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Bibliography
Chernyavskaya, N.M., Chernyavsky, D.S.(1960) The periodical phenomena in photosynthes. Uspekhi fizicheskikh nauk, 72: 627-649.
Field, R., Burger, M. (eds.) (1985) Oscillations and traveling waves in chemical systems. N.Y., etc.: John Wiley.
Pechenkin A. (2002) The concept of self-oscillations and the rise of synergetic ideas in the theory of non-linear oscillations. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. 33: .269-295.
Shnol, S. (1997) Geroi i zlodei rossiiskoi nauki (Heroes and villains of Russian science). Moscow: Kron-Press.
Shnol, S. (2001) Geroi, konformisty i zlodei rossiiskoi nauki (Heroes, conformists, and villains of Russian science). Moscow: Kron-Press.
Strogatz, S. (1994) Nonlinear dynamics and chaos. Reading (Mass.): Perseus books.
Winfree, A. (1987) The prehistory of the Belousov-Zhabotinsky oscillator. Journal of Chemical Education, 61: 661-665.
Ханс Позер (Германия). Как оправдать оправдание. Комментарий к докладу Александра Печенкина
Hans Poser (Germany). How to justify a justification. Comments on Alexandre Pechenkin’s paper
1. Pechenkin on the Belusow-Zhabotinsky-Reaction
Since Thomas S. Kuhn has introduced the view that sciences depend on paradigms, the history of science has turned into a history of scientific revolutions concerning the reasons and mechanisms of paradigm switches. One of the most important cases throughout the last half century is the entirely new development of theories from chaos theory up to complexity theory. One of the classical examples is the Belusow-Zhabotinsky-Reaction, discussed by A.A. Pechenkin. Known as the chemical clock, it is a topos classicus of a dissipative structure of auto catalytic type, mentioned even in popular scientific books as e.g. Paul Davies’ Cosmic Blueprint of 1987.
The point Pechenkin is interested in, is the fact that neither the Communist Party nor ideologists from the outside, but scientific journals refused to publish the empirical results of Belusow, whereas some others succeeded with comparable ones nearly at the same time. This is indeed a remarkable case, since it throws some light on how a new paradigm – in this case, a new understanding of chemical processes – enters the scientific community.
As we all know, Kuhn is not very clear concerning paradigms; therefore Pechenkin offers a distinction between paradigm and ideology. The first one is described by “1) symbolic generalizations, 2) ontological model, 3) values, and 4) shared examples”, while the latter one consists in the “descriptive terminology”, i.e. in a “set of concepts” as a part of the specific language of the discipline: Whereas the “paradigm encompasses problem-solving activity”, the ideology “provides a preliminary interpretation of facts”. Due to Pechenkin, it is, in particular this second element which has to carry the burden of a paradigm extension to associated areas, and a paradigm transformation by including new problems: it functions as an “intellectual machinery” to prepare a new paradigm. These are highly interesting and, as I see it, fruitful tools which allow an analysis of the paradigm switch.
Pechenkin’s thesis concerning Belusow is, that one has to take into account not only the paradigm elements, but also the ideology elements in order to understand the original rejection, for Zhabotinsky succeeded in using the language of physico-mathematical theory of oscillation, used by the influential Mandelstam school: It is this which allowed the scientific community to accept Zhabotinsky’s approach, even if there was no real mathematical model of non linearity in its foundation. Pechenkin’s way of looking at the Belusow-Zhabotinsky-Reaction and its acceptance within the scientific discourse really throws some new light on the process in question. But there might be a further point which one has to take into account.
2. Discovery and justification
Elsewhere, I have developed a somewhat differing analysis of the concept of paradigm in distinguishing first-order and second order methodological rules. The first-order rules consist in commitments as follows:
ontological commitments concerning the fundamental objects and relations among them,
the sources of knowledge (accepted experiments, observations, formal procedures),
a hierarchy of these sources (empiricist and rationalists quarreled about the priority of experimental data vs. rationality),
judicious commitments concerning the methods of proof giving, supporting, corroborating, rejecting or falsifying a proposition, and
normative commitments concerning the formal structure, the beauty and elegance etc. of a theory.
