Russian Foreign Policy
Курсовой проект - Экономика
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le war. During this period, Russia will retain the status of nuclear power. Presumably, the regime of arms control would not be completely destroyed, which would provide a predictable military-political situation in general as well as adequate strategic warning and, in effect, would eliminate the danger of surprise attack.general, the possibility of external military aggression is far less of a threat for Russia now than the internal socio-political instability, economic and technological degradation, environmental and technological disasters. It should be recognized that the main threat to the vital interests of Russia today does not come from outside, but are the result of processes occurring within the state and the territory of former Soviet republics. Accordingly, the priorities of Russian national security objectives should be to place as follows.the first place there are internal political and social objectives - protection of individual rights and freedoms, the construction of the foundations of civil society and effective government. The second is provision of an innovative model of economic development, global competitiveness, improvement of the welfare of the citizens., in the third place is the need to protect these gains against threats from outside, ie, the containment of external aggression and ensuring of conduct of vitally important interests outside the national territory. Over the intermediate term (5-10 years), an external threat to Russia could rise primarily in the South. With the growth of Islamist extremism, after 5-6 years Russia may be facing a serious instability in the region of Central Asia.political means will not be enough to prevent a confrontation with the Islamic world, there would be a possibility of worsening conflict with some Muslim countries seeking to achieve dominance over a wide geographic area from Bosnia to Tajikistan. Destabilization of Central Asia is the next challenge. However, Russia can not get stuck in the unpromising regions of the southern part of the former Soviet Union. Excessive concentration of state efforts on these relatively important, but secondary areas will divert material and intellectual resources from more profitable and promising areas of policy development.the worst case scenario, Russia could face with multiple wars, on the scale of Afghanistan one, on its territory or the territory of the CIS. As for the West and East deterioration there can not be ruled out but a direct military threat is unlikely. However, renewed confrontation between Russia and the West can not be excluded completely. There is another problem linked to this matter: the apparent desire of the West to weaken Russia as a competitor in the global market. This is exemplified in high-tech, not to mention the arms trade. All promises of aid to Russia are immediately replaced with tough declarations as soon as it comes to the redistribution of spheres of influence in the global market.Russian integration into the global economy which is controlled by the West is inevitable, it may be carried not on an equal basis and in international economic organizations Russia will continue to be kept "in the lobby." It should also be taken into consideration that in the medium-term perspective the role of nuclear weapons in national security probably will decrease and during this period the United States will go to build and equip its armed forces with weapons of "fifth", and then the "sixth" generation (the latest high-precision conventional weapons with a strong information component) with which they can solve any military problem practically in non-contact method.will hardly be able to compete in this aspect with the U.S. The deployment in the next 10 years of not just tactical missile defense systems capable of solving the problem of struggle against some (but not all) of the strategic forces of Russia, but also elements of the territorial defense system by the U.S. can not be excluded. Over the medium term the emergence of serious conflict between China and Russia allies in the region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) is possible as well as between China and neutral Mongolia which is important to Russia. Although there is currently no reason to anticipate any aggressive intentions on the part of China, a number of objective factors can not completely dismissed as the possibility of serious conflict between China and Russia which could create security problems for the Russian territory (Transbaikal and Maritime).most difficult task is to give a long-term prognosis. If attempts in creating a regional security system in Europe and Asia-Pacific region will not succeed and there would be no possibility to strengthen mechanisms of ensuring global security under the auspices of the UN the resumption of typical polycentric system of international relations acute rivalry between the new centers of power with their attempts to establish dominance over the regions of vital importance for Russia can not be ruled out. Under these conditions the absence of a balanced and long-term geo-economic strategy based on the latest foreign policy and foreign technology means that Russia would be facing expulsion to the periphery of global economic development. The greatest potential threat to the new Russian state - especially after the two military campaigns in Chechnya - is the formation of a hostile and sometimes violent relationship by a number of states along the borders of Russia and possible involvement of a local and regional armed conflicts of various sizes. This, first of all, comes to the regions bordering the former Central Asian republics and Transcaucasus. The greatest danger to preserving the integrity of Russia and to ensure optimal conditions for political and economic reforms is the risk of economic isolation of some regions, particularly the Far East, Kaliningrad and Karelia from Russia and creation of some sort of cordon sanitaire which would move Russia farther away from the most developed and economically promising partners in Asia - Japan, South Korea, China, Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and in Europe - Finland. Of particular concern in this respect is the continuing depopulation of Siberia and the Far East. This process is not accompanied by a deliberate government policy on attraction of investment and people there on a new basis.regions - a strategic reserve of Russia - could turn into a geo-economic zone, and then the territory of geo-strategic vulnerability. Rather than a source of growth for Russia, Europe and Asian countries, this area could become a source of instability and an object of great power rivalry. Finally, there is a risk (albeit seemingly unlikely now) of a scenario that has already been attempted to implement in 1917 - the dismemberment of the former Soviet Unions sphere of influence of Japan, China, European Union, Turkey, the United States and other major powers. If that happens, Russia will be discharged into the geopolitical oblivion. It would be simply divided "in pieces" by other centers of power.course, this is the worst scenario possible. And there are all preconditions to avoid it.
Russia in the emerging new world order
is rapidly building its national identity of the twenty-first century and it ought not, as a great power, fuss and panic about natural processes taking place in Europe and the West in general, the more certainly about doomed messianic pretensions of so far the only remaining the worlds superpower. Using a generally favorable international situation for the solution of their problems at home ground, saving their strength, in some cases taking a waiting position, Russian politicians at this stage have to follow the words of Otto von Bismarck: "A politician can do nothing by himself. He should just wait and listen until long he could hear through the noise of events the steps of God, and then rush forward to grab the edge of his robes ." (Bismarck, A. Vol. T. 2, p. 98.)
However, Russia has quietly and firmly assert and defend the national interests by taking part in the European and international affairs as much as possible. And the most important national interest of Russia at the short and long term is the maximum economic rapprochement with the West (for laws of the market economy is universal) formation of a unified Euro-Atlantic security space (which implies a close military and political cooperation with major countries), while maintaining its own unique cultural and civilizational component. It is important to note that this issue is far from irrelevant for the citizens of Russia. All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center at the nationwide survey had asked respondents the following question: "What should be the main goal of Russian foreign policy over the next 10-15 years?"is following: 31% of respondents believe that Russia should regain its superpower status, 23% think that it is important to enter the top five most developed countries, 16% of Russian citizens believe that the country should abandon the foreign policy ambitions and concentrate on solving domestic problems; 12% reckon that Russia should enter the number of economically developed countries such as Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan and others, 6% of citizens believe that the main goal for the near future is to become a leader within the CIS, 5% of respondents believe that the most urgent issue for Russia is to become the leader of a large bloc of states opposed to U.S. global claims. 7% of respondents found this question difficult to answer. (Profile magazine. 2001. № 29, p. Two.)September 2006 aat the meeting with a group of Western political scientists of the debating club "Valdai" in response to one of their issues Putin said: "I would prefer to get a