Russian Foreign Policy
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he Congress of Vienna and in the international configuration of Sacred Union. After Russias defeat in the Crimean War in 1954-1956,. new balance of forces has been fixed in the documents of the Paris Congress under the terms of which Russia lost its leading position. The Frankfurt peace of the year 1971 noted the weakening of France and a major strengthening of Germany unified by the "Iron Chancellor" O.Bismark. Treaty of Versailles in 1918 meant the consolidation in international law, including the League of Nations, a new correlation of forces: Germany as a defeated country was forced to agree to a humiliating position in the international system for itself. The Ottoman Empire was abolished, and the first position were occupied by Britain, France and the United States. After the Second World War two countries - the USSR and the USA - made their appearance in the league of "superpowers" .was enshrined in the postwar settlement documents, including UN documents (at the formal equality of all five permanent Security Council members - the USSR, USA, China, Britain and France). It is obvious that after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 the world has developed a new correlation of forces, which no longer reflected the main provisions of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations. Under these conditions the documents signed in 1945 could no longer been the sole source of international law and insisting on this is pointless and counterproductive.can, of course, condemn unilateralism of the U.S. particularly in Yugoslavia and Iraq but it only illustrates the destruction of international law, which had been developed over 60 years ago and fixed the balance of power on the international arena. An appeal to this international law (the new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation contains 22 mentions of that) is a sign of weakness not of strength. It is equally meaningless to stress on the exceptional role of the United Nations (this is done in the Concept up to 23 times) in the process of construction of a new system of international security.effectiveness and credibility of this mechanism decreases from year to year for quite obvious reasons: an anachronism of its procedures, including procedures for decision-making in the Security Council has become increasingly evident. Attempts to reform this organization at this stage has completely failed. Finally, we can not accept the call for the reduction of force factor in international relations as politically promising: on the contrary, there is a tendency to an increase of this factor, including the factor of military force., it should be stated that all three of the fundamental thesis of the new Concept, approved by the third President of Russia - an appeal to the strengthening of international law, the authority of the UN and the reduction of the power factor in world politics - unfortunately, are poorly realizable under present conditions and, therefore, can not serve as a convincing indication of whether any foreign growth potential of Russia is present. In the absence of real power, including the the military one, such foreign policy would inevitably be reduced to an endless submission of complaints which is more than useless. A noble calling for "humanizing of international relations" (Tsygankov, Andrei. "Vladimir Putins Vision of Russia as a Normal Great Power," Post Soviet Affairs 21, no. 2, (2005). which are not supported by "soft" and "hard" power, can not be a realistic basis for the growth of international influence in the modern pragmatic and even cynical in many ways cruel world. And this is clearly confirmed by the latest developments in the Caucasus.episode of a Russian foreign policy development should be analyzed separately.
RUSSIAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN GEORGIA AND THE CAUCASUS
foreign policy doctrine russia
Russia analysts observe that:
"Russias new central battleground is in Chechnya and increasingly in the rest of the North Caucasus, where it fights Islamist terrorists, separatists, and bandits." (Dmitri Trenin. "Reading Russia Right," Policy Brief #42 Special Edition. October 2005. Available online at
"Central European plains were replaced by the Caucasus mountains (and potentially, the mountains and deserts of Central Asia); familiar peer enemies by primitive but deadly warriors; operations of groups of armies were replaced with a mixture of counter-insurgency operations, special forces engagements [and] police mopping up campaigns". (Dmitri Trenin. "Russias Foreign and Security Policy under Putin," Carnegie Endowment (2005)the longest border on Russian unstable Southern rift zone, Georgia has figured prominently in Moscows foreign and security strategy. Russian key interests in Georgia are characterized by efforts to ensure regional stability, retain military influence, "protect" the Russian diaspora and increase economic ties. Each of these goals is developed below to provide a glimpse of Russian view of the Caucasus.chapter then examines the cultural, diplomatic, economic and military means that Russia has used to advance its agenda in Georgia. Finally, these efforts are compared to the tenets of Tsygankovs Great Power Normalization model to determine whether they meet its criteria of a pragmatic Russian approach to foreign policy.
Regional Stability
Caucasus have historically served as a buffer between the Orthodox Christian empire and Muslim powers to Russias south. That geopolitical reality has not changed. With what Russians generally refer to as "Wahhabi" (Salafi) influence growing in Uzbekistan and inside Russia itself, Moscow is deeply concerned about instability in its "soft underbelly."source of the instability, Chechnya, is largely a secessionist crisis and the subject of Western criticism that Russias heavy handed military operations in the region created an environment where militant Islam could get a foothold. (Chechen rebels, looking for external sources of support, tapped into the international jihad movement to further their cause but while elements of Islamic extremism now exist in the region, the crisis began, and still is, largely a separatist struggle).has always been stung by this criticism and has sought to portray the Chechen conflict as part of the larger Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).
Continued incidents of violence in the Northern Caucasus have spread eastward from Chechnya to Dagestan and westward to Ingushetia, North Ossetia, and most recently, Kabardino-Balkaria where coordinated attacks against assorted federal and security installations rocked the capital city of Nalchik in mid-October 2005. ("Russias hot spots: Caucasian dominoes," The Economist. 15 Oct 2005. p54).
To Russias domestic audience such a spread of violence lends credibility to President Putins "domino theory" about how the whole southern region of Russia can be destabilized, potentially causing Russia to lose control of the strategic border region from the Caspian to the Black Sea. If this happens, the Kremlin argues, energy supplies from the Caspian basin will be in danger, and terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction technology will expand.(Ariel Cohen. "Competition over Eurasia: Are the U.S. and Russia on a Collision Course?" October 24, 2005. Heritage Lecture #901. Online at ">).fear that with Islamic extremism no longer contained to Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus, but spreading to places like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, successful secessionist movements in these regions could effectively split Russia down the middle, with lines of communication between Moscow and its resource rich Siberian environs extremely difficult. ( Dmitri Trenin, "Russias Foreign and Security Policy Under Putin" (Carnegie Endowment, 2005)stability also means that the Kremlin does not want to see pro-Western governments coming into power in the former Soviet republics. This means no more "colored revolutions" that disrupt the political status quo that Moscow has fostered since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin publicly couches this concern by criticizing not regime change itself, but the manner in which it takes place - namely through what it considers unlawful and unconstitutional populist demonstrations. What makes Russias position on the "constitutionality" of these revolutions dubious, from a western perspective, is that the Kremlin does not apply the same standards to authoritarian regimes which violate their own laws and jail or kill their own citizens, such as Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
Military Influence
, like Armenia and Azerbaijan, contained remnants of the Soviet Transcaucasian Mili