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Приложение 2 Сравнительные показатели внешней торговли Российской Федерации со странами Закавказья
России с Закавказскими странами
Удельный вес в общем объеме торговли России с Закавказскими странами (в %)
David Dusseault
Introduction: A word about theory and approach
Starting off on the wrong foot?
Evidence for Reformulating the Superpower Discourse
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Приложение 2

Сравнительные показатели внешней торговли Российской Федерации со странами Закавказья




год

Страна
1995
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006




























Удельный вес торговли с Россией во внешнеторговом обороте (в %):























Азербайджан
14,8
9,3
5,7
9,49
9,6
10,6
12,4
14,0

Армения
21,4
6,0
10,4
10,1
10,4
10,1
10,5
15,5

Грузия
19,5
12,1
14,8
14,9
15,8
13,5
15,2
13,7

Внешнеторговый оборот России с Закавказскими странами (млн долл):
501,6
461,2
482,4
674,9
942,6
1302,0
1867,5
2767,8

оборот в % к предыдущему году
155,1
113,4
104,6
139,9
139,7
138,1
143,4
148,2

Удельный вес в общем объеме торговли России с Закавказскими странами (в %):























Азербайджан
38,4
58,8
44,4
53,9
53,3
58,1
57,0
59,0

Армения
40,3
15,5
26,3
22,3
21,6
16,0
15,7
17,9

Грузия
21,3
25,7
29,4
23,8
25,1
25,9
27,3
23,1

Удельный вес торговли со странами Закавказья в общем обороте России (%)
0,4
0,34
0,34
0,44
0,49
0,50
0,54
0,63

в т.ч. страны СНГ
1,8
1,8
1,9
2,6
2,8
2,8
3,6
4,3



David Dusseault*

(США)


A Grand Strategy or Contingency:

Russia's Energy Relations in the Eurasian Context


Abstract

In light of the politicisation of Russia's energy relations with neighbouring states including those in the CIS and EU, analysts and academics alike have been at a loss to substantively explain the souring nature of relations with Russia. In the absence of other viable hypotheses, previously discredited cold war vintage geopolitical models have been recycled and applied to the contemporary energy issue. Strictly defined yet poorly conceptualised strategic interests are once again identified as comprising the critical factors behind the Russian state's reinvigorated pursuit of its preferences in the international arena.

A major issue identified as proof of the reincarnated geo-political discourse's validity is the increased level of bilateralism in energy relations with neighbouring states as well as international energy firms. Illustrative of this trend are the construction of the Nordstream Pipeline, recent monetarisation of energy relations between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, TNK-BP's sale of the controlling stock package of the Kovytka gas field to Gazprom, the sale of the Shell's Sakhalin project to Rosneft and the construction of the Caspian shore gas pipeline uniting gas supplies from Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan through the Russian transit network to CIS and European markets. According to the geopolitical school, energy in these cases is not an economic commodity. Energy is political mechanism, which allows producers to accrue gains in strategic interest competition between states. In this analysis, Russia is striving towards energy superpower status to the detriment of the energy security of the world's consuming states as well as to the established global political and economic order.

However, while admitting that Russia's energy giants and the Russian state (whose interests are presented as one in the same) face daunting geographic, institutional and financial obstacles to fulfil the superpower strategy, members of the geo­political school fail to rectify the gap between the posited energy superpower strategy and the lack of institutional and financial capacities to fulfil such a grand plan in the short to medium term. Another glaring omission of the geo-political paradigm is the role that consumer states' responses or perceptions of Russian strategy play in contributing to the counter productive and simplistic nature of the current energy security discourse.

By examining several of the cases mentioned above, this paper seeks to take the energy issue out of the restrictions of the energy security discourse and subject it to a more nuanced treatment in which actor agency on the part of diversified Russian and international interests are examined in conjunction with existing physical, financial, informational and institutional conditions. In this respect it is expected that bi-lateralism in the energy sector is not the result of a geo-political grand strategy on the part of the Russian state, but the product of actors' contingency based upon their specific preferences as well as the conditions under which energy strategy formation takes place at any specific time.


