklein. Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1999. P. 17, 21). He was in tune with the way Lenin proclaimed the main goal of foreign policy of Soviet Russia as fostering external conditions for the construction of socialism in the country. The second point was less archaic, but it also had not been innovative. It continued the logic of the "new political thinking" of M. Gorbachev the integral part of which was the idea of universal values. But while for the new political thinking the principal value has been the survival of humanity and its salvation from nuclear war, the new thinking "in Yeltsin's work" was regarded as universal interest assigned to the democratization of the world. It was assumed that this democratization is attainable through joint efforts of all democratic countries and since year 1991 Russia has reckoned itself as such kind of country. From this work the idea of "democratic solidarity" had emerged which had been worked as modern and natural reinterpretation of well understood by the Russians old Soviet concept of "socialist internationalism." This phenomenon was interpreted in the USSR as the doctrine of the common historical destiny and the fundamental interests of socialist countries. Similarly, the "democratic solidarity" was pictured as an attractive hypothesis with the idea that all democratic countries (including Russia) will act in solidarity, with regard for one another, as befits the states with common interests. The idea of a favorable external environment for the sake of building democracy was more pragmatic. Hypothesis about solidarity of actions has been more impregnated with ideology. On the level of practice both of them intertwined. But once accustomed to perceive the world primarily through the prism of ideology, as was customary in the Soviet Union, the new leaders of Russia (Boris Yeltsin's entourage and the president himself) exaggerated the role of solidarity with the West, seeing it as a tool to ensure a favorable international environment. The latter required the new regime to survive, the destruction of the Soviet system and the creation instead of it some version of the democratic system. Diplomacy of early 1990s had to solve complex problems. It had to build a new Russia in a dramatically changed international environment, trying to minimize the inevitable losses. Thus occurred a difficult political and psychological problem. The Soviet Union acted as a unique actor and the main force opposing "global capitalism" on the world stage. New Russia had to master the role of a regular actor among democratic countries. Soviet citizens had been accustomed to believe that they live in "the world's first country of triumphant socialism." This was an important component of self-esteem for Soviet citizens, the foundation of its foreign policy ideology and notions of "universal and historical mission" of the Soviet Union as the leader of world communism. Nationals of the new Russia could not think anything of that kind with regard to their country. The new democratic environment, in which the Russian Federation was trying to "fit" has already had its own leader and its own "Messiah." The United States, like the Soviet Union, also saw themselves as a unique country - "the world's first victorious state of freedom" and "leader of world democracy." The balance of powers that existed between Moscow and Washington in the early 1990s, the problem of their rivalry in any sense, could not stand in the current environment. A key line of behavior of Russian diplomacy was "leveling" of the its positions on international issues with the positions of the US and Western Europe, which together with the reunited Germany in the 1992 officially proclaimed themselves as the European Union. The period 1992-1993 has been an amazing time. The Russian government has avoided to clearly indicate its national interests regarding foreign policy, identifying them with those of democratic countries, "the world community of democracies" in general. "Moscow strongly urged international partners - in spite of their lack of confidence - to recognize that support for the initiatives of the Western countries is the main foreign policy goal of the Russian Federation. A typical figure in this respect was the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Kozyrev". (Kozyrev, A. Partnership Strategy / / Foreign and Security Policy of Contemporary Russia (1991-1998). Chrestomathy in two volumes. T. 1. Book. 1 / Comp. TA Shaklein. Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1999. P. 150-166). The logic of his foreign policy, based on the line of "democratic solidarity", is most clearly manifested in the behavior of Moscow during the initial period of the disintegration of Yugoslavia (1991-1992). Russia unreservedly supported the formation of new independent states on the territory of former federation - first Slovenia and Croatia, and then - Bosnia and Macedonia. Moscow declared its diplomatic recognition of new governments of the former Yugoslavia together with the European Union, and before such declaration had been made by the United States. It is significant that Washington did not hurry with a decision concerning the recognition of new states, assessing possible complications in the case of anticipated opposition from Moscow and a potential war on the Balkans. Refusal of Russia to support the central government in Belgrade against the separatist Croatia and Slovenia was a surprise to many Western diplomats. But Russian leaders had their own logic. Having come to power under the banner of "self-determination of Russia from the USSR", feeling vulnerable to charges of aiding and abetting separatism in general, Boris Yeltsin sought to prove their strength and integrity. The actions of Russian diplomacy on the Balkans in the early 1990s had to demonstrate the consistent support of Moscow's principle of "right of nations for self-determination" applicable to all situations within