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Alexander Pechenkin (Russia). Comments to Prof. J. Margolis’ paper “Conceptual differences in modeling the physical and the huma
В.Г. Федотова (Россия). Когнитивные принципы в социально-гуманитарных науках
Valentina Fedotova (Russia). Cognitive Principles in the Social and Human Sciences
Social construction of reality
J. Habermas' communicative theory
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Александр Печенкин (Россия). Комментарий к докладу проф. Дж. Марголиса

Alexander Pechenkin (Russia). Comments to Prof. J. Margolis’ paper “Conceptual differences in modeling the physical and the human sciences”


I take the liberty to say that I am a specialist in the philosophy of physical sciences. My topics are the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the structure of quantum chemistry, and the status of non-linear dynamics. I followed the interrelation of chemistry and physics, and I stressed that the theory of chemical bond and valency was reducible to quantum mechanics. In the Soviet philosophy, reductionism was not popular because it contradicted to Engels’ writings. Nevertheless it has been reductionism which has led to progress in chemistry and biology. When in Russian philosophy the conceptions of self-organization became popular I insisted that the nature of self-organization should be elucidated by means of the reduction of this phenomenon to non-linear dynamics.

According to C.P. Snow there are “two cultures” in modern society. I regard myself as belonging to physical and technological culture. Certainly, as a philosopher I am not hostile to humanities. However, in my opinion, philosophy is heterogeneous. I work in and for the philosophy of science. There are other philosophies: the philosophy of life, the philosophy of art, etc. The philosophy of science is philosophy, on the one hand, and it is science, on the other hand. The genuine philosophy of science reacts to the problems which spontaneously arise in science, it posits its problems on the base of the scientific problems, and uses scientific methods (methods of logic, mathematics, psychology) to solve these problems.


In his paper Prof. Margolis attacks my main beliefs. He says that “all would-be science are, in a deeper sense, human sciences”. He also says that “the physical sciences are themselves restricted forms of the human sciences”.

Prof. Margolis attacks reductionism, which determines the status of physical sciences. He claims, that ”The reflexive features of the human or encultured world are not… reducible to the extensional properties of the physical sciences admit in the world they chose to examine”. He also states that “to claim… that non-extensional… is reducible to the extensional … is tantamount to impoverishing the competence of science”.

Prof. Margolis does not highly appreciate the current philosophy of the physical sciences. He claims that “every attempt at a reasonably explicit methodology ranging over the physical sciences has simply failed to establish its conceptual authority”. Here he refers to well-known difficulties that the philosophy of science confronts by distinguishing between theoretical and empirical terms, by defining unobservable entities, by justifying induction, by inventing idealized models of the laboratory life, etc.

Nevertheless, to confirm his approach Prof. Margolis refers to the philosophy of science. He refers to Th. Kuhn’s “The structure of scientific revolutions” to emphasize that the “gains and loses of comparative conceptual power can not always be straightforwardly apprised”. However, his reference to Th. Kuhn has a positive charge. To his mind, Th.Kuhn shows that scientists’ thought and perception are “enlanguaged” and “encultured”, that the “study of any objective data ineliminably implicates the reflexive features of such data”. “There is no escape there”, he writes.

Prof. Margolis also refers to constructive realism. In contrast to “representational realism” this realism shows that “what is admitted to be “given” in experience “can not be cognitively decomposed in order to determine the separate subjective and objective contributions to the work of any of the science”.

I agree that T.Kuhn’s philosophy and constructive realism incline us to put the physical science closer to the human science. However, every conception of the philosophy of science provides just a projection of what real science is. Every philosophy of science is an idealized model of real science. We can not say anything reasonable about science, if we don’t use the philosophy of science terminology. But there is no unified philosophy of science. There are different philosophical conceptions: positivism, constructive empiricism, instrumentalism, realism, materialism, etc. Each conception provides its explanation of what science is and these explanations differ from each other.

