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Илья Касавин (Россия). Комментарий к докладу Еуи-Су Кима
Ilya Kasavin (Russia). Comments to: “Philosophers should be able to Influence Value Systems”, by Eui-Soo Kim, Korea
Prof. Eui-Soo Kim has formulated a set of very strong critical and positive statements concerning new value strategies.
I am very sympathetic with the main idea of his paper. Of course we, philosophers, are obliged to influence value systems, and I hope that we do so in fact. But the speaker did some new steps drawing our attention to conceptual and practical work with values. Even more, three specific forms of philosophizing have been proposed for this purpose. I am afraid nevertheless, that the speaker considers the role of philosophy in a little bit too practical way. But the most difficult though inevitable thing is still to analyze some basic concepts and in particular to answer the following questions:
1. What is value?
2. What does it mean in this very case “to influence”?
3. Under what conditions are we capable to influence?
So I would not like to confront directly with the positive programme of Prof. Kim, but to draw attention to some prerequisites for the solution of his tasks
My definition of value is rather broad and vague: value represents an existential side of socially accepted regulative concepts, which are articulated in texts, penetrated into activity and communication and exist in a form of ideals, norms, intentions, purposes and other dispositions of human behavior.
By “influence” in this case I mean human action, which makes other persons accept or negate a value, or an action, which results in the change of its meaning. Hence there are two different actions: the first one has socio-psychological character in order to persuade a person in the process of value choice; the second one is epistemological and deals with a cognitive shift in the meaning of the word, which denotes a value.
The third question requires additional differences and speculations. When does the value influence take place? We should distinguish two possible though rather abstract situations. In the first one the values are mostly stable; in the second one they are changeable. In the situation of value stability any influence is easy to plan (for the value meaning is clear) and at the same time difficult to arrange (for the resistance is too strong). And in contrast to this, the situation of value change is favorable to any restructuring efforts, though the subject of change appears vague and even theoretically inaccessible.
The second question is: where are we going to undertake a value influence – in a congenial or strange or even hostile culture? The difference between congenial and strange culture is evident: we live in the first one; the second one is a conceptual and emotional construction. The culture, which we belong to, makes our understanding culturally dependent and therefore inadequate. According to Alfred Schutz37, only the strange culture can be objectively and scientifically studied. The stranger is regarded the only person who can properly analyze and understand any cultural system. At the same time it is evident that it is easier for the resident of culture to introduce some value novelties though these novelties are less thinkable for him.
And one more question: what is the subject of influence – past, present or future values (here we limit ourselves to the nearest past and future)? It is evident that past values are easy to identify though hard to change. The opposite is true in relation to future values – they are hard to identify though easy to change. The problem is that doing so we are situated in present, where past and future values are combined, and we face merits and demerits of past and future. Choosing the temporal vector of value movement, we determine the tasks to be solved. If the larger part of present values is a combination of the past values, we are able to understand, to conceptualize and to use value system building a consistent world view. An orientation towards future values makes our discourse vague, morality – diffuse, and activity – risky.
So in order to provide reliable self-orientation the discourse about values ought to be 99 per sent based on the past values and only 1 per sent – on the possible future ones.
And now we are returning to the meaning of the word “influence” in relation to values and their agent. Trying to understand various cultural determinants and limitations building the conditions of philosophical theorizing on culture and practical dealing with it, we can separate at least two different levels and three stages. The first, theoretical level I will dub “an internal production of values”. It is a professional activity of a humanitarian (scholar, artist, priest), which takes place in a local institutional context. The second, practical level can be denoted as “external production of values”. On this level, social dissemination and ideological justification of definite values are generated with the help of PR-specialist, political technologist, journalist as well as under participation of scholar, artist, priest etc. Both levels are only theoretically distinguished from each other.
Now if we speak about real ontogenetic process of value learning, we might draw the difference between three stages.
The first one is a stage of concrete life experiences, learning mother tongue, long lasting relations with people like parents, relatives, classmates, teachers, with local domestic realities like home and house. Here the practical, unconscious, emotional mastering of culture takes place most of all; values are gradually learned, internalized, and rarely questioned and changed.
At the second stage (traveling, contacting foreigners, and learning foreign language) a person gets knowledge of another cultural realm where the customary solutions of usual problems are basically limited. The words have unusual meanings, the relations among people seem strange, and the social surroundings behave in unexpected manner. This is a level of problematization of the common sense that provides possibility to change, to extend one’s cultural knowledge or to form a picture of alien culture, full of misunderstanding and fear. The cognitive attitude appears for the first time at this level due to a distance from immediate cultural background. It strengthens one’s critical and rational abilities, whereas the emotional attitude limits the mutual understanding of different cultures.