the former Soviet Union and beyond. Within the country at this time the Russian government has led a risky game with the separatists, using them against a large part of the "pre Yeltsin" Soviet party and state elite, which kept the power in the Russian regions and did not trust Boris Yeltsin. Therefore, local nationalists seized power in autumn 1991 in Chechnya with such ease, and were trying to repeat the success in other republics of Northern Caucasus and the Volga region. The policy of decentralization, part of which was an extremely liberal interpretation of the principle of "right of nations to self-determination", in fact, helped Boris Yeltsin. Because of it regional elite, autonomous republics and economically prosperous regions of Russia eventually not only provided political support for the president, but also provided the necessary material resources in exchange for recognition by the federal government of their rights and privileges (including tax relief), which together led to a redistribution of power in Russia between the center and the regions in favor of the latter. Russian foreign policy in this regard and during this period was a reflection and extension of the interior one. By destroying the Soviet system in the country, the Russian government without regret has helped to break the remains of the old international order. The latter seemed to be part of the heritage of the Soviet Union from which they could safely get rid of, bearing in mind that every step in the destruction of this heritage in the Moscow interpreted as evidence of its commitment to solidarity with the West. Meantime, in the U.S and the EU the debate unfolded regarding a new world order and global democratic society. Being immersed in the internal turmoil in the first half of the 1990s, Russia could not pursue an active foreign policy. And it was not trying to do so. The growth of the U.S. presence in Eastern Europe (Central-Eastern Europe) and the former Soviet Union did not cause any protest or opposition. Russia not only expressed no concern about the proclaimed in September 1993 American concept of "expanding democracy", but welcomed it wrongly assuming that the program would bring her a direct financial benefit. This concept has proclaimed the most important foreign policy challenge of the United States to support democratic reforms and building democracy in the former socialist countries of Europe. Theoretically, this also included Russia, although in fact, virtually all U.S. assistance towards establishing democracy was addressed to former "Warsaw Pact" countries completely disregarding Russia. Just as an aid to Western Europe under the Marshall Plan in 1947 was intended to create binding of Western European countries to the U.S., the concept of "spread democracy" was supposed to solve (and it in fact did) this task in relation to the former Eastern European socialist countries. It has contributed to the total destruction of their economic, cultural and other ties with Moscow. Countries in the region shifted in economic terms to the interaction with the European Union, and in the political and military - in cooperation with the United States. The United States became the most influential political force in this part of the world, "intercepting " the role from the "old" European leaders - France and Germany. As a result of the concept of "expanding democracy" Russia has not received anything. However, the loyalty that it showed towards the U.S. activities in Eastern Europe, that meekness with which it perceived its exclusion from this part of the world, brought some of the winnings. U.S. and EU countries supported the requests of Moscow to the international financial institutions - the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Large-scale borrowing from these institutions have been in those days an important condition for the economic survival of Russia, which since 1992 as a result of "shock therapy" of the Government of Yegor Gaidar was in a situation close to economic collapse. Characteristically, by providing concessional assistance to the Eastern European countries, the Western countries did not provide similar benefits to Russia. The financial and economic assistance was delivered to it on the usual conditions. For such a choice of the West there were several reasons. Firstly, it was important to complete the reform of small and medium-sized ex-socialist countries as quickly as possible and with the predominance of Western aid. Secondly, it was in the interests of international creditors to impose the large financial commitment upon Russia, interest on which, together with the principal sum had to substantially exceed the original loan amount. Lending to Russia does not seem a risky investment for international experts taking into account the export potential of its energy. Thirdly, accepted obligations to loans by Russia had given the international institutions levers of influence on the economic policy of the Russian government. IMF and the World Bank provided funds on such harsh conditions, that lenders have had the opportunity to control the actions of the borrowing country. The first half of the 1990s - is the time not only of the collapse of relations with former socialist countries, but also with the states of the Arab East, South Asia, Africa and Latin America. Russia 'left' part of the world - especially from those countries which where connected with military-political cooperation and geopolitical ambitions of the Soviet Union upon global leadership. This kind of diplomatic retreat has been explained in the country as a need for better use of scarce foreign policy resources. Outside Russia, this line was presented as a conscious move away from unnecessary rivalry with the West at the points that had no significance for Russian interests, but had a value, for example, for the interests of the United States and the EU (Latin America, Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa). This