These first order commitments are taught at universities, and they are accepted in the scientific community in periods of normal science, as Kuhn puts it. But they are not, in fact, fixed, but rather undergoing changes, emendations, variations and breaks throughout history – Kuhn’s revolutions. But unlike the way in which Kuhn describes this process – that all this happens in an irrational way, much like a religious revelation – these changes are always going on and imposed by means of arguments!
Thinking of the example, analysed by Pechenkin, it is a special problem of justification, moreover, of accepting a new way of justification, which differs from the old paradigmatic one. Remembering the well-known joke, that philosophy of science without history of science is empty, whereas history of science without philosophy of science is blind, we might say: Justification without discovery is empty, discovery without justification is blind. Agreeing to this view, the problem is dissolved, so to say in a Wittgensteinian manner, for it consists in two different questions, which are in a Kantian perspective (i) the quaestio facti, namely what is it, which we found out, and (ii) the quaestio iuris, namely why it is really the case what we found out. Kant, in order to combine the level of intuition with the conceptual level of categories introduced his schematism, namely rules how to combine one side with the other under the necessary conditions of knowledge, located in the transcendental subject. This shows, that the whole approach cannot be overruled by a Wittgensteinian trick, but that it will have a metaphysical price, which logical positivists had not been willing to pay.
Now, in the case of Belusow-Zhabotinsky-Reaction, we are confronted with the problem how to connect both sides in such a way that we have to take into account whether the original results of Belusow had not been accepted for reasons concerning the observation or concerning the theoretical explanation. Due to Kuhn, we never would be able to observe something new as long as we do not change our paradigm, whereas in the case in question it seems to be the theoretical side which one did not accept. Or in my terms: One did not reject the sources of knowledge and the hierarchy, but one did not accept theoretical methods which had not been in use in this discipline up to that moment; so one did not accept the justification.
3. A systematic problem
The systematic problem in history of science is: How does it happen that we get new observations, ideas of new theoretical entities, and new theories. To explain that this is nothing but a narratio is not sufficient, since in order to see new items (in the world as well as in theoretical imagination) it is requested as a pre-condition, that we have such a property to recogize something new and unknown to us – which means that we are open-minded. This is far from being self-evident, for non-scientific cultures would normally suppress such novelties as dangerous. Therefore, discovery (new kinds of observation) is bound up with cultural pre-conditions up to the world view, which has to be taken into account: Not ‘discovery’, but the history-dependent ability to make discoveries as a quaestio facti should be the new focus of further research.
The systematic problem in philosophy of science is: If there are two layers, that of observation/discovery and that one of explanation/justification – how are they connected with each other? If there are two temporal stages – how can it happen, that discovery is a justification at the same time (e.g. in case of an observation)? If discovery is theory-loaded (i.e. guided by something which is already justified) – how is it possible to observe entirely new phenomena (quaestio juris)?
Both kinds of systematic problems seem to create new difficulties. But we cannot get rid of the necessity of discovery, as long as we try to enlarge and extend sciences. And we cannot abandon justification, since it is the conditio qua non of scientific thinking. The way out, therefore, consists in a new perspective on the old difficulty.
A further hint from Kant, who defined science as follows: “A science is each system of knowledge, ordered by principles” (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, Vorrede): A system of knowledge – that is something which necessarily presupposes justification, for, since we know from Plato, that knowledge differs from belief not only in so far as it is true, but as it is justified. Discovery is no justification; and the history of a discovery, too, even if we would use a Lockean theory of knowledge, which seeks a foundation via the genesis of knowledge: The history of an error would not transform the error into truth. Now we have learned from Th.S. Kuhn, that justifications themselves have a history and depend on paradigms. Therefore, the history of a justification is no justification at all. This is the new post-Kuhnian problem: What about the justification of justification?