I believe that materialistic explanation of science makes its sense. I mean the conception according to which science provides a true representation of reality (in contrast to religion). I think that positivism also makes sense. Positivism represents a scientific theory as a hypothetical deductive system. It is useful to explain, say, the mathematization of modern science.

Incidentally, the word “mathematics” is not present in Prof. Margolis’ paper. Moreover, he says that the “human sciences… make the success of the physical science possible”. I think that this success has appreciably been provided by mathematics and positivism (or the positivitistically inclined philosophy) contributed a lot to explain the status of mathematics in modern science.

So, I believe that Margolis’ conclusion on the nature of physical sciences proceeds from his a priori decision in favor of one version of the philosophy of science and against the other versions.

There is another line in Prof. Margolis’ argumentation. To my mind, here the key statements are the following: “the work of the physical sciences is ineluctably and profoundly reflexive” and “it is self-deceptive to suppose that the physical sciences are not reflexive in the very same sense in which the human sciences are”.

In the paper I have not found a definition what the “reflexive” is. From the context I conclude that “to be reflexive” is a property of human beings’ judgments, it appears in the course of “linguistics utterance and communication, intelligent behavior”, etc. Since the primary empirical facts, sense data are theoretically and emotionally loaded, the physical sciences have human beings’ reflexion in their foundations.

I think that the situation is more complicated. The physical sciences are based not only on empirical facts, but also on mathematics. Sense data become the empirical facts as they are expressed in mathematical structures. The data treatment obeys rigorous rules, which tend to eliminate human being’s attitudes, emotions, and hence reflection.

I agree with Prof. Margolis’ claim that “thought and perception are themselves culturally penetrated by methodology”, that methodology enters, “constructively”, into the “very constitution of… our primary empirical data”.

What is methodology? As for me, this is the philosophy of science. The philosophy of science is reflexive since it is partially philosophy, the human science. The philosophy of science constructively enters into science itself. However, there is a reverse trend: the physical science constructively enters into the very constitution of the philosophy of science and forces it to develop rigorous concepts and methods. As a result the philosophy of science is a very special area of philosophy.

I think that the physical sciences must be properly appreciated. They differ very largely from the human sciences.


В.Г. Федотова (Россия). Когнитивные принципы в социально-гуманитарных науках


Сегодня в когнитивных науках распространена идея сведения сознания к знанию, а последнего к обработке информации. В некоторых науках и при решении некоторых задач такой подход приносит новые результаты. Социально-гуманитарные науки так же проявляют интерес к когнитивным подходам.

Тенденция рассмотрения сознания как знания в социально-гуманитарных науках получила серьезное развитие. Она распространилась на изучение даже повседневного сознания. Самое общество стало толковаться как «общество знания». Усилился проектно-технологический аспект, где знание выступает в виде информации, которую надо использовать. Однако с самого начала становится понятным, что у когнитивных процедур социально-гуманитарного знания, есть своя специфика. В свете этой специфики традиционный когнитивизм нередко выступает как в некоторых отношениях полезная натуралистическая редукция, которая при абсолютизации превращается просто в ошибку, не соответствующую культур-центристским парадигмам социально-гуманитарного знания. Онтологические предпосылки объективирующих начал науки и техники не являются универсальными. Поэтому исследование когнитивистских подходов в социально-гуманитарных науках предполагает наличие пределов, в которых их применение не разрушает научности.

Идея предела, границ, в которых существует наука, побуждает подумать о когнитивизме в социально-гуманитарных науках как об опасном для них полюсе, если эти подходы станут неадекватными социально-гуманитарным наукам.

Когнитивные науки во многом продолжают информатизацию общества, и потому, казалось бы, должны способствовать развитию черт постсовременности. Тем не менее, они в большей мере характеризуют экономоцентричный модерн, желание подчинить человека производству и выгоде.

Социально-гуманитарные науки и знания, помимо отождествления сознания с знанием, и технологических возможностей, сближаются с когнитивными науками в том, что в них устранено различие между эпистемой и доксой, познанием и практикой. Именно это формирует сегодня их когнитивные подходы.

