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Еуи-Су Ким (Корея). Комментарий к докладу Елены Гурко
The Theory of Epistemic Rationality
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Еуи-Су Ким (Корея). Комментарий к докладу Елены Гурко

Eui-Soo Kim (Korea). Comments to Dr. Helena Gourko’s “Knowledge and Religion: Derrida’s Radical Reinterpretation”


It was my honor to have a chance to comment on Dr. Helena Gourko’s article about J. Derrida’s essay on Religion, and I have a chance to read Derrida’s works that I haven’t read much before.

However, I’m afraid my commentary might disappoint Dr. Gourko and Derrida, since it is not a professional comment of a specialist and might not draw a professional and delicate discussion. I hope my commentary offers a kind explanation to non-professionals and can be supplemented by discussions with other participants.

I haven’t had a chance to study about French philosophers including Derrida. I only read a few books of Foucault and Althusser. I only remember Derrida by the fact that he supported Heidegger during the controversy after the book of Farias, Heidegger et Nazisme, was published in 1987. I was disappointed with Derrida’s stand because I introduced the relationship of Heidegger and nationalsocialism to the Korean philosophy community through Poegeller’s article, “Den Fuehrer fuehren?”(1985). Then I changed my attitude on him when he announced Spectres de Marx in 1993.

I was interested in religion and developed my arguments in the context of Clash of Civilizations vs Zusammenleben der Kulturen. I didn’t pay much attention to Kant’s philosophical discussion about religion and God that Gourko and Derrida were concerned about ever since I was a college student. I favored that Barber criticized Christian fundamentalism in America and Islamic fundamentalism in Middle Asia in his book, Coca Cola und Heiliger Krieg. I’ve also criticized Korean conservative Christian fundamentalism armed with mysticism and exclusivism and focusing on building a huge church. Therefore I have to confess that it was hard for me to comment on Dr. Gourko’s article.

Nevertheless, I decided to take this chance and think about Derrida and philosophical discussions of religion and God. I read Derrida’s essays and books and had several fringe thoughts about his theories. I do understand and favor Derrida’s theory of deconstruction. Derrida’s theory of ecriture and his innovative writing are appealing.

I favor Derrida’s interdisciplinary writing which transcends genres and deals with literature, semiotics, and philosophy including techno-science and media.

I appreciate it highly that Derrida was based on philosophical fundamentals such as logic and critical thinking, and that he tried free-thinking and creative attempt in highly mental level.

But finally I would like to summarize in three questions what still remains open for me.

What means (What kind of Bedeutsamkeit has) Derrida’s essay about the phenomenon of religion these days?

Christian culture (claims of theologians, faith of believers and so on) in Europe differs from that in America. I assume Derrida’s point speaks for the European culture. Then how do American philosophers and theologians think about Derrida?

Don’t you think it goes against the theory of deconstruction that Derrida claims, there is something in the religious that is inalienable from the fundamentals of human existence?


Научное издание


Доклады международного симпозиума «Знание и общество» (IV Российский философский конгресс, 24-28 мая, Москва) под редакцией И.Т. Касавина. М., Канон+, 2005. 216 С.


Ответственный за выпуск Божко Ю.В.


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1 I.T. Kasavin, T.P. Stchavelev. Analysis of Alltaeglichkeit. Moscow, 2004. Pp. 12-14.

2 A. Schutz. Reflections on the Problem of Relevance // Selections: the World Shining with Sense. Editor N.M. Smirnova. Moscow, 2004. P. 344.

3 See its detailed analysis in the above mentioned work of I.T. Kasavin and S.P. Stchavelev. Pp. 263-281.

4 A. Schutz. Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences // American Sociological Thought. R. Merton, G. Mead, T. Parsons. A. Schutz. Moscow: International University of Business and Management. Moscow. 1996. P. 530.

5 P. Berger, N. Luckmann. Ibid. P. 31.

6 P. Berger, T. Luckmann. Social Construction of Reality; "Good Society". Social Construction of the Society Acceptable for Life. Ed. by V.G. Fedotova. Moscow, 2003.

P. Berger, T. Luckmann. Social Construction of Reality. Treatise on Sociology of Knowledge. Moscow, 1995.

"Good Society". The Social Construction of Society Acceptable for Life. Ed. by V.G. Fedotova. Moscow, 2003.

7 A Dialogue. – In: Dictionary of Antiquity. Moscow, 1989. P. 180-181.

8 Ibidem. P. 181.

9 J. Habermas. Philosophical Discourse on Modernity. Moscow, 2003. Pp. 312-315.

10 V.S. Shvyrev. Rationalization as Value of Culture. Tradition and Modernity. Moscow, 2003. P. 122.

11 J. Habermas. A Philosophical Dispute around an Idea of Democracy. In: J. Habermas. Democracy. Reason. Morality. Moscow lections and interviews. Moscow, 1995. P. 52.