3. Conventions, contingency, and Kant on truth
Since Carnap has analysed conventions of measurement, and since Kuhn has showen the conventional character of paradigms behind each scientific approach, we know that conventions belong to the inevitable pre-conditions of sciences. This has consequences for the methods of justification – up to the danger, that there is no truth in sciences at all, but mere convention (therefore Feyerabend’s ‘Everything goes’ has been taken literally by post-modernists, who intended to substitute truth by aesthetic categories). Indeed, there are at least these five kinds of conventions, which I mentioned above. The judicial commitments within this framework are the most important ones, for they do not allow the substitution just mentioned, and they make clear why science is seen as the best kind of systematic knowledge we have. Now, this seems to be destroyed by the conventional and paradigm-fixed character of the judicial commitments: Remember, that, according to Kuhn, the way from one paradigm to the next is a kind of conversion, not a rational decision, for paradigms are incompatible: These commitments, a Kuhnian would say, are transformed throughout history, so that science seems to be a purely contingent undertaking, far away from justified truth.
If this really were the case, the consequences would be disastrous indeed: Reichenbach’s aim to separate discovery from justification in order to get rid of historical and metaphysical conditions would be pointless, since there would be no chance for justifications at all! But just this misses the critical point. First, historians of sciences as well as scientists themselves have always argued, that in fact, scientists never followed quasi-religious conversions, but always gave rational and well-founded reasons for their decision to change the content of the commitments, including those concerning justifications. Secondly, Kant made clear already, that a universal criterion of truth is impossible, for, in order to be universal it must be purely formal, whereas true propositions always have a content; and therefore they need criteria referring to contents. Just this is the dilemma of each method of justification: it aims at truth, but we can never formulate universal conditions as time-independent criteria. Exactly this shows the way out: Reasons given in case of a paradigm switch aim at better theories, all of them are located not within the framework of the paradigm, but on a meta-level, they always argue against the traditional commitments, advocating for this or that specific transformation or substitution in pointing out, that the new proposals make it probable to get nearer to the truth (even if we will never be able to measure this approach). To put it philosophically: truth is taken as a regulative idea, and all proposals for commitments of justification are defended by pointing at this idea of truth, in trying to elaborate criteria referring to the contents in question. Seen in this light, the paradigm switch depends on arguments on this meta-level – but as they aim at changes within the rules governing justifications, they aim at a justification of the new way of justification!
The new and unexpected topics of history as well as philosophy of science, therefore, consist in a clarification of this meta-level, which is responsible for new concept formations and theories outside traditional boundaries, but bound up with the regulative idea of truth and with elements of a time-dependent worldview, that is, with metaphysical elements or convictions how to fill the gap between a purely formal idea and a phenomenal content in the world. To clarify the ways of justifying justifications will be one of the most central problems of both disciplines – and it will leave the distinction between discovery and justification behind as something belonging to an earlier stage on an earlier ground level.
4. Reasons for the acceptance of the Belusow-Zhabotinsky-Reaction
Thinking of these arguments, the central question does not so much center around the formal structure which Pechenkin has called the ideology imposed by the language, but rather it concerns the fruitfulness of the proposed alterations. The most critical cases are those where judicial commitments, the core of each science, are questioned in order to be changed, for this means to discuss how to justify a new kind of justification. All this does not happen on the first order level, but on a second order one. Think of Max Planck as the Editor-in-chief of Annalen der Physik, who got papers of a young unknown man named Einstein to be published there. As each editor of a scientific journal, he had to decide whether one should accept a paper which is not ‘scholarly’ thinking of the established first order commitments. Now, his difficulty depends on the fact, that there are no fixed rules on the second order level; but all the arguments in history of science show that those who introduce new elements are always explaining that
the adoption of a special formal structure of language within an area where it has not been in use,
a revision of the ontology accepted up to now,
the use of new methods in order to enlarge the scope of knowledge, etc.,
allow one to formulate new, broader and fruitful, namely true insights. In fact, the outcome are hypotheses on the level of sciences, nothing more, but they all are put forward under the regulative idea of truth. So, it is much more than a language game which caused the acceptability of Belusow’s results known as the Belusow-Zhabotinsky-Reaction, since it presupposed not only a new ontology, and the acceptance of a differing view of causality, it forced to agree to substitute the classical methodology of corroboration of hypotheses by means of predictions by a very tricky one – really a strange attractor .... In fact, it took about half a century to accept these new approaches and its fundamental commitments as a kind of new scientific world view.
