Russian Foreign Policy
Курсовой проект - Экономика
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ors, the most effective of which are their internal secessionist conflicts. A March 2005 EU country report, drafted as part of its neighborhood action plans, described progress toward reform in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and providing detailed overviews of their progress toward adopting EU values such as rule of law, democracy, and a market economy. The EU generally considers Georgia to be the most advanced of its Caucasian neighbors with relatively few problems identified in terms of domestic political reforms. Of note incriticism of both Armenia and Azerbaijan are breaches of fundamental freedoms, a general lack of willingness to reform and "widespread Russian influence on decision making in both Armenia and Azerbaijan." Perhaps emboldened by the EUs hesitation to become directly involved in helping resolve Georgias "frozen conflicts" in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or assist in monitoring the border between Russia and Georgia, Moscow has continued to make the most of its political mechanisms. One includes its veto in the OSCE, an organization Georgia has sought to involve to a greater degree in its internal stability efforts. Since the establishment of a Georgian-South Ossetian ceasefire 1992, a four-party Mixed (or Joint) Control Commission has been responsible for monitoring and implementing the peace. The Commission is comprised of representatives from Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia, and Russias oblast of North Ossetia, a composition that seems blatantly biased toward South Ossetia. Georgia has long lobbied that the Commission in its current format is "ineffective" and that the OSCE and other international organizations should take a morepart in developing and implementing a peace process. In Georgias opinion, whenever Russia feels that the role of the Commission in the conflict resolution process is threatened, Moscow orchestrates a minor concession or position that demonstrates the Commissions utility to outside observers and ensures Russia continued political leverage. An even more potent lobbying tool is Moscows sponsorship of Georgias two breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (as well as those in Moldova and Azerbaijan). Both separatist regions are highly dependent on Moscow for support and therefore highly susceptible to Kremlin influence. Most South Ossetian citizens hold Russian passports and Russian laws provide the breakaway region with its legal code.regions ties with Russia provide it with what little economic activity exists in the area. Several Russian officials have even been appointed to posts within the breakaway regions government, which provokes concern in Tbilisi. In an interview with RIA Novosti, Georgian President Saakashvili was quoted as saying "when the chief of the Federal Security Service (FSB) for [the Russian republic of] Mordovia is appointed as head of the South Ossetian ministry of security, and when the deputy chief of the Siberian military district is named as the South Ossetian governments chief military aide, then were not talking about regular personnel changes." Likewise in Abkhazia, many residents have Russian passports and the Russian ruble is also commonly used in trade.maintains peacekeeping forces there that act as guarantors of each regions defacto separatism from Tbilisi. "Because of its unrecognized status Abkhazia has few ties apart from its link with Russia. The CIS peacekeeping force that patrols the ceasefire zone is made up entirely of Russian Federation soldiers. To many (though by no means all) in Abkhazia, Russia is perceived as the one source of military and economic security to which they can appeal." Georgian experts believe that these regions continued dependence on Russia is a serious hindrance to the peace process.While the Kremlin does not currently formally recognize either regions independence, it maintains close political ties with their leaders. In September 2005, Moscow hosted the "self-styled leaders" of Georgias breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as Moldovas Transdniester and Azerbaijans Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. The representatives pledged to pursue independence and Russian lawmaker Konstantin Zatulin, from the Kremlin-directed United Russia party, called the sovereignty of these entities a "reality that should be accepted." Such behavior only serves to exacerbate the perception that Russia is anything but a "neutral" peacekeeper in Georgias conflict zones. With President Saakashvili having made resolution of Georgias frozen conflicts part of this campaign, his job security and political clout is tied to progress on that front. Russia on the other hand may be counting on the internal conflicts to lead to regime change, perhaps to a more accommodating, pro-Moscow leader, if voters become disillusioned about Saakashvili ability to reach agreement with the Russian backed separatist regions. As Georgia continues to edge closer to Western institutions, Moscow appears not to have backed away from political mechanisms as a means to keep Georgia off balance; however Georgias proximity to Europe allows it to counter the Kremlins influence with its own political levers such as the regional organizations GUAM and the Community of Democratic Choice. Georgia ands pursuit of different political alternatives for regional integration, options that do not include Russia (such as GUAM and CDC), further highlights their perception that Russias attempts at influence are not constructive, but self-interested, intended to maintain Moscows diplomatic mechanisms of influence.
Economic Mechanisms
to Energy Efficiency Center Georgia, a renewable energy consultancy sponsored by the European Union, Georgias domestic oil, gas and coal supplies only meet 20% of its annual demand. Unlike its oil rich neighbor, Azerbaijan, Georgia produces mainly hydropower, which provides enough electricity for the spring, summer and autumn when water levels are high. When water levels are low in the winter months, energy resources must be imported from Russia, Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Accordingly, one of Russias strongest mechanisms of influence in Georgia is economic, specifically energy. Rising oil prices and a monopoly over pipelines have allowed. Moscow to wield this tool very effectively. Two distinct strategies have emerged:, expansion of energy giants such as Gazprom through acquisition of shares in, or joint ventures with, foreign gas and energy related companies; second, control of energy prices through monopoly of transportation mechanisms. Both of these efforts are consistent with Tsygankovs Great Power Normalization. Under the Saakashvili regime Georgia has made tremendous strides to address theshortages that plagued the state since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Power fluctuations in the capital drastically improved over the years with only periodic blackouts in the fall due to faulty transmission lines and general disrepair of the electricity infrastructure. Outside the capital however, home to approximately 68 percent of Georgias population, areas would sometimes go several weeks or even months without power. Despite progress on its energy issues, Georgia is still vulnerable to economic pressure from Moscow. Russia views itself correctly as the "economic engine" of the CIS. It has been pushing for higher prices for its energy, which it had continued to supply to its former republics at discount rates since the fall of the Soviet Union. The Winter 2005/2006 gas war clearly demonstrate the ruthless nature of Russias energy agenda and added fuel to the accusation that efforts are politically motivated, targeting those countries the Kremlin has labeled as "disloyal," those who eschew a pro-Moscow orientation. In a closed door session with Kremlin politicians, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made clear that gas, oil and electricity were the countrys principal diplomatic resources, and implying that the "whole diverse arsenal of economic pressure tools" were going to be applied to insufficiently loyal CIS neighbors. The inconsistency in applying "market corrections" across the board to FSU customers without regard to political orientation undermines the pragmatic nature of Moscows policies. It is difficult to understand how economic liberalization and transparent bilateral arrangements (goals of Great Power Normalization) can be established when costly, imperial practices of subsidizing some select states energy needs still remain in place. The most effective demonstration of Moscows pragmatism would be a comprehensive, equitable phased approach to energy cost adjustments that would be transparent and more in line with fair market practices, but such a plan has not yet been articulated.
Military/Security Mechanisms
a 28 November 2005 meeting in Brussels with Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced that "the door is open" for Georgias eventual membership in the Euro-Atlantic alliance and Georgia has expressed hope it might be among the next list of invitees expected to be announced in 2008. Georgia has signaled its intentions to pursue NATO membership and move toward closer alignment with the EU. Aside from its economic mechanisms of influence, Russia continues its ability to sway Georgian policies by playing upon the states most significant weakness, its internal instability. Three primary sources of tension in the area of security exist between Moscow and Tbilisi: the issue of border monitoring along their common border; the continued presence of Russian military bases on Georgian territory; and the intractable secessionist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to Tsygankovs model, these types of issues should be s