В докладе рассмотрена проблема приемлемых когнитивных принципов на примере трех направлений:

- социальное конструирование реальности (А. Шюц, П. Бергер, Т. Лукмана, А. Хеллера, политолог А. Вендт), которое иллюстрируется на примере «хорошего общества»;

- теория коммуникативного действия (Ю. Хабермас);

- теория символического обмена и интеракции (символический интеракционизм Дж. Мида и Герберта Блумера).

Все эти три подхода характеризуют приемлемый для социально-гуманитарных наук культур-центристский «когнитивизм», где применены обозначенные выше принципы когнитивных наук, но трансформированы в соответствии со специфическими объектами социально-гуманитарного исследования. В докладе рассматривается дальнейшая перспектива анализа специфики когнитивных принципов социально-гуманитарных наук, решающим среди которых является их связь с повседневностью и реальным жизненным дискурсом.


Valentina Fedotova (Russia). Cognitive Principles in the Social and Human Sciences


Today in cognitive sciences there is an idea of reduction of consciousness to knowledge, and the latter – to information processing. In some sciences and in solving some problems such approach brings new results. Social-humanitarian sciences also have interest to cognitive approaches.

A tendency of consideration of consciousness as knowledge in social – humanitarian sciences has developed. It has covered analysis even of every day consciousness. The society itself began to be interpreted as "society of knowledge". A project-technological aspect where knowledge acts as information that should be used has strengthened. However from the very beginning it becomes clear that cognitive procedures of social-humanitarian knowledge have their own specificity. In view of this specificity traditional cognitivism often acts in some respects as useful naturalistic reduction, which, when absolutizing, simply turns into a mistake not corresponding to culture-centrist paradigms of social-humanitarian knowledge. Ontologic prerequisites of objectifying science and technology foundations are not universal. Therefore research of cognitive approaches in social-humanitarian sciences assumes the presence of limits in which their application does not destroy scientific character.

There are different ways to subject science to pressure that will deduce us from its boundaries. As French researcher Bataille - a left materialist and a leader of surrealists – said: "we cannot advance cognition to last ditches without the cognition itself that aspires to reduce people up to a level of subordinate, practically used things will dissolve … Nobody can cognize (so – V. F.) and at the same time protect himself from destruction". The criticism of science by Bataille is based not on cognitive rationalization. On the contrary he sees ways of destruction threatening to it not in objectifying tendencies of science, but in economic pressure of capitalist system with its principle of benefit, which subjectifies the science. But all the same the idea of limitations, borders, in which the science exists, induces to think about cognitivism in social–humanitarian sciences as about the second pole dangerous for them, if these approaches become inadequate.

Cognitive sciences in many respects continue informatization of society and thus, apparently, should promote development of post-modernity features. Nevertheless they characterize increasingly an economic-centric modern style, a desire to subordinate a person to manufacture and benefit. It comes in contradiction with changes, which are observed even by supporters of the idea that modern is an uncompleted project. J. Habermas who carries out this idea consistently mentions, at the same time, that practice loses today a paradigm of manufacture. He asserts that:

manufacture restricts understanding of practice;

naturalizes it excluding normativeness;

contains values that are lost in connection with the historical end of labor society. This last thesis requires an explanation. If earlier people left agriculture for industry and then left industry for service, now there is a problem of 20:80 in hi-tech countries. It characterizes a situation when only 20% of population will be necessary for postindustrial manufacture, and 80% will be no place to leave and they will be "nonworking workers".

The social-humanitarian sciences and knowledge, besides an identification of consciousness with knowledge and technological opportunities, get together with cognitive sciences in that a difference between episysteme and doxa, cognition and practice is eliminated in them. Just this forms their cognitive approaches today.

We'll focus on the three directions of analysis in which these three abovementioned cognitive features approve themselves:

- social construction of reality (A. Schutz, P. Berger, T. Luckmann, A. Heller, political scientist A. Wendt);

- a theory of a communicative action (J. Habermas);

- a theory of symbolical exchange and interaction (symbolic interactionism of G.H. Mead and H. Blumer).