Introduction: A word about theory and approach

This paper is in part a response to the need to address the perceived theoretical, methodological and interpretive weaknesses in contemporary scientific literature concerning the nature of energy policy formation in Eurasia. The main focus of the research is the Russian Federation by natural default. Current conditions in the globe's hydrocarbon resource base along with market forces have shifted global energy majors' as well as states' focus towards Russia as a potential well-spring of oil and gas, providing the lure of boundless opportunities to maximise economic profit and secure supplies of crucial commodities necessary to the maintenance of firms' economic solvency and states' political legitimacy.

However, as much as the image of Russian oil and gas provides potential investors and public servants with images of uninterrupted supplies of strategic natural resources, profit, and with it domestic political stability, Russia's predicted ascendancy to the status of energy superpower has ushered in a period of trepidation on the part of consumer states and international energy companies alike. Despite all the natural wealth and economic potential the country possesses, Russia, under the Putin regime, is short of a seemingly indisputably important, internationally recognized commodity: credibility.

In terms of the social science perspective, the gap between natural resource based potential and state capability to organise disparate societal interests to achieve an adopted strategy provides an immense field for seeking out explanations to just how and why this gap exists.271 Although full of possibilities for social scientists to conduct meaningful enquiries, the energy field is fraught with just as many constraints on the research, which however daunting, fortunately should be familiar to all those that have previously struggled to design a research programme in other fields of the social sciences.272 What makes the energy question particular may not be comprised solely of the challenges it presents contemporary society or social scientists in terms of issue scope. Instead we, researchers ourselves, may be handcuffing our own attempts to explain energy policy through the scientific inadequacy of present day models applied to the energy phenomena.

In order to release the energy issue from the existing directionless debate, this paper then bases its arguments on several fundamental principles of social scientific inquiry.273 All research in the fields of social science starts with questions, not answers. If we as social scientists were as sure about other aspects of society as we seems to be concerning Russia's role in Eurasian energy policy, there would hardly be any need for our intellectual production beyond affirming indisputable, universally accepted truths.

Second, if we assume that there is a need and an added value to be derived from questioning our current understanding of the nature of energy policy formation in Eurasia, then the goals of this intellectual exercise should not be only confirming currently held, popular assumptions, but instead should serve to challenge conformity by aiming for possible answers based on derived scientific inference274. Deriving inference from our research, although exposing the limitations of explanatory power of social scientific enquiry, simultaneously allows us to identify further holes in our knowledge and continue the pursuit of a more precise conceptualisation of our social reality.

Third, in addition to conducting all research associated activities in a transparent and public manner, our work needs to be carried out according to accepted rules of the scientific game. The method by which we do research distinguishes social scientific enquiry from other forms of less robustly structured intellectual pursuits. In part, the application of method assures that the conclusions we obtain are not only accurate in relation to the model and data collected, but with the addition of newly gained data and improved methodology, obtained conclusions can be further questioned and our collective understanding of the object of research honed.

Following on from my colleagues' related work on this exact issue275 I would characterise the current treatment of the energy issue and Russia's increasingly central role in the Eurasian energy sector in many cases as substantively incomplete, lacking sufficient data on specific actors and their associated interests. Under such conditions, the remedy does not need to be explained here, simply to say that more field work is needed to fill in the gaps in the data.276

However, in the worst case, treatments are methodologically insolvent. In some instances, inappropriate independent variables are over specified. In others, assumptions are used to fill in substantive data gaps contributing to overt speculation or deterministic conclusions. In the case of significant amounts of data, appropriately developed cognitive constructs or sound methodology to treat the data and explain the phenomena with the required degree of scientific objectivity and professionalism are underdeveloped or are simply absent.

The solution to the current crisis in Russian energy sector research cannot be forthcoming in this paper. Instead my intention is to argue for a more accurate assessment of the nature of Russia's role in the Eurasian energy sector. To do so, I intend to present some of the existing pertinent questions and data surrounding Russia's energy sector and subject the material to more rigorous tests in order to assess the degree of validity of each question's conclusions and to proffer alternative hypotheses where necessary and identify directions for subsequent research into the issues in question.