Людмила Маркова (Россия). Изменчивость и стабильность в науках
Ludmila Markova (Russia). Variability and stability in natural sciences
1. Science from the point of view of variability of its structures
In XIX and XX centuries when a correlation of stability and variability was discussed, all attention was focused usually on processes of change, transformation. In XIX century the evolutionary idea was conquering positions one after another and was seizing more and more new areas of knowledge. In XX century when studying variability the preference is given to points of mutation, the genetics starts to dominate in biology. The same occurs in the majority of other areas of knowledge - gradualness gives up the place to interruptions, unexpected leaps which too conduct to changes, only not gradual, but sudden, sharp. So, in the history of science scientific revolutions are put forward in the foreground, they define character of the subsequent evolutionary development. It is important to note, however, that, despite of obvious contrast of two approaches (evolutionary and revolutionary), there is in them a common beginning which unit them, namely, the subject of their analysis is variability. Certainly, anybody never denied, that in the world around us stability exists, that this world is not a chaos. However, this circumstance was accepted as a matter of course, it did not give rise to doubts and did not deserve serious discussion. It is the movement in time that is the most important, let it be in biology, history, or philosophy.
In the philosophy and history of science the study of a creative act as a generation of new knowledge was followed by the radical transformation of our understanding of science. Its development has appeared as separate "cases" of the discoveries which logically have been not connected with each other, each time formed as though "from the very beginning". The question arose: what them unites? If within the framework of each "case - event" the science arises like as anew, and arises in its own way, in unique, especial conditions why we speak each time about a science? When the question is about such « large events » in the history as Antiquity or New time, we are faced with the same difficulty: scientific rationality is original in each of these historical periods, it is lawful to speak about different types of a science, but, nevertheless, types of a science, not of art or economy. If we want to have really new knowledge, we cannot simply deduce it from knowledge already existing. In this case we should to admit, that the received knowledge in some kind already contained in previous, then what is new in it? At the same time, if a new knowledge is not generated by an old one where does it appear from? Is it possible to admit that the new knowledge in a science arises from what is not a science, from what is behind its limits?
At the end of the last century the powerful tradition of sociological interpretation of scientific knowledge and its social construction was formed and it was this thesis that its representatives proceeded from. The principle of novelty is observed in this case strictly; really, the content of knowledge is determined exclusively by set of all circumstances (not necessarily bearing a relation to science), which were available in the period of obtaining a result in laboratory or in any moment of historical development of natural sciences (research such as case studies). Such situation is unique, it cannot be reproduced in other place and at other time, it cannot be a repetition of what already was. Event of knowledge construction drops out of the general lines of development of science, it does not have connection neither with the past, nor with the future; it is unique and gives out unique result.
Difficulties in interpretation of science, however, do not become less. Main of them - on what basis all these separate events can be considered as belonging to science? Why are we fully confident that newly received results are capable to be included logically in the already existing scientific knowledge? A question arises: may be this infinite variability of knowledge destroys any stability of science in space and time, "dissolves" it in the boundless world outside the science? Such threat exists, and the picture of investigations of science developed to the end of the last century demands, at least, serious specifications, and even essential changes. All questions which interest researchers considerably change. The problem of a logic commensurability of a new theory and an old one does not cause disputes any more, a new theory does not destroy its predecessor, they coexist as independent from one another. Such concepts as the truth of scientific knowledge, its objectivity, evolutionary development and development through revolutions gradually disappear from the works of researchers of natural sciences. Together with these problems interest to the idea of development of scientific knowledge in time is lost also.
