Міжнародна конференція “ Переосмислюючи Близький Схід: Цінності, Інтереси та Проблеми Безпеки в політиці країн Заходу щодо Іраку та ширшого регіону, 1918-2010 ” – Британська Академія, Лондон

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Содержание Turkish-American Relations in the Middle East Key words Difference in methods and instruments Different approaches to conflict resolution Concerns about the nature of the future Iraqi regime. Representation of different ethnic groups and religious factions Kurdish question Maintaining balance of power in the region Difficult geopolitical and civilizational choice Compatibility of foreign policy visions Compatibility of foreign policy instruments. Promoting peace, stability and democracy in a post-war Iraq Fight against terrorism and terroristic organizations The latest initiatives

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Доповідь:

Міжнародна конференція “Переосмислюючи Близький Схід: Цінності, Інтереси та Проблеми Безпеки в політиці країн Заходу щодо Іраку та ширшого регіону, 1918-2010” – Британська Академія, Лондон

(березень 2010)


Турецько-американські відносини на Близькому Сході:

балансування між політикою сили та взаємозалежністю

Стаття представляє собою порівняльний аналіз регіональних стратегій безпеки двох держав. З одного боку, Сполучених Штатів Америки, що є головним «зовнішнім актором», залученим до регіональної політики, а з іншого боку, Туреччини, що останнім часом позиціонує себе у якості регіонального лідера, або, за висловлюванням міністра закордонних справ Ахмета Давутоглу, «регіонального актора з глобальною сферою інтересів». Окрім того, в статті розглядається питання, яким чином співробітництво цих двох країн може сприяти створенню стабільної та безпечної геополітичної ситуації на «Широкому Близькому Сході».


Y.V.Gaber, Ph.D. candidate

International Relations Department,

Odessa National I.I. Mechnikov University


Turkish-American Relations in the Middle East:

Balancing Between Power Politics and Interdependence


The article gives a comparative analysis of the regional security strategies of the U.S.A., which is the main “outside actor” involved in the local politics, and Turkey, which has recently positioned itself as a regional leader, or as its Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu put it “a regional player with a global reach”. The other question to be discussed is how the cooperation between these two forces can contribute to creating stable and secure geopolitical situation in the Broader Middle East area.

Key words: Turkey, the United States, Middle East, Iraq war, strategic alliance


Paper presented at the international conference “Rethinking the Middle East: Values, Interests, and Security Concerns in Western Policies toward Iraq and the Wider Region, 1918-2010” – British Academy, London – 17-19 March 2010.


The Broader Middle East has traditionally been the focus of attention of the major world powers, notably after the WWI. Though during the 20^th century the balance of power has shifted several times towards different centres, the most influential actors of the world politics, whichever countries it might be at the moment, have never ceased their struggle for dominance in the region. However, it has gained its extremely significance since the notorious events of 9/11 and the subsequent 2003 Iraq War that had dramatic impact over the whole region. It is since then that the local states have begun to defend vigorously their own national and regional interests and to propound various initiatives for regional security cooperation claiming their desire to stop being referred to simply as the passive objects of the Western powers’ strategies. On the other hand, virtually all major world powers which do not necessarily constitute a part of the region, try to develop such security strategies and search for such instruments that would strengthen their influence and protect their interests in the region.

The security concerns of all these actors cannot be taken individually, as they are interconnected. In other words, these actors constitute a “security complex”, defined by Barry Buzan as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely” reaching at some point the stage when “their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from another”. This brought some researchers to the conclusion that the strategic setting which emerged after the Iraq War of 2003 created a new sub-regional security sphere with Iraq as its center. The main actors in this new setting are no longer just the countries of the Gulf but now they include Turkey, Syria and Jordan¹. I would go further and claim that in the broader meaning the United States can also be included in this security complex, especially taking into account the level of the American presence in the region as a whole and in Iraq in particular. The question, then, is how the states of this sub-region can achieve their ultimate goals in the new strategic environment.