It is exactly the third stage that makes this cognitive attitude possible in a systematical way, namely the level of scientific and philosophical study of culture. Here the different cultures are studied as equal parts of the “third world” as Karl Popper puts it38. This sphere of objective knowledge accessible and valuable to every mature personality demonstrates the plurality of cultural universals. The rational dialogue of cultures takes place in this very intercultural domain.
At the same time this stage provides deeper understanding of obstacles and difficulties connected with the value change.
On the role of philosophy in cultural synthesis
Discussing the prospects for future civilization often leads us to the concept of humanism – originally the European Renaissance ideology. This social and intellectual movement gave a human being a status of hero – a person who competes with gods, creates culture and society, masters nature and demonstrates elementary demiurgic abilities, absolutely unconstrained and arbitrary powers. If we look at the political strategy of nowadays, it can be often recognized as a tendency to a new heroism. Some political officials consider themselves to be the new knights without fear or reproach, new heroes fighting against the Evil all over the world. Terrorist and antiglobalist leaders proceed in a quite similar way, struggling against imperialist oppression.
This is not the only case when two evidently different social and political trends reveal their diffuse, contradictory character that sometimes moves them pretty close to each other. They appear different only for those who currently experience the first and the second stages of their value development. As soon as we consider different value systems on the third level of cultural dynamics where the cultural meanings are rationally analyzed, then their vagueness, syncretism, limits and shortcomings can be revealed. It means that ideology and mass consciousness construct social values, compose them into a system, being disinterested in their critical analysis. The ideological strategy consists in justifying the values of its own and falsifying the strange values. And it is only philosopher who goes beyond any value system, trying to remain politically and value neutral. Philosopher is the last person to construct cultural values as he expects their inconsistency and vagueness from the very beginning. As an empirical person acting on the first and the second levels of culture he/she may prefer and create definite values and negate other ones. But the genuine predestination of philosopher is, following Wittgenstein, not knowledge but activity. Philosopher knows for certain that he knows nothing for certain – the future remains unpredictable; the results of human actions do not coincide with the goals. His only position in cultural dialogue is to make this dialogue possible and positive by demonstrating the limitations of the both sides and moving slowly to consensus. His neutrality provides distance. Thereby he may try to build the critically analyzed values into the broader context of intellectual culture. At the same time the distance makes horizon visible. But this hypermetropic, long-sighted vision prevents from distinguishing the details. Balancing between both intentions, philosopher proceeds according to the complementarity principle.
My conclusion sounds as follows. We are of course aware of the limited role of personality in history. At the same time it would be a strong version of Hegelianism to assert that social values are invented by some impersonal folk spirit, by elementary social movement. It is always a group of intellectuals who elaborates certain social projects and programs and tacitly imposes them upon society. In the ancient times there were sages, prophets and oracles that influenced social decisions by proposing and maintaining certain mythical, religious and legal values. Philosophers also participated in political life, though they remained in opposition, like Socrates, towards current social order. More often they were capable only to undermine it by their criticism or utopian alternatives.
So philosophy differs from wisdom, and philosopher should not identify himself with a sage. Philosopher cannot produce general social values, but he is able to criticize and construct meanings. Thereby a set of particular philosophical values is introduced, namely, the values of critical and rational discourse. Indirectly it provides a basis for the very process of value making. As one well-known Russian lawyer expressed this, “no law can emerge without critical discussion”. Following Juergen Habermas, we may consider critical discussion as a proper social procedure of value production.
So we all take part in the value formation as empirical people of definite cultures, as participants in social initiatives. But we can do more if we act as philosophers, for instance, participating in this symposium, analyzing, criticizing different value systems, providing thereby conditions for the present and future cultural synthesis.
Валентин Бажанов (Россия). Наука в переходном обществе: поиск стратегии выживания
Озабоченность состоянием и перспективами развития науки в современной России, кажется, присуща и Президенту России, и правительству, и самим ученым. Все отмечают тяжелое положение, скудное финансирование науки в нашей стране. Множество ученых было вынуждено сменить форму деятельности: стать более или менее успешными бизнесменами, банкирами, нефтяниками, а то и "челноками". Численность сотрудников Российской Академии наук (РАН) сократилось в 1990-х гг. примерно на 50% .