Let's consider them in more detail.


Social construction of reality

It is a leading anti-naturalistic interpretation of every day life, which is not interested in its quasi-naturalistic description as it does not consider it beyond the context of social construction of reality the core of which is described masterfully on the basis of E. Husserl's phenomenology in A. Schutz's, P. Berger's, T. Luckmann's (in sociology), A. Heller's, A. Wendt's (in political science) works and in works of other researchers. Concepts a status of which is new appear especially during crisis periods, during epochs of transformation when new conceptual tools connecting representations of every day life with scientific and philosophical ideas are found. These are concepts of discourse. The discourse is such (by definition) a discussion of a problem in philosophy and science that cannot ignore a discussion on the given theme in a sphere of everydayness and in a number of specialized spheres of activities and knowledge. In other words the discourse is a discussion of a problem in philosophy, science and, simultaneously, beyond their boundaries. Representation of every day life in the discourse by such elements as stereotypification, invariance of mental reactions, experience of solving social problems by a group, transformation of individual creative achievements into intersubjective ones, static character, archetype secularization, adaptive opportunities1 in phenomenological tradition replenishes with a number of procedures of social construction of reality.

This methodology allows to work not only with every day life as a steady complex of intersubjective links of the life world reproduced day by day, but also with breaks of every day life, its destruction and changes, attempts to reconstruct the destroyed every day life typical for our time. Phenomenology more and more orients to other's experience. "An opportunity to exceed the bounds (given initially. - V. F.) of the life world belongs to an ontological situation of human existence", - asserts A. Schutz2. Just the theme of an everydayness change and a different everyday reality collision became a leading theme of A. Schutz and his followers. In works "The Stranger: An Essay in Social Psychology"3 and "The Homecomer" it is shown changes of the vital world consisting of a person's getting to new everydayness deficient in former every day life experience self-evidences and ability of former methods of activity to solve vital problems.

Ideas about social reality as the unities of the objective (the institutional) and the subjective (consciousness) goes from A. Schutz - one of the most influential representatives of a phenomenological tradition in social cognition. He negated naturalism taking on trust social reality as an objective entity. In Schutz's opinion social sciences not simply study the social world, but take part in its creation together with carriers of ordinary consciousness, with all people creating the social world and having knowledge of it. He writes that the main goal of social sciences is to get the ordered meaning of social reality. A term "social reality" he understands as totality of objects and events inside the socio-cultural world as experience of ordinary consciousness of people living their daily lives. It is a world of cultural objects and social institutions. Here all were born and should find a point of support for themselves, set mutual relations. Both the world of nature and the world of culture are not a subjective world, but an inter-subjective one, a world common for everybody4. Schutz imagines everydayness as the world of self-evidence that everyone shares with other people and reproduces habitually in stable situations. As P. Berger and T. Luckmann showed the theoretical definitions of reality (philosophical, scientific and even mythological) do not exhaust that is "real" for members of society. People know as a reality that they meet in their daily, non- or pre-theoretical life… This knowledge forms "a factory of meanings" without which there can not be any society5.

Within Russian national discourse of social problems it is important to discover the entire common sense knowledge of society, social distribution of knowledge between the specialized and unspecialized layers, points of convergence and divergence. Just this creates a methodological basis of philosophical analysis of social knowledge and social construction of reality.

As A. Heller, an explorer succeeding Lucas and, at the same time, working in close to him traditions, points out human expression of a thought possesses the force of objectivization that is found out in products of human activities clear to all people: a manufacturer and other people – as elements of their common world. Objectivization is a process, by means of which products of human self-alienation get objective character.