The purpose of this paper is to give a comparative analysis of the regional security strategies of the U.S.A., which is the main “outside actor” involved in the local politics, and Turkey, which has recently positioned itself as a regional leader, or as its Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu put it “a regional player with a global reach”. The other question to be discussed is how the cooperation between these two forces can contribute to creating stable and secure geopolitical situation in the Broader Middle East area.

The Iraq War of 2003 is often regarded as a turning point in the bilateral Turkish-American relations meaning that it became one of the most serious crises between Turkey and the United States, breaking off relatively stable development of the strategic partnership since the late 1970’s. In fact, up to 2003 Turkey had permanently supported all American initiatives in the region. Ankara cooperated with Washington in the Second Gulf War in 1991 and then in the context of the operations “Poised Hammer” (“Çekiç Güç”) and “Northern Watch” (“Kuzey’den Keşif Gücü”)². The main preoccupations and security concerns of both partners coincided and Turkey was among the countries that applied sanctions against Iraq from the very beginning though it considerably damaged its economy. However, at that moment Turkey was still much dependant on the U.S. assistance and the intervention of the coalitional forces to Iraq was legalized with the UN Security Council resolution.

The situation in 2003 was quite different. A combination of factors at global, regional and local levels as well as dramatic changes that Turkey Republic itself had undergone in the period between two Gulf Wars resulted in the refusal of the Turkish Parliament to accept the motion to take active part in war or even to open its borders for the American troops. Initially, the U.S. were planning to use Turkish territory to attack Iraq from the North and expected to place 62, 000 U.S. soldiers, 255 warplanes and 65 helicopters in Turkey³. Instead of this, the only positive decision that Washington was able to get from Ankara was a permission for U.S. planes to use a Turkish airfield and Turkey’s airspace, given by the Turkish Parliament in late March 2003 after the war had begun.

The subsequent crisis in the relations has not lead to the collapse in strategic partnership between Turkey and the United States, nor did it put an end to their regional cooperation. However, it made evident the fact that being strategic partners does not mean having one and the same interests in all questions. Therefore, before considering the prospects of the future development of Turkish-American tandem in the Middle East, one should first try to analyze a full range of convergent and conflicting interests of the partners in the long run.

The competing priorities of the two countries and their different approaches to regional challenges did not only cause a sudden escalating tension that shook the alliance after Turkey’s rejection of cooperation with the U.S. against Iraq in 2003 but have become an integral part of the bilateral relations ever since. As Prof. Aykan puts it, “the fluctuations which have been regularly observed in Turkey-U.S. relations in the wake of the U.S. war against Iraq have their roots in the perceived differences between the two states concerning their international identity, places and functions in the post-Cold War international systemic structure”⁴.

To be more precise, these differences and the consequent problems include:

1. Discrepancies in initial goals that were openly declared or explicitly contained in positions of both parties on the eve of the war. For example, some Turkish academicians claimed that American incentives in Iraq war included their desire to take regional countries under control which was deemed absolutely necessary for maintaining the global balance of power, to gain a foothold in the region rich in natural gas and oil reserves, to find evidence of Saddam regime’s crimes in Iraq in order to justify American actions in eyes of international community and public opinion at home, to secure vital interests of numerous lobbies (Jewish, oil companies’ etc.) and to prove the efficiency of the power politics traditionally adopted by Neoconservatives.⁵ At the same time these goals had very little to do with the national interests of Turkey whose main preoccupations were focused on national and human security issues in case of possible war with Iraq. Moreover, the American administration paid very little attention, if any, to Turkey’s sensibilities in building her bilateral relations with Iraq who was its immediate neighbour and in elaborating approaches towards Saddam’s regime (represented by the Sunnis as well as the absolute majority of Turkish population);
   
2. Difference in methods and instruments preferred by Turkey and the United States in course of policy-making in the Middle East were vivid examples of their different objectives and views on the region. The administration of George Bush was ready to use force and to declare a war on Iraq from the very beginning whereas Turkish decision-makers tended to find peaceful solutions to all regional problems and insisted on the necessity to continue dialogue with Iraq as long as possible.
   