New problems and new concepts appear and they testify of more interest to space, than to time: a local field, a functional field, a cogitative field, the immanent plan, the plan of reference, the landscape, neighborhoods, borders, etc. In the natural sciences, and in the philosophy, history, sociology of science theories coexist, instead of cancel each other, they are related with each other as neighbors on the basis of equality. Researchers of science including historians, concentrate attention not so much on the following of scientific ideas one after another in time, as on their interaction with the social environment. An emergence of a new idea is an integral event; its components are the diversified factors which occupy a certain space at the concrete moment of time and in this space an event of generation of new knowledge occurs.
Problems of the philosophy of science in the context of Rene Thom’s ideas.
The biology always gave a rich material for the decision of philosophical problems of development, evolution, sharp, mutational changes. As R.Thom's book shows, the modern biology can help with the decision of problems which are put forward now by the philosophy, sociology, and history of science during interpretation of scientific knowledge by them. It is important, certainly, that for a substantiation of the author’s ideas he has chosen mathematical discipline about surfaces and forms, geometrical topology. This circumstance emphasizes an orientation of interest of the author to the consideration of biological problems in space, more likely, than in time. And such change of orientation fully corresponds, in my opinion, with those changes which occur last decades in philosophical interpretations of science.
Let's consider more attentively to what extent the problems put by Thom in his book correlate with these changes. First of all he is not drawn for formulations of global character; on the contrary, he repeatedly emphasizes necessity for the scientist to deal with local cases, spaces, volumes. Research experiment itself is planned in such a way that it would be possible to isolate an investigated subject from the whole of surroundings. In works on studying science of New time independence of an experimental situation, from the experimenter, first of all, his human characteristics is usually specially emphasized. For Thom even it is more important to isolate a subject investigated during experiment from global laws of the nature (established, by the way, too by the person). The researched phenomenon, in his opinion, should be considered as existing in itself. Let's recollect character of studying of a science in the context of culture of a certain epoch, which features natural sciences acquires. In result in different cultures we deal with different science. Or in a less scale, in frameworks of «case studies», when events, which are investigated include insignificant ones, but those, which deserve scientist attention from the point of view of features of their formation. Difference of the classical experiment from the event in the frameworks of «case studies» consists, in particular, in the following. From the classical experiment in an ideal case everything “unnecessary” is eliminated (not clear, what remain from an investigated subject); and in the frameworks of «case studies» in the event of generating new knowledge almost everything of an environmental context is included (whether it is possible to decide in this case, what does not enter into a subject of attention of the scientist). Both in that and in the other case stability of a subject of studying is lost.
It is beforehand possible to tell, that such state of affairs cannot satisfy Thom. He repeatedly asserts that our world is not a chaos; things around us, events, plants, animals, we ourselves - have stability which is predetermined by presence of a form, borders. Any subject, a thing, an alive creature keep the form if influences tested by them do not pass a certain border. If the slightest push from the outside causes irreversible changes such system is shapeless, unstable and represents a zone of bifurcations. In the world of living creatures it is assumed the presence of a vital field, some preorder determining a direction of shaping of alive beings. This idea appears in this or that form in many cases of science studies, of investigation of the character of scientific knowledge development, of a subject of scientific study. It inevitably arises when an attention of the researcher is switched from a context of time to a context of space. Really, if the investigated phenomena are not considered as generated in time by their predecessors a problem arises of detection of spatial relations with things, subjects, processes which play a role in generating something new, what doesn’t yet exist (a new theory, a new organ of an animal). It is necessary to isolate any area from all variety of world around, related in this or that way to an investigated subject; thus, the first criterion is a spatial proximity. From here in the philosophy and history of science interest comes into being to the culture of certain epoch in which context science exists, or to a local event - case as such within the framework of which new scientific knowledge emerges, or to set of conditions in laboratory as a place of scientific research. Any of these objects (the culture, case - event, laboratory) is understood as self-sufficient, and in the relation to corresponding objects in the past and the future - as coexisting with them in one time space.
