Подборка материалов по председательству казахстана в обсе (1 января-14 февраля 2010 г.) Оглавление
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Polit100.ru, 19.01.2010, Нурсултан Назарбаев готов к председательству своей страны в ОБСЕПрезидент Казахстана Нурсултан Назарбаев в своем видеообращении к участникам венского заседания Постоянного совета Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе подчеркнул важность предстоящего председательства Казахстана в ОБСЕ и ответственность, которую осознает руководство страны, приступая к исполнению председательских полномочий. «Безусловно, ситуация в мире осложняет экзамен, который Казахстану предстоит выдержать в качестве страны-председателя ОБСЕ. Однако самые актуальные проблемы, с необходимостью решения которых сегодня сталкивается ОБСЕ, всегда были поставлены во главу угла внешней политики нашей страны», – заявил Назарбаев. Президент отметил, что председательство в ОБСЕ воспринимается в его стране «не только как внешнеполитический успех, но и как ценность общенационального масштаба». «Казахстан в качестве действующего председателя будет твердо привержен основополагающим принципам и ценностям ОБСЕ», – заключил Нурсултан Назарбаев. Белорусские Новости, 19.01.2010, Казахстан намерен выступать за упрощение визового режима в рамках ОБСЕВо время председательства в ОБСЕ в 2010 году Казахстан намерен выступать за упрощение визового режима в рамках ОБСЕ, в том числе для Беларуси, сообщил посол Казахстана в Беларуси Анатолий Смирнов 19 января на пресс-конференции в Минске. «Это одна из главных тем, на которую Казахстан планирует обратить внимание. На 2010 год намечен ряд мероприятий по упрощению визового режима со многими странами, куда входит и Беларусь. Думаю, белорусский вопрос в процессе обсуждения и принятия решений будет рассматриваться», — сказал Смирнов. По словам посла, основной акцент в решении вопроса об упрощении визового режима Казахстан будет делать на необходимости проведения консультаций между заинтересованными странами, отмечает ссылка скрыта. Сайт ОБСЕ, 19.01.2010, OSCE's Corfu Process key for future of European security, says EU president Spain's foreign ministerThe OSCE-anchored dialogue on the future of European security known as the Corfu Process brings an opportunity that must be seized, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos told the OSCE Permanent Council today. Moratinos, whose country holds the rotating EU presidency, said the Corfu Process had "reactivated the role of the OSCE and was offering a strategic perspective and structured procedure for discussion." "The anchoring of the Corfu Process in the OSCE shows that security in Europe has a global and indivisible character," he said. Moratinos, who was OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in 2007, welcomed Kazakhstan's Chairmanship of the OSCE this year, saying the Central Asian country's leadership brings an "historical opportunity for Kazakhstan as well as for the OSCE." Kazakhstan has proposed holding an OSCE summit in 2010, and Moratinos said the EU was eager to see that such a meeting would have substantial content. "From my side, I want to reiterate that I believe that a summit is indispensible to generate the political impetus that the OSCE needs in order to significantly advance in core matters," he said. Consensus among the OSCE's 56 participating States is required for a summit to be held. Moratinos also called on OSCE participating States to revitalize the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and to adapt the Vienna Document, an OSCE agreement from 1999 that comprises confidence and security-building measures including obligations to exchange military information. "We need to be ambitious and reflect on mechanisms that could generate trust, security and stability in a strategic environment that is very different from the one that existed when the current instruments were created," he said. On Georgia, Moratinos noted that though the EU has a mission in Georgia, it was "in favour of restoring the OSCE's presence on the ground". On Nagorno-Karabakh, he said that the frequent contacts between the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan had created "a positive dynamic that should not be wasted", and he called for talks in the 5+2 format to be resumed to resolve the Transdniestra conflict. "The efforts we are making to strengthen security and stability in Europe are worth nothing if they do not contribute to the resolution of real problems on the ground," he said. The Permanent Council is one of the OSCE's main, regular decision-making bodies. It meets weekly in Vienna to discuss developments in the OSCE area and to make appropriate decisions. Turkish Weekly, 19.01.10, Less Democracy, More Security: Kazakhstan and the OSCEKazakhstan’s chairing of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the first former Soviet republic or Central Asian state to do so, is a huge achievement for Astana. It is less of a success for the OSCE itself. The organisation’s commitment to monitoring elections, strengthening human rights, and supporting democratisation sits uncomfortably with Kazakhstan’s track record on these issues. Fully aware of this, Astana