Starting off on the wrong foot?

In the first lines of a recent article by William Zimmerman277 the basic syndrome facing researchers of the contemporary Russian state is laid plain. As area specialists, we are forced to deal with the spectre of Russian exceptionalism. Following on from Zimmerman, the particular difficulty posed by Russia as an outlier means that researchers and analysts are forced either into arguing for or against Russia's degree of normality within a particular set of observations. Arguing for exceptionalism calls into question whether it is actually possible to divine scientific inference from the Russian case and apply these lessons to other data sets. On the other hand, if exceptionalism is rejected, the individual researcher is perceived as an apologist, blind to Russia's particular political, social and economic foibles. Even more disturbing is the apologists' perceived inability to comprehend the threats that the Russian state posses to its neighbours and the stability of the international order.

The reason I mention this discrepancy brought up by Zimmerman is simple. The straightforward dichotomy in terms of Russia's role in the world and the nature of the Russian state's strategies as understood by researchers is pervasive in the present treatment of Russia's increasing role in the world's energy sector. Already back in 2002, analysts and journalists began to speak of Russia's intensified activity and influence in the world's energy markets in terms of an energy superpower.278 This discourse has since moved away from the question whether Russia will become an energy superpower. It is now assumed that Russia is striving to become an energy superpower. Researchers, journalists as well as public servants are now seemingly more interested in finally "proving" that this state of affairs is an accurate and fair representation of the social reality.279 Despite clear economic, political, physical evidence to the contrary, the framing of the general research question which is on most observers' lips these days can be formulated in the following manner: Is Russia an Energy Superpower?

Many seem convinced that Russia's march to a renewed superpower position in the international arena is assured, fuelled by the continuing demand for exports of its natural resources280. Therefore making an attempt to "disprove" the obvious would only add fodder to an already open-ended debate framed in the exceptionalism context. From a social scientific point of view, the question is too narrow in its scope281. Perhaps, a more scientifically sound argument would be formed through a redressing of the fundamental research question which would allow researchers to take advantage of a wider set of data available concerning the Russian energy sector.


Evidence for Reformulating the Superpower Discourse

It is one thing to announce that the sky is falling. It is an entirely different intellectual enterprise to substantiate that this assessment is indeed accurate. Beside utilising a tautology (Russia is or it is not a superpower) to formulate the basis for social research, another major fault of the Russian energy superpower discourse is that in its current manifestation, the data utilised to support the theory is a collection of events, such as a string of gas and oil shut offs to transit countries282, the construction of new pipelines that bypass former transit states, or the removal of foreign energy majors from substantial oil and gas development projects on the territory of the Russian Federation. Juxtaposing events as "proof” of a politically motivated agenda without taking into consideration historical context within which the events occurred or identifying the dynamics (signified by operationalised independent variables) that underwrite such actions subtracts from a more fundamental understanding of the underlying interests (descriptive & causal inference) that contribute to state policy formation.

Modifying the direction of the research into Russia's energy policy formation away for the superpower discourse would not demand a major paradigmatic shift, mining of significant amounts of new data or the identification of major behavioural trends in energy sector actors' preference formation and agency. In fact several potentially interesting areas for further scientific inquiry have been identified previously by geographers, economists, IR theorists, sociologists and political scientists alike.

Some potentially important research questions have already been unearthed and could serve to contribute to an improved understanding of the implications the Russian energy sector may have not only domestically, but in a regional as well as global context. For instance, M. Bradshaw283, Gaddy and Ickes284 have done significant amounts of research into the structure of rent in the Russian natural resource sector, identifying not only the nature of the benefits accrued from resource export, but who tends to benefit from the exploitation of Russia's natural resources. Those who benefit are not defined plainly as Putin's cronies or heads of favoured companies. The picture is more complex. In one sense, a very disturbing trend concerns the flow of resource rent away from the peripheral regions, where the resources are located to the federal centre. This relationship indicates that those that own resources do not necessarily benefit from their exploitation, an issue that cropped up during perestroika and now seems to be left unresolved.