Согласно федеральному закону на научные исследования должно тратиться не менее 4% расходной части бюджета, причем во всех правительственных документах и президентских посланиях наука называется среди "высших государственных приоритетов". Тем не менее, 4% никогда не выделялось и эта цифра остается недостижимой мечтой: в 1997 году на науку было потрачено 2,88%, в 1998 году – 2,23% (это – согласно плану, в реальности – только 1,48%), в 1999 году – 2,02%, в 2000 году – 1,56% (это – согласно плану, в реальности – только 1,46%), в 2003 году – 1,74% (это – согласно плану, в реальности – только 1,6%). Наука и образование финансируются в России по остаточному принципу. Если расходы отделения математики АН СССР составляли, по расчетам академика Л.Д. Фаддеева, стоимость одного танка в год, то расходы этого отделения в постсоветское время равны 1/10 стоимости танка [Арнольд, 1998].
Средняя заработная плата в системе Российской Академии наук равна примерно 110-120 долларам США в месяц; примерно такие доходы и у вузовских преподавателей. В январе 2005 года правительство собирается повысить зарплату примерно на 8% (ставку на 20%, но все добавки не изменяются), но заработная плата будет меньше на 10% (имея в виду покупательную способность), нежели два году назад. Только чуть менее 1% научного и образовательного сообщества России имеет среднемесячный доход порядка 1000 долларов США, причем, как правило, он не определяется всецело научной активностью, а скорее как раз вненаучными факторами. Короче говоря, ученые и преподаватели в России вполне можно отнести к неблагополучному социальному слою. Более того, Российские ученые отмечают "бесцеремонное" отношение к ним правительства, когда решения правительства напрямую затрагивают их судьбы и благополучие [Соснов, 2004].
Один из наиболее авторитетных исследователей советской и российской науки Л. Грэхем предпринял анализ последствий перестройки и состояния науки в России после 1991 года. По его мнению, "экономический кризис 1990-х гг. подвел российскую науку к гибели ближе, чем политические репрессии сталинских времен" [Грэхем, 1998, с. 16]. Если страны "Большой семерки" тратят на развитие науки 500 миллиардов долларов в год, то РФ – максимум 1.5 миллиарда.
Несмотря на наметившийся скромный рост отечественной экономики каких-либо существенных прорывов в финансировании науки и высшего образования, а, стало быть, в положении ученых и преподавателей в обозримом будущем (пять, а то и десять лет) ожидать не приходится. В связи с этим проблема сохранения научного потенциала приобретает особую остроту. Естественное старение научных кадров, отток ученых и преподавателей (занимающихся научными исследованиями) в другие сферы деятельности, резкое снижение престижности научных и педагогических профессий придает проблеме сохранения научного потенциала статус проблемы, предопределяющей будущее России как высокоразвитой страны, входящей (или хотя бы претендующей на вхождение) в "золотой миллиард" человечества. В настоящее время о России можно говорить лишь как о развивающемся государстве, и потенциал ее развития в направлении создания постиндустриального общества всецело определяется состоянием и перспективами развития научных и образовательных структур, которые только и способны изменить структуру формирования внутреннего национального продукта – сократить сырьевую составляющую и увеличить составляющую, формируемую продуктами, полученными в результате применения высоких технологий.
Как можно (и дóлжно!) не только сохранять и развивать научный потенциал до того счастливого момента, когда стратегия государственной политики в отношении науки изменится на всемерную и – не побоюсь произнести этого слова – щедрую поддержку? Какие принципы должны быть заложены в фундамент формирования политики России в области науки и технологий? Какая стратегия представляется не просто оптимальной, а выигрышной? Наконец, какие конкретно организационные формы поддержки и развития научных исследований соответствуют этой стратегии? Думается, что предлагаемая ниже стратегия будет подходить не только к российским реалиям, но и ко всем развивающимся странам, которые склонны финансировать науку и образование по остаточному принципу.