Berger and Luckmann see four ways and, at the same time, levels of social construction of reality. The social construction of reality is an embodiment of ideas to society, which recognized these ideas and made them collective representations. The first of them is habitualization, i.e. turning into a habit, transformation into everydayness. The term close to that named by M. Weber as routinization. Among a variety of realities there is one, the most essential reality. It is reality of a daily life. The every day reality is non-problematizible reality. Its social construction usually consists of almost automatic reproduction through tradition, memory, knowledge and representations transmitted from generation to generation. The second way Berger and Luckmann name typification. It divides objects into classes (the man, the buyer, the European and so on). Every day life has self-reproduced non-problematizable typifications for typical situations. Typifications create in the sum repeating samples of interaction and make social structure. Destruction of every day life in case of sharp social reorientations destroys the typification, samples of interaction and, hence, the social structure. So in traditional society there is a clear representation what is "a good person". In modern society typification of "a good person" becomes more complex. A typical example of an inadequate typification is non-distinction of good and evil, beautiful and ugly, true and false, suitable and unsuitable, a friend and an enemy. The social construction of reality assumes restoration of a typification procedure itself by a discussion of number of problematized types. The third level and way are institutionalization. The institutionalization fixes typification. Any typification already is an institution. However not all institutions are typifications. Institutions also include roles and statuses, system of sanctions and social control for maintenance of norms, an order, common aims, directions and samples of behavior (standards), establishments, codes, laws and so on. Without general collective representations achieved as a result of typification, and efforts directed in considerably transforming society to achievement of typification and formation of collective representations (through activities of scientists, mass-media, public organizations, literature, art, education, activities of notables) social structure as a whole and institutions activities cannot be provided. The formula "We do it again" as Berger and Luckmann speak now is replaced with the formula "It is done in such a manner". The world obtains stability in consciousness, it becomes much more real and cannot be changed easily. Thus the understanding that even objective properties are products of activities of individuums. It is an important and obliging the philosopher to activity proof that the habitual world can be both cancelled by activity of consciousness and created by it. An aspiration to achieve integrative meanings does not eliminate cultural variety and even ideological pluralism. It is inherent in any society. A part of institutionalization and simultaneously a last step of objectivization is reification - objectification when many phenomena created by people are perceived as quasi-natural. It is forgotten that they are products of human activities. And, at last, the fourth stage and way of social construction of reality is legitimation. It is a process that is necessary for transfer of the just developed institutions to new generations, for their validity in opinion of those who did not establish these institutions and would easily be tempted with new variants of society alteration or even with abandonment of social establishments as fictions in relation to psycho-physiological needs, reality of instincts and temptations of hedonism. The legitimation can be in the best way described as semantic objectivization of "the second order". The legitimation creates the new meanings serving for integration of those meanings that already are available. The role of the legitimation is to make already institutionalized objectivizations of "the first order" objectively accessible and subjectively probable. The full cycle of social construction of reality includes the specified ways as steps6.

In this specific embodiment cognitive principles cannot transform sociology to a cognitive science as keep for it socially accepted values, an aspiration to the truth, a socio-cultural context, multi-paradigmatic and interdisciplinarian approaches.


J. Habermas' communicative theory

Themes of a dialogue, communications, tolerance, multi-culturalism were included to a number of obvious means of cognition and reconciliation of both cognitive and real contradictions. A dialogue is a word of Greek origin meaning a conversation between two or several persons. During the Renaissance it began to be understood as a debate or political dispute7. Now terms "a dialogue", "communication", "tolerance" have formed the basis for renaming some processes that formerly had other names, for example, "a discussion", "a consideration", "an interaction", "mutual relations of contradictions", a compromise", "solidarity", "sociality". A dialogue, communications are undoubtedly both a discussion and a consideration, and an interaction of people and ideas. The dialogue is an element of dialectics that is characterized by unity and conflict of oppositions. From the dialogue and communication they expect a compromise, collective solidarity and sociality of new quality that can grow on their basis. Any of these names does not look a panacea for all troubles though such universality is attributed to a dialogue, communications, and tolerance. In this sense – they characterize style rather than content. The dialogue considered as an element of an antique drama, as a conversation between two – and since times of Sophocles - three actors8.