Recent work by K. Martin285, Milov, et. als.286, Sagers287, Bradshaw & Bond288, and Aslund289 question the nature and degree of state intervention in the energy sector. Far from being a situation in which we could describe the Russian state's and Russian energy majors' interests as being either mutually exclusive or entirely unified, an accurate representation of the relation between the state and the business community has so far eluded social scientists. Journalists report on splits amongst competing groups or individuals within the presidential administration of Russia or amongst the firms or governmental ministries.290 However, attempting to substantiate this speculation is highly problematic due to constraints mentioned earlier in the paper291. Many of the above authors also categorise state intervention in the energy sector giving mixed marks to the Putin administration according to the policies adopted and the suitability of state institutions to carry out the state's policies.

Other researchers such as Yakolev & Zhuravskaya292 have tended to conduct their analysis on a more general level and investigate the nature of competition amongst firms at the regional and federal level and their ability to capture state bureaucracies for their own economic interests. This research contradicts the conventional wisdom that state and business sector interests coincide fully and the source of policy formation is the state itself. In her work, the author finds that it is the firms at both levels that are competing to take over state assets, mostly at the regional level, and not vis-versa. Other regional analysts293 in their case studies have identified competition amongst the federal energy majors and other business conglomerates over political resources at the regional level, indicating that even within the same region, the likes of Gazprom, Rosneft, and Lukoil have their own networks of political supporters and differentiate themselves according to their interests and domestic strategies, even though they are supposedly playing on the same Kremlin team.

Still more research points to the replication of organisational models of political and economic resources between the regional and federal level. The concept of a national hero has been attributed solely to President Putin and his scheme to have the country's major industries contribute to the country's long term socio-economic development. However, companies such as Tatarstan's Tatneft have been fulfilling this role in the Tatar Republic since the late perestroika period.294 The intertwining of political networks and financial flows serves to create a formidable political machine which affords the local population economic and social stability and the political leadership with loyal cadre for the bureaucracy and a reliable source of budgetary funds. In a related vein, the business strategies and roles of the energy majors could be investigated in conjunction with suggestions made by Gaddy and Bradshaw regarding resources rents mentioned above.

From the technical perspective, Leslie Dienes295 and Clifford Gaddy296 illustrate severe concerns regarding the past exploitation and future sustainability of Russia's precious hydrocarbon resource base. Russia is far from being able to count on a smooth transition from maturing brown fields in Western Siberia to green field projects in the eastern regions of the country. Due to physical, financial and institutional constraints, Russia's technical capacity to deliver to the expanding markets of Asia forms a more significant and basic problem for consumer states outside the security discourse: the lack of commercially viable hydrocarbon resources to satisfy increasing demand.

In terms of Russia's energy sector involvement with in the economies of the CIS, several recent works point to the differentiation of political and economic capacities of the states themselves following the collapse of the USSR.297 Other authors have discussed in detail the Russian energy major's economic strategies in the CIS.298Again competition and differentiation amongst the firms' strategies underline the general trend that although Russian influence in the CIS is fairly strong, business development can be characterised as more of a reconstruction of former production and supply networks that existed under the centralised Soviet system than an all out push to re-establish political hegemony over the former soviet republics. This may be in part due to the physical existence of indigenous political elites with their own established political and economic interests in mind when dealing with Moscow299.

Finally, the frames, through which Russia300 and neighbouring states301 perceive, formulate and pursue energy strategy differs on a regional basis. Our research at the Aleksanteri Institute has found a clear demarcation between what can be termed as Russia's European and Asian energy interfaces.302 On the one hand, the institutional constraints that define the EU Russian relationship may be hindering a long term, multi-lateral agreement on supply and demand between the RF and the EU.303 On the other hand, it is the institutionally under-determined nature of Russia's relations with the emerging consumer nations of NE Asia that may provide opportunities for Russia to develop its eastern resources more quickly, if conditions develop favourably over the medium to long term.304