12 J. Habermas. Philosophical Discourse on Modernity. Pp. 322, 326, 336.

13 Z. Brzezinski. The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership. N.Y. 2004. P. 30.

14 J. Habermas. Dispute on the Past and Future of International Law. Transition from a National to a Postnational Constellation // Bulletin of the Russian Philosophical Society. 2003. № 3. P. 17.

15 J. Habermas. The Inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory. St.-Petersburg, 2001. Pp. 381-401.

16 See: Ph. Jenkins. The Next Christendom. The Coming of Global Christianity. Oxford. 2002; A.I. Utkin. The Confessional Future of the World // Literaturnaya Gazeta (Literature Newspaper), December 2004.

17 "Good Society". Social Construction of the Society Acceptable for Life. Ed. by V.G. Fedotova. Moscow, 2003.

18 Our tendency to stick to schematic infe­rences may be the reason why we usually make an implicit move of ‘correction’ and infer “I sing a duet (together) with you” from “we sing a duet.” We ‘save’ the form of inference by changing the form of expression totally. We can infer that I sing in the boy’s choir from “we are a boy’s choir”.

19 Cf. J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, p. 26.

20 There is a recursive continuation of this form of thinking: I think about what you think about what I think about you (and so on). After some few steps it is in most cases not clear at all what it means to attribute a non-arbitrary meaning to such syntactally perfectly well formed sentences.

21 We make silent plans what we are about to say. We can get fairly fast in this practice of verbal planning.

22 The situation is similar as in the case when we talk about predicates. Frege knew that in order to understand the corresponding nominalizations (like “the concept of a horse”) we have to disregard the fact that the verbal form is name-like and seems to refer to an abstract object. Predicates and functions are no objects to talk about. What we talk about if we talk about them, is the implicit use of predicative or functional expressions in the context of saturated and well-formed sentences and utterances.

23 Frege’s ‘claims’ that a function is ‘unsaturated’ and that the expression “The concept of a horse” does not name a concept are headphrases of this sort. They give hints that have to be understood in practice. They do not say anything beyond this. In a similar way we often use metaphorical analogy, metonymy or synecdoche in order to make an implicit practice explicit. The practice of dealing with figurative speech as ‘explicit explanations’ of an implicit practice presupposes at least some mastery of dealing in appropriate way with these figures of speech.

24 For Tuomela, a collective action is a mere actual aggregation of individual actions h1,...,hm, which realize a common goal Z. Questions like how to distribute tasks, what it means to accept a concrete distribution verbally and how such an explicit or some implicit acknowledgment comit us do not appear. The question how cooperative scheme H and H* ‚exist‘ before and indendendent of their actualization cannot even be asked.

25 For Tuomela, individual actions are acts of a certain type. Concrete persons perform them. The type is more or less a latecomer, like a set with respect to its elements. We use the types to classify actions according to certain properties. The peculiar form of existence of a generic action or action-scheme that can be actualized or not (if the individual is competent and the situation favorable) is not analyzed, at least not to my satisfaction.

26 A concrete joint intention consists in the acknowledgment that a concrete joint action H* has to be accomplished. But implicit or even explicit, verbal, acceptance is not enough. It does not imply conceptually or practically that the action is realized. The reason is simple. We still have to perform the acts that fulfill our tasks.

27 The importance of trust and charity is stressed by Hegel at many places. In his Philosophy of History (transl by J Sibree, Buffalo 1991 there is a most interesting and amazing parallel to Tocqueville‘s analysis of the role of Protestantism for the development of welfare and communities in the United States: „From the Prostestant religion sprang the principle of the mutual confidence of individuals – trust in the honorable disposition of other men,“ says Hegel, p. 84), where he continues with the famous phrases „…America is therefore the land of the future…(p. 86) … and as a Land of the Future, it has no interest for us here, for, as regards History, our concern must be with what has been and what is“ (p. 87).

28 When Marx talks, misleadingly, about the necessity of a dictatorship of the proletariat, its positive meanin is this: The growing majority of dependent workers have to seize the power of legislation in order to bring about the changes needed.

29 Hoesle, V. (1995), Praktische Philosophie in der modernen Welt, Muenchen, S.200

30 Stepin, V.S.(2004), “The Mission of Philosophy in the Epoch of Transition”, Gunsan, Korea.

Kasavine, Ilya(2004), “How to Construct the Values of a New Civilization”, Gunsan, Korea.