3. Different approaches to conflict resolution and different meanings that two countries put in the notion of “partnership” resulted in mutual misunderstanding. While unilateralism had become a cornerstone of American foreign policy under Republican administration, Turkey traditionally called for multilateral actions meaning the maximum involvement of all parties of the conflict, regional countries and international organizations. In order to “pave way for Iraq to be not solely an American but an international issue”⁶, Turkey followed four complementary paths of diplomatic relations: through, first, the UN Security Council, second, the Organization of Islamic Conference, third, the Platform for the Extended Neighbouring Countries of Iraq and, fourth, the ethnic and religious groups within Iraq. The above-mentioned “neighbouring countries” process was initiated by Turkey in January 2003 to find a peaceful solution to Iraqi problem and then continued its activities after the beginning of war. As part of this platform, foreign ministers of related countries met formally eleven times and informally three times in such cities as Istanbul, Baghdad and Tehran. Some representatives from the European Commission and the UN, the Secretaries General of the Arab League and the OIC were also involved in these negotiations⁷.
   
4. Concerns about the nature of the future Iraqi regime. Since the end of the major military operations American think-tanks and political experts were offering two possible options for post-war constitution that would guarantee the institutional stability in Iraq. The more radical variant was the so-called “Three States Option” based on the idea of partitioning the country into three separate entities: the Shia, the Sunni and the Kurds. The other, more moderate idea, that had gained ground among most of the American researchers and was actively promoted by the Heritage Foundation, provided for creation of a federal Iraqi state⁸. Turkey could not tolerate the first scenario and initially was opposing the second plan as well. Later Ankara readjusted its position to argue that Turkey did not favor federalism based on ethnicity or sectarian differences but rather supports a form of administrative federalism⁹. The main argument for such change was the claim that a federal structure could be the best way to maintain Iraq’s territorial integrity.
   
5. Representation of different ethnic groups and religious factions in the social structure and political institutions in the post-war Iraq was another reason for tensions in Turkish-American relations. While Ankara strengthened its relations with the Turkmen minority and supported Turkmens’ territorial claims in order to counterbalance strong positions of the Kurds (especially in the city of Kirkuk), Washington regarded the Iraqi Kurds as their reliable partner in the war against Saddam Hussein and, thus, assigned significant role for Kurdish representatives in political and administrative authorities of Iraq. As far as a Sunni-Shia division is concerned, Turkey tried to maintain a balanced policy towards both sides, involving itself in multilateral meetings but still remaining outside the conflict. Though, traditionally Turkish public opinion used to back up the Sunni groups (large majority of Turkey’s Muslims belong to this denomination) whereas the U.S. were putting strong emphasis on the Shia community in their policy towards Iraq. When the Saddam regime was overthrown by the U.S. in April 2003 and foundations for the new Iraqi institutions were laid down, the Temporary Governing Council of Iraq was formed. It consisted of 25 members representing all strata of Iraqi society, namely 13 Shia, 5 Sunni, 5 Kurd, 1 Turkmen and 1 Asuri – the proportion that is unlikely to favour Turkey’s interests in the region.
   
6. Kurdish question in some of its aspects is closely connected to the previous points but is not limited to them. Apart from Turkey’s general discontent with the Kurds playing leading roles in the post-war Iraq, the problem of PKK created additional tensions in bilateral relations and turned out to be a kind of a vitality test for the strategic partnership. Although the US government officially accepted that the PKK was a terrorist organization, the U.S. forces in Iraq consistently failed to take action against it. Such ambiguous position of Washington in the question that Turkey considered to be not simply of national interest but also of national proud and dignity, provoked indignation of Turkish military and political officials, arouse mass protests in the streets and resulted into new waves of anti-American sentiments in Turkish society. This set up a long-running tension between Turkey and the U.S. authorities in Iraq, culminating in March-April 2007, when the Turkish Commander of Land Forces General İlker Başbuğ and the Chief of the General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt both suggested that Turkey should take unilateral military action against the PKK in northern Iraq, although this was opposed by Prime Minister Erdoğan as well as the U.S. government. On October 17, 2007 the Turkish Parliament passed a resolution allowing military operations in Iraq¹⁰. The problem was partially solved during Erdoğan’s visit to Washington in November 2007, when George Bush once again characterized Turkey as “America’s strategic partner” and claimed PKK to be “common enemy of the three countries: Iraq, Turkey and the United States”¹¹. Consequently, a tripartite coordination mechanism against PKK was elaborated and the U.S. promised to supply the Turkish armed forces with “real time” intelligence on PKK bases and movements in the region.
   