period is connected with an important, meaningful innovation at that time. For the first time in history the subject of official bilateral discussions at the international level was the internal politics of Russia. The Soviet Union has always firmly adhered to the principle not to discuss the international negotiations regarding issues of domestic policy. All the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence contained provisions on the right of each country to choose its own version of the political system. This principle has been enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, and many other international documents. n June 1992, Moscow took a step toward the demise of this principle position. During the visit of Boris Yeltsin to Washington the Charter of the Russian-American partnership and friendship was signed. In the preamble and several parts of this doctrine have been specified the principles which the Russian government intended to follow upon the conduct of domestic policy which stated its willingness to support the United States. These principles were identified as "democracy, freedom, human rights, respect for minority rights, including the national ones" (The Charter of the Russian-American partnership and friendship / / Foreign and Security Policy of Contemporary Russia (1991-1998). Chrestomathy in two volumes. T. 2. Documents / Comp. Tatyana Shakleina. Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1999. P. 442-443, 447). This was the first time in Russian history, when the document concluded with a foreign state, regulated provisions relating to public order and internal affairs of Russia. The Charter was a "code of conduct" to which the Russian government pledged to follow. In fact, Moscow has agreed to recognize behind the United States a right to be an informal arbiter in the evaluation of the Russian reforms. The literature sources has featured the phrase "homework" of Russia - it was a set of a moral and political commitments necessary to carry out internal reforms, which would enable to prepare it for a meaningful partnership with the West. The same document contained a provision on the "indivisibility of security" of North America and Eurasia: "Security is indivisible from Vancouver [Pacific port in Canada on Canadian-American border] to Vladivostok. " By signing the Charter, Russia has officially linked its national security with national security of NATO countries. In the understanding of the Russian government provision of its security now clearly conceived in the context of cooperation with NATO. It highlighted the formation of a "quasi alliance" between Russia and the United States. American politicians talked about the fact that the basis of Russian-American rapprochement is cooperation in the democratic transformation of Russia, the construction of a free society and market economy. For several years the idea of "democratic solidarity" between Russia and the West eclipsed controversy that existed in their relationship. wo years of economic disaster (1992-1993), crisis management, massive delays of wages, inflation, rising prices, strikes - all was attributed in Russia with a course of radical liberal reforms. The left opposition accused the president of neglecting national interests and implementation of policies that would benefit the West. The negative attitude toward the authorities exacerbated by the October events in 1993, during which the opposition to Boris Yeltsin was suppressed by force on behalf of members of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. The first elections to the State Duma of Russia in December 1993 showed a sharp drop in popularity of pro-presidential forces and the rise of nationalist sentiment. Enthusiasm for the benefits of cooperation with the West, from which a liberal portion of Russian society was expecting effective help in the name of "democratic solidarity" grew weaker. There were growing doubts about the true goals of Western countries towards Russia. The Americans were accused of wanting to "take advantage of the plight of Russia." With no intention to change the foreign policy, the government tried to change the official phraseology. At the beginning of 1994 during the first speeches after the last elections to the Duma, Russia's Foreign Minister Alexander Kozyrev first ventured to say about "special interests" of Russia in the zone of the former Soviet republics. Although it was not followed by the activation of Russian policy in the CIS, the words of Minister symbolized a new trend: under pressure of public sentiment the administration began to realize the need to modify at least the ideological and theoretical component of foreign policy. The authorities tried to connect the logic of the "democratic solidarity" with the elements of liberal statism (liberal nationalism) with absolute predominance of the former. On practice, this resulted in the continuation of policy coordination with the U.S. and the EU. But now the co-operation was accompanied by reservations, and timid attempts of Russian diplomacy to accompany it with the nomination of certain conditions. Either Russia would become effective, including military and political aspects, tool of solidarity actions with the West, or it needed to clearly define the limits of rapprochement with it. In the first case, perhaps it was necessary to prepare for joint action with NATO in the Balkans or in peacekeeping operations in Africa. In the second - should formulate some kind of interaction rules that would restrict the behavior of both NATO and Russia. Meanwhile the reality of the mid-1990s became more controversial. In 1995 the war in Bosnia reached its climax. September of 1995 was followed by NATO's intervention in this country, which caused criticism in Russia against not only of the the Western powers but also Boris Yeltsin and A. Kozyrev, for their failure to prevent such actions. That same year elections to the State Duma which has already carried out under the new Constitution, showed a further decline in the popularity of the president and the growing popularity of anti-Western forces in Russia. In the West, new developments have taken into account in its own way, and in 1995 they started to openly discuss the prospects of NATO expansion to the east. In Moscow, this was fairly regarded as an attempt to exert pressure on Russia and the expression of the latent threat from the West. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1996 Boris Yeltsin had to go through the presidential elections, the chances to win which where were small. In this situation the government has made a deliberate and symbolic change: "too westernized" Alexander Kozyrev was replaced as foreign minister at the beginning of 1996 by Primakov, who had a reputation as a strong politician and moderate statesman. He was not ashamed of words about the need to defend national interests, but also made them a constant refrain of his own presentations and speeches from his subordinate senior foreign ministry officials. "Primakov, in fact, compared with its predecessor, began to speak more often about relations with its Asian neighbors - Japan, China, India and Arab countries" (E.M. Primakov International Relations on the brink of the XXI century / / Foreign and Security Policy of Contemporary Russia (1991-1998). Chrestomathy in two volumes. T. 1. Book. 1 / Comp. Tatyana Shakleina. Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1999. P. 179-195). He considered the collapse of relations with Latin America not justified. But being a realist, Primakov was not seduced over the the relation of opportunity between world powers and did not question the policy of partnership with the most powerful and promising of them. He saw his task as the minister not to oppose Russian interests in the west, but to teach the West the need to negotiate all the major decisions that affect their interests with Moscow. In 1991-1995, Russian diplomacy did not dare even to encroach on it. Diplomacy was geared to minimize the damage from the major international processes, in which Russia was objectively included, but in the regulation of which it actually took no part. It is important to note that the focus on partnership with the West have not questioned. The novelty consisted in the transition to a more active protection of it's interests by Moscow. The foreign policy of Russia in the second half of the 1990s, was no longer based on "democratic solidarity". The conceptual meaning of the Russian foreign policy of the second half of the 1990's is best conveyed by the phrase "selective partnership". This concept has had been focused on the preference of cooperation with the U.S. and the EU. However, it accentuated the spirit of Russia's hard bargaining negotiations with the West, defending its works and the right to determine in which cases it to be at one with its Western partners, and in which to distance itself from them. The new approach began to emerge during Primakov's term and remained with appointment of Ivanov who became foreign minister in September 1998 following the appointment of Primakov as prime minister. It seemed that a universal formula of foreign policy had been found. It was both pragmatic and principled. Principled because it did not put into question the vector of partnership with the West. Pragmatic - because the logic of "selectivity" (resistance or partnership) gave policy flexibility. Pragmatic because the logic of "selectivity" (resistance or partnership) gave this policy flexibility. Last years of the twentieth century turned out to be the difficult test for Russia's foreign policy. Having measured and estimated weakness of Russia after the crisis, West "as if on purpose" started to reckon with Russia even less. If the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia in 1996 could pass off as the result of concerted decisions of Russia, NATO and the EU, the conflict over Kosovo in 1999, had been intervened by Western countries in defiance of Moscow. In the midst of the "Kosovo crisis" in the spring of 1999 President Boris Yeltsin decided to make a principal changes in military doctrine of the Russian Federation. In its new version, approved in 2000 was stipulated the right of Russia for the "first nuclear strike" from which the Soviet Union voluntarily refused in the late 1970s. Russia and the West under the pressure of the experience of relations in the 1990s, got rid of the mutual illusions, but at the same time kept the relationship in a non-confrontational line, making use of new instruments and mechanisms. In 2000, the experience of Russia-NATO interaction of the second half of the 1990s was summed up in the "Russian foreign policy doctrine of the second generation, the essence of which has been sustained in the spirit of selective partnership" (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. June 28, 2000 / / Foreign and Security Policy of modern Russia in four volumes. 1991-2002. T. 4 / Comp. Tatyana Shakleina. M. ROSPEN, 2002. P. 109-121). The rise to power of Vladimir Putin (first "preliminary" in 1999, and then "final" in 2000) did not immediately reveal the changes. In the media coverage coming of Vladimir Putin has been marked by a wave of laments over the "instability" of Russia's relations with the West and the growth of Russia-NATO differences. Under president Putin, Russian foreign policy has experienced a revival that contains elements of both restoration and revolution. Russia is back on the world stage, seeking legitimization of its new role and projecting power through economic, as opposed to traditional political-military means. It has revived a pre-revolutionary national identity stressing Russias unique path to modernity. Relations with the West have deteriorated as Russia has challenged agreements that were concluded in the 1990s when it was weak. The Putin legacy in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is