For M. Bakhtin a dialogue, polyphony, multi-world is a problem of Dostoevsky's poetics. According to V. Bibler a dialogue is demonstration of dialectics, and as A.S. Akhyiezer emphasized fairly and applied Bibler's views, civil society should include a forum (a dialogue) of social forces among themselves as well as their communication with the authority. Non-articulation of positions of various social layers of the Russian society, insufficient communications with the authority makes the today's Russian society amorphous and far from a civil condition.

Habermas consistently carries out in his works an idea that a theme of a dialogue does not correspond to discourse of modernity built on recognition of mind and a general aspiration to reasonable assimilation of the reality, and, we shall repeat, modern for Habermas is an uncompleted project. For a proof of this he criticizes H. and G. Bohme's attempt to find actual motives of Kant's criticism of pure reason as having an underlying reason of a dialogue with visionist Svedenborg. Habermas explains that Kant had criticized the reason based on its prospect, i.e. within modernity, and not comparing at all the reason with "other", "another" conditions previous to it9. An epoch of modern is focused on the reason instead of its opposing or a dialogue with all that has no such aspirations. The dialogue that could be here would be a dialogue of supporters of one idea. Therefore a need for a dialogue, communication, in the opinion of Habermas, arose later approximately since F. Nietzsche who had shaken an old building of rationalization.

The late modernity loses monologism and searches for new reasonable bases in a dialogue. The determinative mechanism of rational consciousness correction and perfection, in V.S. Shvyrev's opinion, is attitude towards building of a more scale model of person's inclusion into the world, expanding his world-attitude. A critical-reflective line in development of rationalization as against non-critical-optimistic one he considers as a source of non-classical interpretation of rationalization. Becoming the main line of development of sciences about nature in European ideas classical objective rationalization, - the author writes, - already in XVII - XVIII centuries ceased to be the unique form of rational consciousness10. Just as from this moment necessity of dialogue, a problem of a dialogue appears. But, we shall notice, a dialogue of those who is included to general sharing of rationality. It is a dialogue of different people, but nevertheless the people who in the similar manner understand the world. V.S. Shvyrev opposes "constructive dialogism" both to "monologic rational cognition" and to "relativistic pluralism". I would add that to this cognitive "rule" there corresponds a sociological requirement of absence of monopoly for the truth eliminating prerequisites of dogmatism in scientific community and, simultaneously, obliging it to avoid marginalization. Thus a problem of dialogue during the epoch of modern arises lately enough as a problem of mutual relations and communications among people being within the framework of one culture and general horizon of rationalization.

It is necessary to note that dialogue and communication are interpreted in the implicit manner in our literature as verbally achieved consensus that results in elimination of the real conflict. Only lingual interpretation of dialogue making it judgment of intention created a lot of proclaimed consensus at real irreconcilability of the parties. Habermas derides such a conception literally: "… a similar culturalistic conception ... as if should suggest that people sovereignty has to move to a plane of cultural dynamics of the avant-garde forming opinions. Such an assumption should generate mistrust to intellectuals: they own a word and pull on themselves a blanket of authority that they risk to dissolve in wordage"11. Already Kant showed that signing of a peace treaty when retaining prerequisites of war makes such a treaty senseless. Senseless "dialogues", "communications" and "tolerances" have flooded our literature and our life. Actually an action of dialogue or communication is possible when it is already biult in the existing order of things and is capable to display it at simultaneous establishment of interpersonal attitudes and a lingual expression of participants' intentions. Habermas shows that an action of communication and mutual understanding is capable to execute functions of action coordination mechanism, to form environment of consent when it is capable to understand the existing order of things and to imagine it: "The reason expressed in communicative action promotes mutual understanding, but only together with the traditions, which merged into especial totality, public practice and all complex of corporal experience"12. So a dialogue with terrorists is possible, if from cognitive point of view it is possible to reach an impartial estimation of their actions reasons and to declare it directly. A methodologically important statement of Habermas is that a state respecting international law, which solves a problem on humanitarian interventions only based on its own representations, can mistake concerning concurrence of its interests with interests of other countries or panhuman interests. In his opinion it is not a question of good will or bad intentions, but a subject of epistemology. Expectation to find something acceptable for everybody is checked by an impartial consideration. Rules of such consideration: all the parties involved should similarly take into account prospects of other participants. Zb. Bzezhinsky speaks wonderful words about September, 11: "It is impossible to go away from the historic fact that the American intervention in the Near East is quite clearly a reason by which terrorism was directed towards America - the same as, for example, the English intervention to Ireland prepared often London and even the Royal Family IRA attack. British admitted this basic fact and tried to react to it simultaneously at military and political levels. America on contrast shows remarkable unwillingness to consider political measurement of terrorism and identification of terrorism with a political context"13. And, hence, here there cannot be a speech about a dialogue and the more so about a pacification.