7. Maintaining balance of power in the region of the Greater Middle East seems to be another challenge to the strategic partners and a necessary precondition for their successful cooperation. Turkey’s exceedingly active diplomacy in the region, especially her rapprochement with the major regional powers such as Iran, Syria and other “disloyal” regimes, had deeply shattered her relations with the U.S. in times of Bush administration. Ankara’s recent efforts to promote “zero problem” policy demand developing “good neighbourhood” relations with all neighbours including those labelled by Washington as the “rogue states”. Though such self-sufficient foreign policy line of Turkey finds much more understanding in Obama’s administration, it still causes serious concerns in the White House inducing regular discussions in American think-tanks and decision-making centres about Turkey’s shift to the East¹² and changing its pro-Western orientation. At the same time Turkey has traditionally objected American military and politically presence “on the land” claiming that regional issues should be addressed by the regional countries or, if necessary, settled through the international organisations. Military presence or political interference of the “outsiders” (including U.S.) has been regarded as a source of tension and instability in the region. In terms of regional policy, Turkey implicitly favours the idea of a “Middle East for the Middle Easterners.” This concept fits uneasily with the desire for stronger American leadership in the Middle East peace process but is fully compatible with the new Turkish activism¹³. Thus, it has become obvious over the last years that the leadership ambitions of two partners – a global power (U.S.) and a regional power with global interests (Turkey) will cause crises in relations wherever their spheres of influence overlap and whenever their strategic interests clash.
   
8. Difficult geopolitical and civilizational choice that Turkey often has to do between the “democratization” initiatives of her Western strategic partners (NATO, U.S.) and traditional position of the Muslim community (immediate neighbours with close historical, cultural and religious ties) hampers the development of full-scale cooperation and narrows it to high politics and security concerns disregarding all other dimensions. Different answers given to the same question have split Turkish society into certain cleavages. The major fracture lines stretch over civil – military relations, secular – Islamist groups, power – opposition (AKP – CHP, MHP)¹⁴, Turks – Kurds, state – societal level (elites’ official foreign policy course – public opinion). The latter was especially noticeable in the aftermath of the war in Iraq. Severe anti-American feelings of the Turkish street got a wide reflection in a number of books¹⁵ (both fiction and nonfiction) and films¹⁶. An intensive top-down effort by Turkish leadership will be required to change the current state of affairs. However, Washington should also remember that winning over the Turkish people is the key for any country in achieving a durable and sustainable partnership with Turkey, and the Turkish-American relations are no exception¹⁷.
   

The period that followed the 2003 Iraq War was marked with intensive dialogue performed at the highest level. The necessity of the day as well as the vital importance of the partners for each other in the new security environment arising in the Middle East, brought to the agenda different efforts to mend the deteriorating relations. The range of official visits started in January 2004 when Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited the United States; the return visit was paid by President Bush the same year in June on the eve of NATO Summit in Istanbul. Two years later, in July 2006 U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ali Babacan put their signatures under the document named “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership”. Thereby, Turkey and the United States pledged themselves to work together on all issues of common concern, including 1). promoting peace and stability in the broader Middle East through democracy; 2). fostering stability, democracy and prosperity in a unified Iraq and 3). countering terrorism, including the fight against the PKK and its affiliates¹⁸. The fight against PKK became the top issue on the agenda in November 2007 when Prime Minister Erdoğan met Bush in Washington to discuss the unilateral operation that Turkey was going to carry out in the Northern Iraq¹⁹. The visit of Turkey’s President Abdullah Gül that followed in January 2008 was held in a less strained atmosphere, the range of the questions to be negotiated this time was much wider and included cooperation in Afghanistan, situation in Iran and Iraq, energy projects and regional cooperation²⁰. The fact that Abdullah Gül’s first visit as a President was made to Washington gave reason to speak about “a honey-moon in the Turkish-American relationship”²¹.