mixed; with gains in Central Asia and losses in the Western newly independent states (NIS) and the South Caucasus. However, unless Russia addresses its domestic societal problems its ability to play the role of a great power will remain limited. After a decade of weakness and upheaval, Russia returned to the world stage during Vladimir Putins eight-year presidency, regaining in?uence in its neighborhood and beyond, and venturing into parts of the globe from which it retreated after the Soviet collapse. Moreover, Putins Russia sought to revise many of the major agreements it had concluded with the West in the 1990s, when it was weak and had to accept an agenda imposed on it by Europe and the United States. This is the restorative aspect of the new Russian foreign policy, symbolized by its hosting the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg in 2006 and its award of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. The revolutionary part is that Russia is, for the ?rst time in its history, a major global economic player, especially in the energy ?eld, after years of strong domestic economic performance driven by high oil prices. It could become a serious outward investor as it is poised to dispose of potential sovereign wealth funds and as its corporations go global. As First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said at the 2008 Munich Security Conference, we dont export ideology anymore-we only export goods and capital (Ivanov 2008). Moreover, the Putin administration, by recapturing the commanding heights of the economy, created a system whereby the Kremlin is directly involved in international economic activity, blurring the lines between what is political and what is commercial. This new Russian reality expressed itself in increasingly confrontational rhetoric toward the West. Putins 2007 Munich Security Conference speech lambasted American unilateralism (Putin 2007a) and in his ?nal address to the State Council he accused the West of unleashing a new arms race and trying to gain access to Russias natural resources (Putin 2008). This rhetoric had a negative e?ect on Russias political relations with both Europe and the United States, although economic ties with the West became robust. Russia remains without allies, pursuing multi-vector policies. As Foreign Minister Lavrov explained, Russia will continue playing its balancing role in global a?airs. It will never be part of new holy alliances against anybody (Lavrov 2007). It seeks to ensure that no major international problems can be resolved without its participation and ability to in?uence the terms of the settlement. Russian foreign policy under Putin underwent a dramatic evolution, mirroring the domestic changes implemented by the president. Taking o?ce in the aftermath of the 1998 financial collapse and the pluralist but politically weak Yeltsin years, Putin restored stability to the country by reining in forces of decentralisation and competition, creating the power vertical, restoring control over the country by the Kremlin and its allied party United Russia, and recapturing state control over the commanding heights of the economy. He was lucky enough to preside over this restoration while oil prices skyrocketed from $27 a barrel in 2000 to $130 a barrel by mid-2008. Where under Yeltsin powerful oligarchs could sometimes pursue their own commercial interests abroad, under Putin foreign policy-making was recentralised. Indeed, during the Putin years, it became increasingly challenging to understand how Russian foreign policy is made. On many crucial decisions-for instance, support for the United States establishing military bases in Central Asia after 9/11, support of Viktor Yanukovich during the 2004 Ukrainian elections or turning off the gas to Ukraine in January 2006-the assumption was that President Putin himself was the ultimate decision maker. Nevertheless, it appeared that the domestic power vertical extended to foreign policy which was made by a narrow circle of people. To some extent, the emergence of Russia for the first time ever as a major global economic player was a result of forces outside the Kremlins control, namely high energy prices. In 2007, Russian economic output was 70% larger than in 1999 in real terms and Russian economic performance was considerably above what was predicted a few years earlier. Putin pursued a skilful economic policy for much of his time in office, with sound fiscal measures, the creation of a fund from energy pro?ts that could be used for investment in Russia and abroad, the early payback of Russias foreign debt and some domestic diversi?cation away from an economy based solely on raw materials production and export. Putin succeeded in one of his key goals-restoring Russias status as a great power whose interests have to be taken into account by the international community. This is partly a product of Russias growing economic clout, but also because the international environment created opportunities that Putin, initially playing a weak hand rather well, was able to use to Russias advantage. The major legacy of the Putin era that is in part a consequence of the brittle nature of the US-Russian relationship is Russias determination to revise the agreements of the 1990s, ensure that it never again signs up to policies determined solely by the West and insist that no major international problem can be resolved without Russias participation. If need be, Russia will do everything it can to prevent resolution of these issues, as the case of Kosovo shows. Putin improved ties with new EU members, largely through economic and energy diplomacy. He visited the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria and signed energy deals with them that guarantee greater Russian control of the European market. Thus, the European picture was mixed. Many of the new EU members have only recently emerged from centuries-or at least decades-of Russian and Soviet domination