Valentin A. Bazhanov (Russia) Science in the Transitional Society: The Quest for Survival Strategy
The fate of science in the transitional societies (especially if they are former so called socialist countries), usually unlucky: state support falls sharply, many academic institutes are closed, a plenty of scientists doomed to change microscope or telescope for book-keeper facilities. According to Russia's federal law 4% of annual expenditure budget should be spend for Research and Development (R&D). Science mentioned in Russia's government documents among "the highest State priorities". Nevertheless, 4% prescription was never implemented and remained the unattainable goal: in 1997 R&D got 2,88%, in 1998 – 2,23% (due to the plan; really 1,58%), in 1999 – 2,02%, in 2000 – 1,85%, in 2002 – 1,56% (due to the plan; really – 1,46%), in 2003 – 1,74% (due to the plan; really - 1,6%). Science and education get State money due to residual principle. Meanwhile 1/3 of annual expenditure budget have been spending for military purposes and security. Due to calculations of outstanding mathematician Professor L.D. Faddeev expenditures of Mathematical Department of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR were equal to the cost of one tank; at the Post-Soviet era this Department wastes only 1/10 of one tank cost [Arnold, 1998].
The average monthly salary in Russian Academy of Sciences institutes (RAS) was equal to 110-120 USD. Same amount of salary for Russia's Universities lecturers and Professors. In January 2005 the salary due to be increased for about 8% and it will be 10% less then two years ago (purchasing power is meant). Only less then 1% of academics have relatively good income (about 1000 USD), and this income to large extent do not determined by their activity in R&D. To put it in a few words academics in contemporary Russia is adverse social group. Scholars openly describe traditionally offhand government decisions related to R&D and directly affecting the interests of Russian academic community [Sosnov, 2004, p.3].
L. Graham, one of most profound researches of Soviet/Russian science, launched study of R&D in Russia during and after 1991, and compared it state and losses to the state and losses science suffered in Stalin's purges. He claimed that it was a huge experiment made by the history upon science and scientific community. As a result we may judge: a) science much more viable enterprise we ever thought; b) economic crisis of 1990-th pushed Russia's science toward its downfall nearer and stronger than political purges of Stalin's era [Graham, 1998, ch.3]. If "Big Seven" states spending for R&D equal 500 billion USD then Russia's expenditures for R&D is only 1,5 billion per year.
Russian President, Russian government (not to mention scientists themselves) registers the poor state of science, and its scanty financial support (4% of annual expenditure budget due to the federal law was fixed as a low limit). Despite relatively good performance of Russia's economics during last 4-5 years (about 7% annual growth) and imposing hard currency and gold reserve we see no changes in state politics toward science and education; this fact implies that the welfare of domestic scientists and lecturers will not drastically improve for at least 5 to 10 years. That's why the problem of preserving scientific community (intellectual potential) will be as acute as 10-12 years ago, most tough time for Russian science when only RAS membership diminished on 50%.
Russian scientific community becomes older, scientists leave for business, drastic fall of prestige of academic and educational employment makes this problem the cornerstone one for the future of Russia as developed country entered (or, at least purports to enter) the "golden billion" of mankind.
At present moment we can speak of Russia as a developing state. Its chance to reach postindustrial society stage entirely depends on education and R&D performance which the only sources of modifying the structure of GNP (I mean getting rid of oil and gas export dependence, and drastic enlargement of hi-tech production).
Is there any means (or strategy) of not only preserving but even development of R&D until that lucky moment when the state policy toward science will radically change, and (supplant) academics will feel generous state backing? What principles should be chosen as basic in planning and governing state R&D politics? What R&D strategy seems to be not only optimal but winning? What institutional (and organizational) forms of R&D are adequate for this winning strategy?
I think that proposed solutions will be eligible for any country with scarce state support of R&D and they'll provide most effective allocation policy of meager state spending.
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TOWARDS STRATEGY OF THE DELOPMENT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURES
Within social thought history we can find two rival approaches. The starting point of first approach is the primacy of "whole" upon the "sum of its parts"; the second approach on the contrary puts on the "parts" and preconditioned the success of the development of the "whole" by the development of the "sum of its parts". The first approach may be called social realism; the second one – social nominalism.
Social realism, represented, for instance, by Hegel and K. Marx ("man is a summation of all social relationships") judged that the development of social entity and its parts (man, social groups, etc.) determines by the whole – Absolute Idea (Hegel) or by class struggle (Marx). The dialectics of evolving of class-in-such to the class-for-itself resulted in practice of socialist (communist) states development in the disdain for human life and dignity, violence toward the personality, the excuse of concrete man tragedy by the bright future of whole mankind. We can speak of social utopism feed by the conceptual undertakings of social realism.