In April 2009 Turkey became the second country which Barack Obama visited after his inauguration in order to maintain bilateral relations. A truly “new era” in the Turkish-American partnership was expected after the Presidential elections and the subsequent change of administration in the White House, and Obama was thought to bring further easiness of tensions. There were some reasons for such optimistic feelings among the experts in both countries.

Firstly, the very personality of Barack Obama did not evoke so much criticism in Turkish society simply because he was not the person to start the war in Iraq and to bring American troops to the region. Secondly, in the course of the election campaign the then-candidate for Presidency Barack Obama expressed his intention “to renew American leadership in the world [..] by rebuilding the alliances, partnerships, and institutions necessary to confront common threats and enhance common security” and “to recreate a mutually beneficial partnership with valuable partners after eight years of often gratuitous unilateralism, arrogance, and lack of diplomacy”²². Later he declared three major principles of his future foreign policy – dialogue (as opposed to the use of force practiced under Bush administration), multilateralism (instead of unilateralism) and engagement (as alternative to “deterrence” policy or international isolation of the “rogue” states). These principles were going in full correspondence with Turkey’s national interests and in many of its aspects coincided with Turkey’s new foreign policy vision.

At the same time the sea change in Turkey’s national security strategy and foreign policy happened with the appointment of Ahmet Davutoğlu as a Foreign Minister on May 1, 2009. He had been known as the chief advisor to the Prime Minister and the main advocate of the Turkish “proactive diplomacy” and “integrated multidimensional approach” in foreign policy since 2002 when the Justice and Development Party won the Parliamentary elections²³. Later Davutoğlu was the architect of dialogue with all the political actors in the Middle East, including the most controversial ones, such as Hamas leader Khaled al-Mashal. He was instrumental in Turkey's mediation between Syria and Israel, and he devised the strategy of opening dialogue with all groups within Iraq, including the Kurds with whom Ankara had troubled ties. This increased engagement of Turkey in the Middle East’s politics and conflicts was labelled “Neo Ottomanism” and provided for a stronger foreign policy vision toward the Middle East, the Balkans and the South Caucasus undertaking the role of an order-instituting country in all these regions²⁴. According to Davutoğlu, “Turkey should guarantee its own security and stability by taking on a more active, constructive role to provide order, stability and security in its environs... It is no longer a country which only reacts to crises, but notices the crises before their emergence and intervenes effectively, and gives shape to the order of its surrounding regions”²⁵.

The unique combination of these subjective (new personalities in foreign policy decision-making process in both countries) and objective (changing international and regional environment) factors have prepared a fertile soil for the future development of the strategic partnership which is currently based on the following convergent interests:

1. Compatibility of foreign policy visions. As it was mentioned before, the principles of foreign policy declared by the Obama administration go in line with the Turkish interests. The recent “off-shore balancing” course of the U.S. coincide well with the proactive diplomacy and leadership ambitions of Turkey. While the United States tends to escape intensive involvement in the regional issues and search for strategic partners to share the responsibilities for making peace and promoting democracy, Turkey claims she is ready and willing to become Washington’s reliable ally in the region of the Greater Middle East. These mutually complementary approaches evoked expectations that Turkey could even “complement and supplement what America is trying to do” in the region and “lead to the kind of stable and peaceful Middle Eastern order that does not depend on a large American presence or high-profile American leadership”²⁶. Turkey’s historical and cultural ties with the regional states, its role of a regional leader and a developmental model for the other Muslim countries, backed by the U.S. military force and political will could become a successful formula for conflict resolution in the “Middle Eastern security complex”. In this context, Turkey’s role will even increase after the withdrawal of American combat troops from Iraq which is expected by the end of August 2010²⁷.
   