In our opinion many overlook that, as a rule, through a dialogue it is expected to resolve a conflict between rational and irrational partners or, at least, between carriers of different cultures, different rational self-consciousnesses. But just this represents the greatest difficulty. It is visible best of all by example of countries mutual relations. At the World philosophical congress Habermas explained American policy in Iraq, arisen because of marginalization of the United Nations, with that there is a contradiction between the United Nations Charter, according to which any country - liberal, authoritative, dictatorial – are incorporated to the United Nations, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights demanding, in principle, such political regimes that would not break human rights. The various regimes comprising the United Nations cannot agree upon acceptable norms of this organization activity among themselves. Kant's idea of everlasting peace, in J. Habermas' opinion stated at the World philosophical congress (Istanbul, August 2003), was not realized in many respects because Kant had not provided for a difficulty of a dialogue with others, not such as a European person. Kant, in Habermas' opinion, had shown insusceptibility to birth of new historical consciousness and growth of acknowledgement of cultural distinctions, growth of importance of non-European, unchristian cultures what makes an agreement with them problematic14.

An idea that we speak with an "other", and the "other" is not necessarily "a friend", imposes substantial restrictions on dialogical, communicative theories and on a principle of tolerance. E. Levinas having passed horrors of a fascist concentration camp had a reason to see in an "other" not only a friend, but also a neganthropus. J.-P. Sartre considered that a hell is others. Certainly, the formula of dialogue and communication has its own chances, and all of them should be used. However there are objective features of rationality crisis, which demand attitudes to find out whether such a dialogue is possible. Structures of a dialogue, communication and tolerance are formed in advanced society, have institutional execution instead of they are phenomena of the unfinished society.

Are dialogue and communication between carriers of a different type of cultures and rationalities possible? Incommensurability of political forces became a real stumbling rock for dialogue concepts. Habermas emphasized in the mentioned report at the Congress that the model of unstable balance of forces among independent collective actors more is not applicable. They are free from certain normative considerations and pursue only their own interests determined by themselves. An image of international conflicts does not hold longer into a classical type of a war among states. They are replaced with three new threats to international peace: criminal states, unsuccessful aggressive states and international terrorism. Habermas perceives new threats as a result of objective changes.

Reconciliation by means of public use of mind is the core of the communicative theory that acts as the foundation of democracy as well. Habermas points out three models of democracy: liberal, republican and deliberative15.

In a liberal model of democracy a state is considered as public management machinery. Society is considered as a private persons community structured by market. Policy is represented by expression of private wills in which the state plays an auxiliary role of the machinery.

In a republican model of democracy a concept of negative freedom is denied. Rights of citizens are defined as rights to political participation, political communication and positive freedoms. Such democracy offers political system of socialization and reflexion of the life context of morals.

In a deliberative model of democracy discussion, communication, and ability to agree dominate. This model opposes to a liberal one where democracy is a guard of an economic community and to a republican one where the state is treated as moral generality. The deliberative principle is closer to direct democracy, to direct expression of political will of citizens.