There is, however, a difficulty. Within the framework of the designated space there are many factors which are influencing process of knowledge manufacturing and at the same time have nothing to do with science. It is impossible to consider seriously an idea that badly made coffee for a scientist in the morning somehow can be included in results received by him. Hence it follows that it is not enough to designate spatially area of influence on investigated processes. It is necessary to interpret somehow character of relations developing here, to understand what really form scientific knowledge in its logic and content. Hence it follows also the emergence of such concepts as a landscape, a vital space, an immanent field, an observer and so on.
Thom also uses the concept of vital space. He takes under doubt the thesis of genetics that development of alive beings is controlled exclusively by chance. From all set of factors influencing an alive organism he aim at choosing those that have more chances to change considerably its heredity. The organism should be ready to take up an impact of an irritant even of a very big force until a certain time, differently the organism simply perishes. Apparently in connection with this Thom paid attention at the Lamark theory: the strong need can result in inheritance of the got attributes. Presence of a need makes an organism more susceptible to impacts which satisfy this need. The organism as though prepares itself for the answer to a corresponding impact and ignores the others. This provides stability of an organism: for a while it keeps the form, it is stable, because it does not answer the casual influences which are not concerning in any way to its vitality (or perishes if these influences overcome a certain threshold). When an external irritation appears conformable with unsatisfied need of an organism, there is a jump, or a catastrophe as prefers to speak Thom, the organism is destabilized and passes in a new condition. It is important, that Thom sees a problem: it is impossible to build the whole system of evolutionary development on the basis of mere chance, it is necessary to search for other ways of the problem decision.
The situation is the same in the realm of science researches: when they try to gain a foothold in a case, in casual influences, this results in full loss of any stability of scientific knowledge. Therefore it is necessary to find those influences which belong not simply to the world outside of a science (this world is boundless, and most of its influences inevitably should be casual), but the world of noscience, which is already stood out the chaos of all as a certain prescience, as a field or a landscape of the prescientific order. In this direction the research moves when the talk turns to the notion of the observer. He as though represents the scientist in a research field, and his opportunities of observation are limited to a certain landscape, concrete space. There is no more Laplace’s Demon who surveys the whole world and improves the knowledge indefinitely in time. His opportunities to observe are limited either by the speed of light, or by his position concerning an investigated subject, or by the distance to it. An emergence of new knowledge is not reduced now to received results, which accumulate infinitely in science in the process of its evolutionary development; but it is not as well a moment, an intuitive enlightenment which cannot be caught by rational means; it is a process which can be studied and logically interpreted. Factors which determine it, on the one hand, are far from being exhausted by what belong to laboratories (either to culture, or a separate case in a history); on the other hand - their number does not include set of the circumstances being components of these social formations. A certain field of nonscience, coinciding neither with its social structure, nor with logic of scientific knowledge as positivists understood it is in such a way formed. But at the same time it is a basis as of social structures of science, so of its logic. The belonging to this field as to a basis provides as stability of scientific structures, so an opportunity of their change.