In the current situation when the global financial crisis has shattered American economic power and the changing international conjuncture has questioned American political supremacy, Washington should probably try to transform its position from being “the only superpower” to the “first among equals” by sharing duties and responsibilities in various parts of the world with its partners in the relevant regions. That is why Obama’s call for making “cooperative effort of the whole world” and building “new coalitions that bridge old divides – coalitions of different faiths and creeds; of north and south, east and west”²⁸ got significant support in Ankara. For instance, Davutoğlu on several occasions approved Obama’s foreign policy style for comprising more multilateralism, more consultation, more interaction with allies, instead of preparing policy and implementing it before consulting with other allies²⁹.

At last, moving away from militarization of U.S. policies in favour of diplomacy resonates well with Turkey’s new role as a regional peacemaker. Now that Turkey holds a chair of the non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, cooperation between the two countries in this area will be increasingly important³⁰. It is expected that Turkey’s much-improved soft power in the Middle East under the AKP at some point may be turned into a diplomatic asset for the Obama administration in areas such as facilitating dialogue with Damascus, Tehran and Hamas³¹.

2. Compatibility of foreign policy instruments. Both countries tend to use the combination of “hard power” and “soft power” instruments. In January 2009 the newly elected U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that in her foreign policy she would largely resort to “what has been called smart power, the full range of tools at U.S. disposal – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal and cultural, picking the right tool or combination of tools for each situation”. In practice this would mean maintaining American military strength while using persuasion and attracting the others with such values as democracy, human rights and similar Western ideas³². These words are consonant to H. Clinton’s Turkish counterpart’s statement that “soft power and military power must be employed in coherence. If these forms of power are not managed together, even the most successful operation would bring about damaging results”³³. Turkey has been traditionally viewed mostly as a hard power in the Middle East, due to its military and economic strength. In recent years, however, Turkey’s appeal as a soft power has increased, especially in the Arab Middle East, as it demonstrates potential for reconciling democracy and Islam in internal politics and gains ground on the international arena. Thus, democracy has become its major soft power.
   
3. Promoting peace, stability and democracy in a post-war Iraq is regarded as the top-priority task by both countries. Turkey can play one of the central roles in the post-war environment contributing to the peace-making process as a peace-broker, facilitator, mediator or conciliator among different entities in the Middle East or between certain cleavages and the U.S. Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “shuttle diplomacy” has proven its efficiency in some quite delicate situations. Besides, Turkey possesses valuable experience in building Western-type democratic governmental institutions in special circumstances of traditional Eastern societies. While its efforts to become “a model country” for the Central Asian countries failed after the dissolution of the USSR in 1990’s³⁴, now it can be a good example of successful political and socioeconomic development for its neighbours in the Middle East. The AKP (Justice and Development Party’s) experience provides the moderate Islamist groups in the region with an example of a way to engage in legal politics without abandoning their conservative agendas³⁵.
   
4. Fight against terrorism and terroristic organizations in the Middle East and wider geography is regarded as a cornerstone in the U.S.-Turkish strategic partnership after the notorious events of 9/11 in America and the subsequent terroristic acts in Istanbul. From American point of view, Turkey is seen as a critical country whose support and cooperation is very essential. There is a strong belief in the United States that supporting moderate Muslim countries, which oppose terrorism and extremism, is the key to winning the war against terrorism. The Turkish model embedding Islam within a secular system, its geographical location and experience in fighting terrorism at home and abroad since 1970’s, Turkey’s own national interests in keeping its immediate environments secure and stable makes it “a steadfast partner in war on terrorism”. As the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Robert Pearson put it, Washington “could have no better ally than Turkey in the war on terrorism”³⁶. On the other hand, Turkey needs American military assistance; U.S. support in the campaign against PKK terrorists in the Northern Iraq and backing of Turkish command of Afghan peacekeepers. As a result, Turkish-American partnership which got a severe blow in 2003 Iraq War, was “rediscovered” in the course of the war on terrorism³⁷.
   