31 Giddens, Anthony/Beck, Ulig/Lasch, Scott(1994), Reflexive Modernization, Standford.

Giddens, Anthony(1998), The Third Way, London.

Boxberger, Gerald/Klimenta, Harald(1998), Die 10 Globalisierungsluegen, Muenchen.

Martin, Hans-Peter/Schuhmann, Harald(1996), Die Globalisierungsgefalle, Hamburg.

Rifkin, Jeremy(1995), The end of work, New York.

32 Kim, Eui-Soo(1999), “Kuturpluralismus und die philosophische Orientierungen der Menschheit im 21. Jahrhundert”, Seoul.

(1) The principle of humanity and life

This means an objection to mental and physical suppression and extortion, an objection to loss of labour stemming from the rationalization and automatism, an objection to the invasion of human rights and weapon development in the information age, struggle against the whole control of superpower capital, prevention of human alienation by the law and system, prevention of a bad results of any genetics like human cloning, a recovery of a civic community, prevention of exhaustion of global resources originated from overproduction and overconsumption, hinderance of any act or law harming the environment, living an ecological life, objection to corrupted culture and crime, and global efforts for scientific activities cherishing human beings and lives.

To make these possible, we have to be mentally mature. All human beings have to launch the same mission of conserving the universe, and have to share the view that we can control nature in the right manner once we have the right historical and social perspectives.

(2) The Principle of Equality

This is the correction of inequality hardened in our society. This is a hard struggle against the inequality caused by our preference human beings over nature, development over conservation, consumption over saving, high speed over low speed, large good over small good, This means our determination not to allow the inequality any more. This is the principle that strives for the survival of human beings and nature, and for the equality of all human beings. This is a true principle striving for diversity. But this principle is not a compromise with the current situation. It has the sense of responsibility for our future. It is the principle of process that constantly changes toward balance, based on the principle of humanity and life.

(3) The principle of solidarity

This means the exchange and union of the intellectual. Thinkers who agree on the above two principles should cooperate with each other. This is a small community movement. This might include testing the model for an ideal community. This does not stop at particular communities. It is the movement of the combination of those communities. It is the worldwide solidarity, making use of information revolution. It is a new political movement, making use of the internet network. It is a movement securing both diversity and universality. It is a life movement, attempting to save the sick earth that became inhuman and unnatural. It is a principle that realizes the first principle and the second principle. It is the driving source toward hope that goes through the pessimism about the 21th century.

33 Huntington, Samuel P. (1996), The Clash of Civilizations.

Chua, Amy (2003), World on Fire.

Walzer, Michael (1977), Just and Unjust Wars, New York.

Walzer, Michael (2004), “An Interview with Michael Walzer: Words of War: Challenges to the Just War Theory”, Harvard International Review.

Chomsky, Noam (2003), Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance.

34 Mueller, Harald (1998), Das Zusammenleben der Kulturen, Frankfurt.

35 Sloterdijk, Peter (2004), “Die amerikanische Ausnahme: Anatomie einer Versuchung”, Vortrag, Seoul.

36 Gellner, Ernst(1991), Nationalismus und Moderne, Berlin; Taylor, Charles(2002), Wieviel Gemeinschaft braucht die Demokratie?, Frankfurt.

37 Schutz A. The Stranger // Schutz A. Collected papers, V. 2. The Hague, 1962-1966.

38 Popper K. Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford, 1972.

39 In my forthcoming social order analysis and when making conclusions I’m guided by thorough examinations of V.G. Fedotova in this field. E.g. see: Анархия и порядок. М., 2000; Апатия на Западе и в России // Вопросы философии. №3, 2005.

40 Quoted from: Wartofsky M. Positivism and Politics: The Vienna Circle as a Social Movement N.Y., 1996, P. 59.

41 Several grounds of the social order determination and classification could be found. H. Spencer, E. Durkheim, M. Weber, N. Luhman and others have contributed to its development. F. Toennis when analysing the concepts of “society” and “community” has divided the social order into “totalitarian” and “democratic” ones.

42 V.G. Fedotova writes about different types of mass in a mass society – a passive (H. Blumer), revolted (J. Ortega y Gasset) and apathetic (J. Baudrillard).

43 Famous Russian writer F.M. Dostoevsky draws a good case of that in his “Player”: “What a lovely scene: centennial or bicentennial successive work, patience, wisdom, honesty, character, firmness, providence and a stork on the roof… I don’t want to become Goppe & Co in five generations” and the like. (Достоевский Ф.М. Полн. собр. соч. в тридцати томах. Vol. 5, p. 226).

44 Уткин А.И. Аргументы российского оптимизма. In: “Glavnaya tema”, December 2004, №2, p. 111.