Communicative ethics, change of communication between countries for more adequate understanding of their needs and a joint discussion of ways to improve their lives to which many invoked has a certain prospect that, in our opinion, is obviously smaller than expected.

As a whole communication conceptions have obviously colored interest to cognitivism working with consciousness as knowledge and orienting received knowledge practically, but numerous contexts, prerequisites and difficulties do not make the theory of communication a cognitive science.


Symbolic interactionism

I shall not look at this concept in detail. Its essence: personal and social actions – are formed with the help of symbols, which are got in process of socialization, mutually proved to be true and changed in social interaction. Meanings of symbols assume that many people share them. According to G.H. Mead there is an ability of people to image themselves as objects of their own thought. Personality has the “self” and that it adopted in interaction with others. According to H. Blumer people are acting on the basis of meanings they give to objects and events. Values are created. They are results of interpretations in contexts of interaction. Ch. Cooley's "glass-looking self" theory reflects the same.

Here we also see actions of cognitive principles of consciousness and knowledge identification, a technological aspect and connection with practice. However this all does not transform sociology, psychology and social psychology to cognitive sciences.

Thus sociology of knowledge becomes a method of social cognition of the world constructed with the help of knowledge. Today, as G.M. Andreeva considers, psychology of social consciousness as a cognitive science has appeared providing for promotion towards sociology of knowledge in the above-mentioned meaning.

Though the above-mentioned approaches have long enough history their advancement as leading methods of social-human sciences is linked with abrupt social changes: globalization, absence of a uniform model of postindustrial society, occurrence of "the new world of new worlds" (E. Tiryakian), "new economy", " knowledge society".

Abrupt changes bring about change of technogenic civilization value as a prerequisite for successful development. As it is shown in V.S. Stepin's, I.T. Kasavin's, A.I. Utkin's works we see search for normative legitimation of new order substantiation today. It is a noble goal that faces philosophers and other experts and to which scientists of the West also come nearer. But it is not operationalized, intended for objective process or social movements. Now we have only the Islamic system opposition to values of a technogenic civilization, probably, revolutionary Christianity in countries of the third world16. But their alternative to the existing world order is far from panhuman one.

Obviously, it is necessary to connect a normative aspect with a cognitive one during legitimation of new valuable relations; we have tried to make this in our work "Good Society"17. First of all good society is defined empirically by such criteria as life expectancy, health, education, annual earnings (in Russia it is 2.5 thousand dollars, in the West – 30 to 40 thousand dollars), solidarity, safety, effectiveness.

A normative aspect is the most problem one; for ones one thing is good, for others - another. And, at the same time, society cannot exist with absence of common ideas about good. It is a strong reason to discuss the entire spectrum of meanings. E. Husserl believed that there could be normative sciences, for example, logic making the basic measures rather than the basic attributes to which the object corresponds. A normative statement can be expressed as ought, and can be expressed as a consequence of theoretical conclusions.

Theoretically good society can be constructed by resolution of antinomies of right and good, freedom and good, individual good and public one. It is necessary only to remember that "complex societies cannot keep their integrity only at the expense of feelings those similarly to feelings of sympathy or trust are oriented to near sphere. The moral behavior with regard to others requires "artificial" virtues, first of all, tune to justice", - Habermas says.

As the result we should conclude that normative maintenance of modernity through the market and the state affects the life spheres not allowing sciences of society to become positive cognitive ones. "It is impossible to cognize and to protect oneself (science – V. F.) against destruction", - we repeat Bataille's words already with reference to the other pole - cognitive objectivization of knowledge.

We find ourselves obliged, therefore, to acknowledge that we cannot return to the old distinction in the old way. There’s the beginning of the inescapable heterodoxy of the human sciences released from the hegemonies of reductionism and dualism — which starts in earnest with Hegel’s having thoroughly historicized the very meaning of Kant’s greatest discovery. The rest of what is needed needs to turn to a close analysis of what is irreducibly reflexive in the human or cultural way. In Anglo-American philoso­phy, that would be the discovery of a new conceptual continent.