5. Regional cooperation in the Middle East on a wide range of issues. Whatever strategic importance it presents, Iraq cannot be regarded separately from the other aspects of regional cooperation. It is not a pattern in itself but rather a tile in the multilayered mosaics. Besides Iraq, the United States and Turkey enjoy a wide of range of convergent interests in the region of the Broader Middle East:
   

- democratization and modernization of the regional countries;

- economic, cultural, educational development of the region, creating necessary infrastructure;

- joint efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict;

- political and military cooperation in Afghanistan;

- Iran and the problem of proliferation of the WMD (especially, while Turkey is in the UN SC);

- prospects for basing the elements of the anti-missile defense system on the Turkish territory;

- creating a new regional security architecture with U.S. and Turkey as order-instituting actors;

- promoting alternative energy projects;

- confidence building initiatives on the societal level, restoring trust and mitigating alienation effects between different communities within the states and within the region as a whole.


The latest initiatives that concern the possible forms of the future Turkish-American cooperation in the Middle Eastern region envisage gradual transition from the traditional “strategic partnership” of 1990’s to the “model partnership” of 2000’s. This idea has been reshaped several times and got numerous interpretations since May 2009 when it was first suggested by the Director of the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Initiative and the Senior Vice-President of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies Dr. Stephen Flanagan. While some Turkish experts evaluated it as a general move from the America-centered partnership to the partnership of equals³⁸, which included solid plans for building such “model partnerships” in the Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus and the Balkans; the others put special emphasis on certain aspects and mechanisms embedded in this formula³⁹. According to this conception, the Middle Eastern region is to become an area for broad investment activities and intensive economic cooperation. For instance, it includes plans to create special Qualitative Industry Zones (QIZ) on the Turkish-Northern Iraq borders in order to improve the trading balance of the regional countries and the U.S.⁴⁰

The recommendation that Dr. Stephen Flanagan, a main advocate of the “model partnership”, gives in his report suggests that as the United States rethinks its own approach to the Middle East, it needs to make space for an increasingly activist Turkish diplomacy in the region. The United States could benefit from Turkey’s soft influence and efforts to stabilize the Middle East. How Ankara and Washington shape Turkey’s resurgence in the region will likely affect the development of a broad range of common interests including Iraq’s stability, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology, and Arab-Israeli peace efforts. Over the past few years, Ankara has played a more active, positive role in Iraq, cultivating growing trade and investment opportunities, as well as a network of political contacts, including tentative steps to increase engagement with the Iraqi Kurds. However, Turkey has yet to prove that it can play a leading role in regional affairs, and it remains unclear how much influence it actually possesses over a range of actors in the region⁴¹.

Today the Broader Middle East is the region where Turkey and the United States seem to balance between power politics and interdependence.

On the one hand, Turkey’s leadership ambitions and growing independence in conducting its foreign policy have often put under question the future of the alliance and the compatibility of the Turkish and U.S. positions on major international issues. The crises of confidence on the societal level and the clash of national interests in the region, where their spheres of influence overlap, have sometimes forced the long-term strategic partners to act as the strategic rivals.

On the other hand, over the last years it has become obvious that Turkey and the United States are doomed to the multifaceted cooperation and cannot afford the luxury to act unilaterally. The strategic partnership that came into being after the end of the Cold war has gained even more importance in the new security environment that was formed in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent developments in the Middle East region.

This gives right to expect the continuation of the Turkish-American cooperation on the global and regional levels in the future. At the same time, today we can witness the further evolution of the partnership in search for the optimal formula of cooperation. New initiatives such as the “model partnership”, that seems to be gradually replacing the “hollow” Greater Middle East Project, can serve the evidence of the viability of the partnership. What can be said for sure, is that the Turkish-American alliance remains the central link in the Middle Eastern security complex whereas Iraq and the Middle Eastern policies constitute the top-priority agenda in the bilateral Turkey-U.S. relations.

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