and remain wary of Russias intentions. However, dependence on Russian energy and traditional economic links remain, and Russias presence in Central Europe is greater today than it was in 2000. At the end of the Putin presidency, the West was more wary of Russia than it was at the beginning of his tenure. And it is questionable whether the highly centralised system that Putin has restored is really an adequate model for a great power in the twenty-?rst century. The domestic and international legacy of this sovereign democracy will outlast the Putin era, but it could eventually limit Russias ability to play the role of a twenty-?rst century great global power if the Kremlin does not fully address its domestic challenges and if it continues its confrontational stance toward the West. Following the breakthrough of Putin in the field of foreign affairs, the newly elected, by that time, president of Russia Dmitry Medvedev on August 31, 2008 announced the "five positions" of Russian foreign policy: 1)Primacy of the fundamental principles of international law. 2)Rejection of a unipolar world and the construction of a multipolar world. 3)Avoiding isolation and confrontation with other countries. 4)Protection of lives and dignity of Russian citizens "no matter where they are." 5)Protecting the interests of Russia in the "friendly regions." The highlights of Medvedevs foreign policy include the new European security architecture initiative launched during his visit to Germany in June 2008, a month after he assumed office, a five-day war with Georgia later that year, the subsequent statement on "the sphere of privileged interests" and the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A gas war with Ukraine left part of Europe without heat in the middle of winter, but then Russia signed the "Gas for Fleet" agreement, under which it cut gas prices for Ukraine in return for an extension of the deployment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea. Medvedev has exchanged words with Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko, against whom he even initiated a media war. In a surprise move, Russia approved military intervention in Libya but later said that it was a mistake. Medvedevs visit to the South Kurils caused a sharp deterioration in relations with Japan. His indirect foreign policy achievements include the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and progress in relations with Poland, although Vladimir Putin contributed more to both of these than Medvedev. Analyzing Russias activity in the period from spring 2008 to autumn 2011, it could be pointed out that its foreign policy was not the sole responsibility of Medvedev, but a joint effort of the ruling tandem, even though Putin stayed behind the scenes for the most part. A closer look at Russias foreign policy achievements leads to a paradoxical conclusion. Medvedev, with his friendly smile and pro-modernization rhetoric so acceptable to Europe and the United States, was widely seen as a pro-Western politician. Yet Russia has made hardly any advances on the Western front, while its anti-Western or alternative policy directions have proved much more successful. Medvedev has set out a policy which will be continued under Putin: Russia's transformation into a power with a regional focus, although the region in this case is Eurasia, which adds a global dimension. As a conclusion to this chapter it might be stated that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia endured a difficult rebirth into a unipolar world order where it struggled to find its place for some time. For some time it carried out the role of a dependent upon the will and interests of the West. This had been the most significant right after the collapse of the USSR. But with time Russia had found levers of influence on the global stage and now is becoming close to a status of major political force in the world. Russian modern foreign policy might be described as a multipolar international system, where a plurality of stakeholders shares the burden of enforcing international law and guaranteeing global stability. All three presidents had made a significant influence of the foreign policy of Russian Federation, although their methods and tools of influence differed depending on the situation. Having been left with "broken trough", after collapse of the USSR, Yeltsin tried to carry out the politics of non-interference and obliquely help its yesterday's sworn enemy to establish authority at what has been recent strongholds of social ideology. No one can blame him for that as it is in general the ordinary historical contour. Besides, Russian had to deal with the vast array of internal problems and preserving the leftovers from regime was it's natural and logical option. Putin managed to grope the strong suit of renewed Russia (natural resources) and utilize it as a tool of influence of the international arena. He wasn't an obedient lamb, the sense of authority is in his subconscious I recon (maybe because of his IS (intelligence service) past). Nevertheless, he propelled Russia on the qualitatively new level of diplomatic game. Medvedev was but a successor of Putin's ideas and trends. But his term brought some new directions of Russian foreign policy development. It began to pay more attention to Eurasia distancing itself from Europe to the merit of a economical cooperation. Russia is perceived not as a peasant waving red flag, but a bunch of suits sitting on the oil pipe counting profit. Is it for the best of worst the next chapter of dissertation will try to reveal. In general pubic eyes, Russian bureaucrats made numerous miscalculations in conducting international relations as initiating the military conflicts or speculating on natural resources supply and it may result in a unfavorable consequences. But at the same it might be the part of some major plan, which is unavailable for the public. Nevertheless, those events definitely are worth analyzing.