Social nominalism, represented, for example, by liberalism and its forerunners (J. Locke, D. Hume, A. Smith, J. Mill) judge that the man, its rights and freedom has the priority upon the state, that the state itself emerges as a result of social contract, and it provides for the citizens more comfortable and safe existence than they might have in the absence of the state. Economic strategy based upon the ideas of social nominalism resulted in high living standards for the stated of "golden billion".
Strategy of R&D based upon social realism (pursued often implicitly) imply that the progress of science depend on the activity of large academic research institutes, Universities, the choice of a priori perspective directions of research, "leading" research institutes and Universities. Namely the latest should get the lion's share of money and state support for they provide the scientific progress. This approach represented by A.I. Rakitov, the former advisor of the Russia's President [Rakitov, 2001]. He and his followers insist that state money should be concentrated on several priorities directions, and should be preserved only some research institutes and Universities of federal status. The rest of the institutes and Universities must be deprived of state support. Latest government program of reforming Russia's R&D suggests curtail of state research institutes up to 100-200. At present moment there are 3500 state research institutes, 450 only at RAS.
Almost certain that perspective directions of research, "leading" research institutes and Universities at nowadays Russia will be chosen not by honest and just rating but due to political gifts of lobbyists, like governors or Presidents of the republics, or by non-academic status of some academic "heavyweights".
The latest trends in Russian R&D politics enables us to claim that the strategy of R&D determines predominantly by principles of social realism. Perspective directions of R&D are defined, some Universities due to be announced as "leading", and they'll get tangible state support. Surely, we can be happy that our colleagues at these Universities likely to get more deserving salaries, purchase equipment for their experiments and thus be more successful in scientific activity. The rest scholars and Universities certainly will not get money spent for "leading" (or "best") Universities, and would find themselves more and more behind the progress. Low fees will lead to brain flow from non-leading Universities, their informational and hardware fillings and capabilities become worse and worse. Therefore R&D will be concentrated in small amount of Universities, representing "lucky" Russian regions (especially if they are outside Moscow and S.-Petersburg).
Meanwhile several eldest Russian Universities are already declared "National dignitary property", and lecturers there get salary 1,5 times higher that their counterparts in more younger Universities. The question rises: National dignitary property prescribed to the old walls of these Universities or their intellectual potential and faculty? Why when I was affiliated with Kazan State University (declared as National dignitary property) I was 1,5 times more valuable than when I transferred to Ulyanovsk State University? I doubt that this spatial shuffle diminished my academic records. Moreover, my experience gained at Kazan University was collected and highly appreciated at the new place. Why from the point of view of the State clerks my practice in Ulyanovsk was less useful than that in Kazan? Being in Kazan I was an element of National dignitary property but ceased to be this element when relocated to Ulyanovsk.
SOCIAL NOMINALISM PRINCIPLES AS BASIS FOR R&D STATE POLICY
Genial idea capable of shaking the world and making it better always emerged in distinct personal brain. This insight is a summation of durable reflexion, persistent labor, and polished intuition. Afterwards idea might be clarified and brushed by scientific community, smoothed at numerous discussions and academic interchange. The milieu of evolving of the idea into the "material" force, conception, capable if recruiting masses, pretty rarely envisioned itself as grand research institute, all the more so University. Usually it consists of quite compact community (ten – twenty -- at best forty scientists). It is a group pixilated – but only temporary -- by this idea. If the idea is attractive enough it might serve as a bottom of the research of dozens of institutes, and in this case we can speak of new scientific direction (branch). If the idea happened to be not good enough members of the research team eventually will perceive this fact and descend to some other teams, dealing with other ideas.
The birth and death of research groups is natural form of development of science, and it reflects rivalry and selection of research programs. Institutional "conservation" of such groups damp scientific progress. That's why successful strategy should be based upon the freedom of actions and strenuous support of scientific creativity – both personal and rather compact research communities.
This is not a mere declaration but cornerstone principle of academic policy planning. As A.I. Yablonsky stressed in 1986 ''scientific productivity is function of money investment and organization; it proportional to the logarithm of money spent and in direct ratio of the degree of organization of research process" [Yablonsky, 1986, p. 207]. The choice of right strategy under the scanty investment – key problem for the survival of science in Russia and ultimately for the fate of the country doing it best to get rid of its raw material dependence pushing it on the periphery of the postindustrial era and "golden billion".
Winning strategy therefore must stem from the principles of social nominalism. The main character, personage here is concrete scientist and particular research group which have the goal to fulfill certain task (see: [Bazhanov, 2001]).