45 I owe notice of the Shaver dimensions to M. P. Spackman (1998).


46 My understanding of the task-tool metaphor was greatly advanced in discussions with Bennett Helm and John Deigh.

47 This point became clear to me during a discussion with Kevin Weinfurt


48 See Plato, Republic, translated by C. D. C. Reeve, Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004, 511C-514A, pp. 205-207.

49 Kant refers often to this seminal distinction. The most important passage is Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Paul Guyer and Allan Wood, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998, B 566, p. 535.

50 J. H. Lambert, Neues Organon oder Gedanken über die Erforschung und Bezeichnung des Wahren und dier Unterscheidung von Irrtum und Schein.

51 See “To J. H. Lambert, September 2, 1770,” in Immanuel Kant, Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-99, edited and translated by Arnulf Zweig, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967, p. 59.

52 See “To Marcus Herz, February 21, 1772,” in Kant, Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-99, p. 71.

53 See Plato, Phaedo, 101E.

54 See Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson, New York: Collier Books, 1962, § 55, pp. 152-154.

55 See Husserl, Ideas, § 49, pp. 136-139.

56 See Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, trans. By Theordore Kisiel, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, p. 71.

57 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Evanston: Harper and Row, 1962, p. 53.

58 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 62. See also ibid., p. 487.

59 See Plato, Republic 509.

60 The differentiation of the forms of change goes back to Aristotle and the distinction of the three relationships between object and process that are correlated with them is due to Hegel.

61 Hegel subsumes here also organization phenomena in a broader sense like geological formation processes.

62 For an extended presentation and discussion in a philosophical perspective see e.g. K. Mainzer: Thinking in Complexity. The Complex Dynamics of Matter, Mind, and Mankind, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York/Tokyo 1994, 1997.

63 See I. Prigogine: Introduction to Thermodynamics of Irreversible Processes, New York 31967, and I. Prigogine: From Being to Becoming. Time and Complexity in Physical Sciences, New York 1980.

64 R. Thom, Stabilité structurelle et morphogénèse. Essay d’une théorie generale des modèles, Reading Mass. 1972 (Engl.: Structural Stability and Morphogenesis. An Outline of a General Theory of Models, Reading Mass. 1975). – E.C. Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory. Selected Papers, 1972-1977, Reading Mass. 1977.

65 But it is picked up for a theory of emergence for example by P. Eisenhardt, and K. Dan: Emergenz und Dynamik, Cuxhaven 1993. Their guiding idea is to fill the (mathematical) gap which they see even in Haken’s approach (see below) by means of a topology, going back to Benoit Mandelbrot’s theory of fractals.

66 H. R. Maturana, F. Varela: De maquinas y seres vivos. Una teoria sobre la or­ganización biológica, Santiago de Chile 1973 (Engl.: Auto­poiesis and Cognition. The Realization of the Living, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1980 [Boston Stud. Philos. Sci. 42]).

67 Eigen, M.: Selforganization of Matter and the Evolution of Biological Macromolecules. Naturwiss. 58 (1971), 465-523; W. Krohn, G. Küppers, N. Nowotny (eds.): Selforganization. Portrait of a Scientific Revolution, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1990.

68 H. Haken: Synergetics. An Introduction, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1977.

69 As early as 1978, C.P. Bruter criticizes that ”it is not yet known, in general, how to identify these mathematical phenomena [belonging to Thom’s topology, e.g. Cantor sets of infinite cardinality, stable and unstable attractors] with physical observables“, which is a fundamental problem of all types of complexity theories. See C.P. Bruter, The Theory of Catastrophes: Some Epistemological Aspects, Synthese 39 (1978), 293-315, p. 306.

70 See H. Poser: Wissenschaftstheorie, Stuttgart 2001, p. 186-207, using results from St. Toulmin, Y. Elkana and Th. Körner.

71 David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, Routledge, 1976, p.32.

72 The content of (7.iii) can be found in Barry Barnes and David Bloor, ‘Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge’, in Rationality and Relativism, ed. by Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, Basil Blackwell, 1982, p.33.

73 David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, Routledge, 1976, p.32.

74 My own best guess at this stage is that the hoped-for analytical tool will be mainly game-theoretic in its character. For further details on that see, e.g., my contribution to this symposium: A. Blinov, ‘Knowledge and Social Suboptimality’.

75 Richard Foley, The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, Harvard University Press: Cambridge a.o., 1987.

76 One further thing, by Foley’s lights, is the perspective of the judgment, but for my purposes here we can forget about it, - at least on the first stages.

77 See, among others, Hirshleifer, J., 'The private and social value of information and the reward to inventive activity', American Economic Review