Thom also aspires to present genetic changes not as instant transformation under influence of casual influences, but as a process proceeding in a vital field, or vital space. He writes that chromosomes are the same functional organs, subject to influence as from the outside, so on the part of internal needs of an organism. For them the metabolism of surroundings provides simultaneously stability, duplication and variability. In the nature there is not an absolute stability of living organisms (as it was supposed by scientists up to Cuvie and Lamark); there is not also a continuous variability (as assert evolutionary theories); there is no alternation of catastrophic changes and stable quiet periods of existence (as believed Cuvie). Any point on a line of evolutionary development can be offered as catastrophic, asserts Thom. At the same time, any catastrophic point includes the moment of continuity. Arranging points by means of geometrical topology on a surface, Thom comes to a conclusion that distinction between regular points (which correspond to the quiet evolutionary periods) and catastrophic ones obviously depends on accuracy of used means of supervision and measurement. Let us recollect in this connection a situation with research experiment. The more precisely and fully all circumstances accompanying it will be fixed and taken into account, the more catastrophic (in terminology of Thom) the point displaying it on a plane will look. In other words, it will be more difficult in this case to reproduce an experiment, to repeat experiment obtaining the same results. It is possible to assume, that any point becomes catastrophic if used means are exact enough. And the contrary is also true. When catastrophes become too numerous each of them cannot be too serious. Frequently each of catastrophes becomes so insignificant, that even their set becomes not observable. In these cases the observer can ignore too insignificant catastrophes.
Conclusion
The historization of scientific knowledge in XX century, its inclusion in social formations changing in time (cultures of a certain historical epoch, separate cases-events of discovering new knowledge, the life of a scientific laboratory) have resulted in disappearing of borders of science: each following step (and steps can be very short) in development of science does it different, and it concerns both to evolutionary, and to revolutionary development. When a scientific knowledge is examined outside of a social context, outside of a creative act, in other words, is examined as a result, its stability is provided with rigid logic connections with other elements of the existing structure of knowledge. Now these connections are broken, and all attention of the researcher is inverted on processes of the production of knowledge. Studying of scientific revolutions has resulted in impossibility to establish rational connection between their results. The theory as a result of some creative act is more connected with its founder, than with the previous or subsequent scientific knowledge. It "drops out", as was already spoken above, from time line and for not to lose stability, searches a support in a social context of the invention, not in time, but in spatial formations. It means that science arises from nonscience. However received results are somehow included in science, this process is backdated. But as social context is extraordinary wide, various, includes boundless amount of factors, to find in it a support is difficult, the basis appears amorphous, and the knowledge is dissolved in it. Each time knowledge gets features of the context, it is new, individual, but whether it is scientific knowledge?
A question arises: if a generation of a new knowledge in science is not determined by the previous knowledge, whether that is possible to count its occurrence to be only casual? In the historiography of science, in philosophy, in science itself a position according to which creative processes can be interpreted logically as well starts to be formed. Often enough Deleuze’s statements about casual character of coming into being of something individual, unique, particular, that in the basis of these phenomena procedure of throwing of bones lays, it is necessary to understand, apparently, as powerlessness, in his opinion, of the existing logic to explain such processes in habitual frameworks of time sequence. Deleuze himself further, than someone else, has promoted the creation of logic of sense, of becoming, logic which is applied for an explanation of things, subjects, ideas, individualities on a surface, in a field, in zones of indiscernibility (indistinguishibility) or unsolvability between which there are bridges, couplings, joints, call-over, soaring above... And so forth.
The Russian philosopher Merab Mamardashvily made essential steps too in the direction of creation of a new logic for an explanation of coming into being of novelty in science. He proved inevitability of an exit out of the history on a surface in sphere of forms. The knowledge as an event or free change is not deducible and is unpredictable as well.
It means that it is impossible to come to it by a simple continuation of previous state of understanding. At the same time it is impossible, considers Mamardashvily, that the content of our thoughts so rigidly specifying what is actually going on in the world (as laws of the nature, physical constants, empirical sizes and so on), would appear chaotically, casually. About the necessity to refuse from chance in the analysis of genetic transformations, as we saw, writes R. Thom. Most likely, in this direction the philosophy of science will develop analyzing the state of affairs in science of our days. Anyway, in order to achieve stability of scientific knowledge, to avoid its dissolution in a social context, it is necessary to fix in the world outside a science some structures which can be designated as nonscience (as against nonart, nonphilosophy, etc.). Let it will be a landscape, a field of reference, the functional field, the observer, and other concepts. It is important, that they isolate some sphere from chaos of an environmental variety, and are able to provide not casual formation of scientific knowledge and thereby provide its stability.