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6. Secret detention and derogations from international human rights
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
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6. Secret detention and derogations from international human rights




  1. Article 4, paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights permits States to derogate from certain rights contained therein “in times of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation”. However, this provision subjects such measures to a number of procedural and substantive safeguards regarding derogation measures: the State must have officially proclaimed a state of emergency; the derogation measures must be limited to those strictly required by the exigencies of the situation; they must not be inconsistent with other international obligations of the State; and they must not be discriminatory. In its general comment No. 29,46 the Human Rights Committee highlighted the exceptional and temporary character of derogations, stating that the Covenant required that, even during an armed conflict, measures derogating from the Covenant were allowed only if and to the extent that the situation constituted a threat to the life of the nation. Derogation measures must be lifted as soon as the public emergency or armed conflict ceases to exist. Most importantly, derogation measures must be “strictly required” by the emergency situation. This requirement of proportionality implies that derogations cannot be justified when the same aim could be achieved through less intrusive means.



  1. Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Covenant lists certain rights that cannot be derogated from, including the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (art. 7).



  1. Although articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant are not among the non-derogable rights enumerated in article 4, paragraph 2, the Human Rights Committee confirmed in its general comment No. 29 that the prohibitions against taking of hostages, abductions or unacknowledged detention were not subject to derogation.47. It also considered that it was inherent in the protection of rights explicitly recognized as non-derogable in article 4, paragraph 2, that they must be secured by procedural guarantees, including, often, judicial guarantees. The provisions of the Covenant relating to procedural safeguards could never be made subject to measures that would circumvent the protection of non-derogable rights. Article 4 may not be resorted to in a way that would result in derogation from non-derogable rights. Safeguards related to derogation, as embodied in article 4 of the Covenant, were based on the principles of legality and the rule of law inherent in the Covenant as a whole. As certain elements of the right to a fair trial are explicitly guaranteed under international humanitarian law during armed conflict, the Committee found no justification for derogation from these guarantees during other emergency situations, and was of the opinion that the principles of legality and the rule of law required that fundamental requirements of fair trial be respected during a state of emergency. Only a court of law could try and convict a person for a criminal offence. The presumption of innocence has to be respected. In order to protect non-derogable rights, the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention should not be diminished by a State party’s decision to derogate from the Covenant.”48



  1. In short, the main elements of articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant, namely the right to habeas corpus, the presumption of innocence and minimum fair trial guarantees, as well as the prohibition of unacknowledged detention, must be respected even in times of emergency, including armed conflict.



  1. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, in its opinions No. 43/2006, 2/2009 and 3/2009,49 concurred with the view of the Human Rights Committee that the right to habeas corpus must prevail even in states of emergency. The Working Group similarly stated that the right not to be detained incommunicado over prolonged periods of time could not be derogated from, even where a threat to the life of the nation existed50



  1. The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances confirmed in its general comment on article 10 of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance that under no circumstances, including states of war or public emergency, could any State interest be invoked to justify or legitimize secret centres or places of detention which, by definition, would violate the Declaration, without exception.51



  1. As the disappearance of persons is inseparably linked to treatment that amounts to a violation of article 7 of the Covenant, according to the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee,52 the prohibition against enforced disappearance must not be derogated from, either. Similarly, article 1, paragraph 2, of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance stipulates:

No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification for enforced disappearance.

  1. Even if one were (wrongfully)53 classify the global struggle against international terrorism in its entirety as a “war” for the purpose of applying the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, international human rights law continues to apply: The Covenant applies also in situations of armed conflict to which the rules of international humanitarian law are applicable. While, in respect of certain Covenant rights, more specific rules of international humanitarian law may be specially relevant for the purposes of the interpretation of those rights, both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive.54



  1. In its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of Justice clearly affirmed the applicability of the Covenant during armed conflicts, stating that “the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities. The test of what constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then must be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict.”55 The Court further developed its view in its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories:

the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in article 4 of the [ICCPR]. As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law.”56

  1. In its judgment in the Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), the Court already applied international humanitarian law and international human rights law in parallel, without as a first step identifying the lex specialis or the exclusive matter.57 In their report on the mission to Lebanon and Israel from 7 to 14 September 2006, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons and the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living stated that human rights law and international humanitarian law were not mutually exclusive, but existed in a complementary relationship during armed conflict; a full legal analysis required consideration of both bodies of law. In respect of certain human rights, more specific rules of international humanitarian law might be relevant for the purposes of their interpretation.58 A complementary approach forming the basis of the present study is also supported by the principle of systemic integration contained in article 31, paragraph 3 (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that, in interpreting an international treaty there shall be taken into account, together with the context … any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties [of the treaty].”59