Research institute and University may be considered as "leading" not due to the abstract definition or State decree but due the outstanding scientists who have been working there and permanently contesting with counterparts confirm the high records. They could not and should not rely upon their great precursors who lived for decades or even centuries ago (like M.V. Lomonosov, N.I. Lobachevsky, A.M. Butlerov, etc.). On the personal level science grow in non-cumulative manner. Science is like bird of Phoenix: only burning itself science could revive. Supporting academic corpses and grounding scientific policy on tombstones principles we will not succeed either in preservation of scientific community, nor in speeding up scientific progress.
To put it in a few words: only concrete scientists (persons) and small mobile research groups are worthy of State support under the conditions of constant tiny investments in R&D. . ."The big research institute (thousands of scientists) in the absence of great challenging problem of National scale and importance is inevitable bureaucratic structure likely to wreck young scholars and their ideas", - stress V.S. Letokhov, one of most well-known Russian physicists [Letokhov, 2004].
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS OF SCIENTIFIC POLICY
Grant system is most optimal and effective organizational form of mentioned above support.
Independent and objective examination by the leading scientists of their colleague projects enables to promote most effective allocation of extremely limited State money. Grant system do not know what means "perspective scientific directions" (though special grant contest may be hold in order to boost research in certain field), nor it respecting "leading institutes or Universities". Grant competition is a contest of ideas and respective projects, and champion projects become "leading" ("best").
Scientific progress is almost unpredictable for the long term. Progress is done "here and right now". Progress did not allow often foresee it results for a decade (or even a number of years). The more fundamental the less predictable discovery is. Constricting R&D to certain "perspective" directions or supporting only some "leading" Universities we risk once again – and how many times more? – find ourselves at the roadside of the progress. At the late 1980's leading Russian radio amateurs aware of all technological achievements on the West seriously discussed the problem of getting swiftly call signs for those who would like to use "walky-talky" (for such devices ought to be very popular and pervasive). Nobody could even imagine that few years later the mobile phones (cellular) system will emerge and rapidly expand. Progress as usual has chosen pathless route. A.I. Artobolevsky noted that often not the discovery itself was fruitful but it unexpected side product.
Ideas will be generated always by persons and it is unwise to restrict the horizon of scientific quest by several "perspective" directions (as A.I. Rakitov suggests in vain hope to widen it when the better times come); it is unprofitable to select "perspective" and not perspective institutes and Universities. Only the shift from the "general" entities (as University) to "partial" (concrete scientist or research group) could provide the diversity and vitality of National science and education.
Surely, Russian grant system should be essentially improved and expanded. Examination of projects must be more thorough and independent, quota's for "provincial" scientists are conceivable; quota must baffle the concentration of R&D mainly in Russian capitals. At present moment from 70 to 80% of federal grant contest holder are from Moscow and Moscow region, 10-15% from S.-Petersburg; at 1996 Moscow and St.-Petersburg dwellers hold 68,34 of RFH grants [Vaganov, 1999]. At present moment we have approximately the same figures. Urals federal region provides 25-27% of GNP but gets only 2-3% of RFBR grant support. It seems to be unjust.
I think that the share of State money for R&D allocated through grant Foundations should be radically increased (there is almost only State grant Fund in modern Russia; see also: [Dynkin, 2001]). If we adopt principle 50:50 (50% of money through grant Foundations and 50% directly to the institutes and Universities; at present moment at best only 2-3% of money are assigned for State grant Foundations like RFBR (rfbr.ru) and RFH (rfh.ru). Principle 50:50 will make Russian science much more flexible and viable. Possibility to win research grant and quite considerable amount of money in open contestation with more elderly and experience colleagues will prevent young scientists from going seeking fortune abroad (See [Milov, Sedov, 2003]. Quota's for the young scholars conceivable as well.
The qualitatively novel types of grants, supporting innovative research might be introduced for skilled scholars. Academics well-known for their works in particular field reluctant to change problem for the grant competition presupposes, so to speak, "legacy" of previous works. Chance not to win grant, and thus to lose money for further research, compels scientist to follow traditional problem and not to make any steps aside. Innovative grants can open new fields of research for such scholars who would bring to the new problem earlier gained experience and methodology. History of science provides evidence that such transfigurations might be very fruitful.
Strong emphasis on the grant system is the winning strategy of R&D when State can't be generous towards science.