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4. Commitment in free cooperation
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i|iI> as such. Moreover, we must agree with the concrete scheme H* for us. That is, we evaluate not only H or H* as a means for Z. We have to decide also if we accept H*. In all these cases we can understand the “we” in a distributive sense. A mystical „we-intention“ is not needed.

The question if we know of each other that we agree in our acknowledgment of H is sometimes, but not always important. It may not be important in cases in which the implicit acknowledgment of H and H* just shows itself by the performances of H. It will be important, however, in cases in which we try to set up a new scheme of cooperation. Then, an individual will take part only if she expects that the cooperative action will succeed in some sufficient way. For this, I might have to reflect about what the others might think about H, H* and about what I will do.


4. Commitment in free cooperation

The crucial problem of free cooperation is this. Even if we already have verbally accepted a concrete division of tasks in a we-action H*, and even if this acknowledgment is subjectively sincere, we still cannot be sure if all of us really will do what we should do. We may have implicitly or explicitly pledged to do it. But still we do not know if we will do it.26 Therefore, we are uncertain if our free cooperation H or H* will not bring about the end Z. Nor is each of us or even any of us certain to get the share ZI he hopes for.

In such cases we talk about commitment or even duty. It means that each person is bound by his own (free) acknowledgement of a co­operative practice or institution. Such an acknowledgement often is implicit. It is often shown by what the person does or what she would say if asked and would make her acknowledgements explicit. In any case, the commitment is founded on the idea of autonomy, on some freedom of commitment. In a sense, it is already a certain form of moral duty, if we understand that the word “morality”, like any such word, is used for a whole family of cases. All of them, though, have to something to do with some form of free commitment and, therefore, with our duty as persons in real or possible relations to other persons. We shall see that this holds even for any possible duty I could have to myself.

We can use a principle resembling in some respects Kant‘s categorical imperative in order to check if there is a commitment in this general form. For this, I turn Kant’s principle from the (slightly misleading) imperative form into a statement of the first person. Then it reads without any loss of information as follows. If I can want that a possible maxim, i.e. a possible form of action, h (relevant for a concrete decision to act) be a general law, then I have to perform h. Of course, we already have to comprehend what this talk of general law means. I would claim that the generality has to be read with respect to all of us, to all persons (since the ex­tension to angels and gods is not at all helpful). Therefore I say that Kant’s principle articulates a particular case. The we-group implicitly addressed by the talk of a law is just the group of we man, we as persons. It is the group that should accept the general law and therefore is committed to it.

I now turn this principle into a ‘we-form’. A group-related form of joint action replaces then the ‘universal’ maxim h. The result is this: If we want a certain form of (free) cooperation H (for what reasons or goals however) as such, and if we (can) accept a concrete division of tasks H* ‘for us’, and if my role or task is to perform the individual action hi then I have to do it, i.e. I have to perform hi.

I shall say immediately something more about this ‘principle’ and its relation to Kant’s version in which no “we” appears. But first I want to remind us that any principle is vague. This is a conceptual statement. It is vague because it is short. And it must be short. A principle is no schematic rule or procedure. Rather, it is similar to a title or headphrase. It refers to a certain realm of procedures and rules, forms of judgments and actions that are ‘in accordance’ with the principle, ‘fall under it’, ‘do not contradict it’. In other words, any proper under­standing of such a principle, with or without further explanation, already presupposes quite some ‘experience’, ‘power of judgment’ and ‘auto­nomous thinking’. The situation is similar as in the case of a proper use of analogies and metonymies and other non-schematized figures of speech.

A first explanation of the principle concerning the question what it means that we want H and (can) accept H* ‘follows’ almost immediately from our analysis of we-intention and we-actions. It means that each of us, I and you and all the others, wantto perform the joint action or practice H ‘in itself’ and (can) accept the corresponding division of task H*, the ‘concept’ or ‘form’ of the action ‘for us’. A second, much more important and difficult question is why Kant for­mulates his moral principle from the perspective of the first person singular and why we do not. As a first answer I would like to say that Kant’s formulation is appropriate for all cases when I am in a position to know without further empirical investigation that I, as an arbitrary representative of us, would acknowledge the concept or idea of the action H and H* as a good form of cooperative practice.

In order to explain what these situations are, the example of the famous prisoner’s dilemma is most helpful (if we do not shift our attention to formal or mathematical technicalities). The paradigmatic situation is this. Two prisoners, both accused of murder, have the option to witness against the other or to keep silent. If one ‚confesses‘ by accusing the other we speak of defection. If he keeps silent we say that he cooperates. If both ‚confess‘ they get, say, a five year sentence. If they cooperate, both get a one year sentence for illegal possession of weapons, as the story goes. If I accuse you, as a witness I am freed and you get ten years, and vice versa. Game theory ‚predicts‘ that both of us will defect on the ground of the following ‚rational’ consideration: If you cooperate it is better for me not to cooperate; if you do not cooperate it is still better for me to defect.

The dilemma is this: At the same time our defendants (we both) know – if they (we) think about it – that it is best to cooperate, i.e. not to defect. This sounds strange and contradicts the definition of ‘rationality’ in game theory. The dilemma disappears if we use Kant’s formulation of the moral principle in an appropriate way. The principle says, in short, that if I can accept H as a general law or scheme of joint action, then I have to act according to it. The principle helps us here because I do not agree to any other scheme of joint action than cooperation. I do not want that we both do not cooperate. And I cannot want that only I cooperate but you not. I can want that you cooperate but I not. But this is no general law that can be accepted by us both.

Each of us knows this quite well. We do not have to talk to each other in order to know what we would have to do in order to cooperate in the we-group. This shows why the implicit case is not different at all from the case in which we make explicit promises to cooperate. Our duty is grounded in the fact that we both know that we would accept only the ‘cooperative’ scheme of action H=