has chosen instead to emphasise the OSCE’s first and second ‘dimensions’ – politico-military security, and economic and environmental security. The priorities outlined by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, and his Foreign Minister (now OSCE Chairman-in-Office) Kanat Saudabayev, are instructive (OSCE, 14 January). There are three that should be closely considered. Firstly is Mr Saudabayev’s explicit reference to Russia’s draft European Security Treaty. The EST, distributed to cautious European and American diplomats in December, would alter Eurasia’s security architecture to give greater weight to Russia and thereby marginalise NATO and the OSCE itself (Caucasus Update, December 7 2009). The EST was quietly dropped by Western policymakers: for Astana to bring it up again is not only diplomatically awkward, but raises some interesting questions about how Kazakhstan views its relationship with the wider Eurasian community. In his address to the OSCE, President Nazarbayev declared that the biggest challenge facing the organisation was “whether it can convert itself into a structure that recognizes the diversity of the world. . . or whether it will continue to be an organization segmented into blocs, where the West remains aloof from the space “east of Vienna”?” In other words, will Europe and North America continue to criticise the former Soviet space for paying insufficient attention to democracy, human rights, and so on. In light of this surprisingly blunt criticism of Western moralising, it seems that Astana could view Russia’s EST as an alternative to the OSCE, not (as Moscow intended) to NATO. Russia grudgingly tolerates the OSCE for providing it with a seat at the table on European security, but loathes NATO; Kazakhstan is generally positive towards the Alliance, which provides it with training and equipment, but dislikes the OSCE’s democratisation agenda. Nonetheless, President Nazabayev recognises the organisation’s importance. Perhaps in a veiled rebuff to Russia (in which case, he was simply being polite with regards to the EST), he insisted that “the OSCE is an organization that cannot be replaced. Its stagnation or disappearance would create a volatile vacuum in the Euro-Atlantic area”. The second and most promising priority area is Afghanistan. Kazakhstan’s geographic location means that, unlike European chairs of the OSCE, the situation in Afghanistan could pose a genuine threat to its security, if violence flares in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Astana’s cordial relations with most of the other Central Asian states also puts it in a better position to support border-strengthening measures along the Afghan frontier, and to encourage collaboration against Islamist extremism in the region. The third significant priority is the focus on the South Caucasus. Mr Saudabayev announced that his first visit as Chairman-in-Office would be to the region, and solicited help from the OSCE delegates in resolving the conflicts there. Certainly, Kazakhstan has a unique role to play in mediating in the region’s conflicts. As a former Soviet republic, and a state in the heart of Eurasia, Kazakhstan can offer its services as an impartial negotiator who knows first-hand the tensions between Russia and its former satellites (in the case of Georgia), as well as the complex ethno-political legacy which the USSR left behind (in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan). Given Kazakhstan’s desire to establish itself as an energy source for the West, the Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan energy and transport corridor also helps to bind it to the region. But international politics is a tough business, especially in Eurasia. A shared history and a mutual interest in energy routes will not easily translate into conflict resolution. Kazakhstan has, for instance, expressed its willingness to help settle the conflict between Georgia and Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is unlikely to do so. From Russia’s point of view the OSCE is still the OSCE, whether it is headed by Kazakhstan or (as in 2009) by Greece. Astana’s chairmanship does not change the realities on the ground or the hard-headed national interests of regional players. It is also unlikely to fire up renewed efforts by the Minsk Group, the OSCE’s own trilateral group of mediators tasked with resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In other words, we should not expect too much from Kazakhstan. The OSCE Chairman-in-Office is just that: a chairman. The organisation’s consensus-focused model means that no single state has the ability or the time to force through any sweeping policies or declarations. Compromise and dialogue are the order of the day. This may be useful, nonetheless. Kazakhstan’s eagerness to avoid talking about democracy and human rights might force it to focus heavily on politico-military security, and to help create a space for contentious issues, such as the EST or Nagorno-Karabakh, to be discussed. More security and less democracy may not be the most welcome approach. But security is in short supply in parts of Eurasia: the chance to build it should not be missed. |