Russian Foreign Policy
Курсовой проект - Экономика
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ears that the majority of post-Soviet states need some CIS functions and mechanisms, and so they are being reformed.the same time, the military union of several CIS states - the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) - was preserved, and Russia is changing the post-Soviet policy of supplying cheap energy to political allies. It is developing new relations with Kazakhstan and a new model of international cooperation in Central Asia, which involves not only the former Soviet states in the region but also China (the Shanghai Cooperation Organization).
The heritage of the Russian foreign policy and its miscalculations
Russian history, the international situation has never been so favorable for a relatively peaceful internal development, as in the early twenty-first century. The absence of large-scale external threats, and who set in the twentieth century, and in the nineteenth century, and XVII, and XIII centuries into question which set the very survival of the nation of Russia and the Russian super-ethnos into question, perhaps for the first time allows a country to focus on issues of domestic policy. these circumstances, foreign policy should not be so much an instrument of self-assertion of Russia as a great power (although it is also very important), but the most important resource of national modernization, which is identical to the transition to an innovative type of country development. In this context the foreign policy activities of Russia and the legacy in international affairs, which fell to the new President of Russia should be assessed. In both official and expert evaluations the state of affairs in Russias foreign policy for several years the incomprehensible euphoria had been dominating. It has been stated in particular that Russias position in the last eight years had become much stronger (Putins famous "hand of Russia grows stronger"), it supposedly became more respected, but do not liked by some states in the world, they say, because "it was again a strong and independent.
"This bravura fervor is reminiscent of the worst examples of Soviet foreign policy propaganda, pierced in recent years through the speeches of top officials of the state, the court "analysts", as well as all the official documents without exception, including a recent review of Ministry of Foreign Affairs foreign policy and diplomatic activities of the Russian Federation "and the new foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation which Dmitry Medvedev approved on July 12, 2008".
( Lowell W. Barrington, Erik S. Herron, and Brian D. Silver, "The Motherland Is Calling: Views of Homeland among Russians in the Near Abroad," World Politics 55, No. 2 (2003) : 290-313.)there objective reasons to these estimates ? An honest and politically unaffiliated answer to these questions are unlikely to coincide with those panegyrics that have been give voice by the official and "unofficial" experts of the Kremlin. No doubt, in comparison with the early and mid 90s of last century, Russias position in the world has improved considerably.this improvement was not the result of a successful, active and well-counted foreign policy, which has since been on various merits (and not in rhetorical terms) has not changed. Some improvement of Russias position was attained by the two factors which it did not accomplish at all: the relative weakening of the political positions of the U.S. (due to the failure in Iraq) and the EU (due to a temporary inhibition of the European integration process) and a favorable situation for Russia on world energy markets. To be fair, it should be noted that significant role has been played by such factors as the internal consolidation of the Russian state, which began in the mid 90s, when world energy prices were not so favorable for Russia.one tries to describe the state of affairs in foreign policy in one word, then this word should be crisis. In this case it is not some marginal crisis or the crisis of Russian foreign policy in certain areas. The crisis is a comprehensive and wide-ranging, systemic and structural, developing both "vertically", i.e. top to bottom, and "horizontally", i.e. in all conceivable directions. It is simultaneously conceptual, institutional, resource, intellectual, technological and an image crisis. Moreover, this crisis is accompanied by a synchronized and increasing pressure on Russia by the major international players.for talks about the "pragmatism" and "multi-vector" foreign policy, which allegedly is followed by the Kremlin, it is obvious that statesmen are trying to hide behind those statements the obvious fact that Russias foreign policy is formed spontaneously, constructed as a system of answers, rather than preventive steps, has no thought for the future, but is purely situational. Is it any wonder that in in the sphere of international affairs, Russia is still not widely trusted and considered unpredictable? The main thing is that in the event of continuation of this kind of policy, Russia is doomed for new defeats. Regardless of various statements, virtually none of the tasks of Russias foreign policy of a global order, which were set in Russian Foreign Policy Concept and approved by Putin in 2000 had not been completed. It is important to analyze in this chapter the problems posed by regional foreign policy in the process of their solving Russia could have played a much larger role:
Development of good neighborly relations and strategic partnership with all states - participants of CIS as a priority area in Russian foreign policy, with the primary objective to strengthen the Union of Belarus and Russia as the highest form of integration of two sovereign states at this stage;opposition to the narrowing functions of the OSCE, attempts to redirect its activities towards the former Soviet Union and the Balkans in particular;of the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in an effective tool of ensuring European security;of intensive, sustained and long-term cooperation with the European Union, devoid of market fluctuations;to NATO expansion plans;of existing human, economic and cultural ties with Central and Eastern European order to overcome the current crisis, and to give extra impetus to cooperation under the new conditions and Russian interests;
(Shlapentokh, Vladimir. "Russia as a Newborn Superpower: Putin as the Lord of Oil and," #18 - Johnsons Russia List, 9 February 2006.)
Development of relations with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the stream of good neighborly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation;the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, resistance to the dismemberment of the state, which is fraught with danger of a pan-Balkan conflict with unpredictable consequences;of considerable difficulties in the recent relations with the United States, which primarily concerns problems of disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as preventing and resolving the most dangerous regional conflicts;the participation of Russia in the main integration structures of the Asia-Pacific region, the APEC forum in particular;of friendly relations with the leading Asian states, especially China and India;development of relations with Japan in order to achieve a true good neighborliness that meets the national interests of both countries, registration of the internationally recognized border between the two countries.
(Trenin, Dmitri. "Reading Russia Right," Policy Brief #42 Special Edition. October 2005.://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17619&prog=zru (accessed December 2005).regard to the Commonwealth of Independent States, Russian policy was simply a failure. Russia not only failed to achieve any breakthrough (though such a task were assigned by Vladimir Putin), but had to back down on all issues, without exception. Prospect of integration have been lost not only with some individual countries - be it Georgia, Ukraine or Belarus - the prospect of integration was lost in this area in general. The situation in this area has worsened especially after Putins statement that the CIS, had no hope, and from the very beginning it was conceived as a "civilized divorce process." In response to the crisis of the integration project in the post-Soviet space, the Kremlins desire to "write off" the collapse of the CIS on some external forces rather than conducting an in-depth analysis of the situation is is especially alarming.doubt, these forces have played its role. However, all these "orange revolution" had an objective character, as they were a form of protest against the bankrupt and corrupt post-Soviet regimes that, contrary to Russias national interests, Kremlin was trying to save. Russia did not even managed to withdraw from military-political threat near its borders over the years, which convincingly demonstrated in the Georgia-South Ossetia military conflict in August 2008 in which it has been literally plunged. It is necessary to ascertain that around Russia has been forming,with external support, a hostile military-political environment.the European direction. Russia did not succeed in stopping the trend towards a narrowing of the OSCE functions (indeed, over the past eight years it has evolved substantially in an anti-Russian organization), neither enlargement or erosion of the CFE Treaty (Russia suspended its participation in this Agreement). Relations with the EU (not with individual countries - Germany and France - and with the EU in general) have now been the worst in the last 20 years. They are clearly came to a state of serious decline, esp