Российская академия наук институт международных экономических и политических исследований модели системной трансформации и социальная цена реформ (опыт России, СНГ и стран цве)

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Teodorović I., Stubbs P.
2. Economic changes and social exclusion in the SEE countries
Table 1: Unemployment in Europe, 2002-2004
Table 2 Changes in Inequality during the Transition (selected countries)
3. The European Union and the Lisbon-Laeken process
4. Poverty reduction strategies
5. The Millennium development goals
Table 3 Progress in meeting MDGs in SEE
6. The human Development Index (HDI)
Table 4 Human Development Indices and GDP Rankings, HDR 2003

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**Teodorović I., Stubbs P.^{^}^{^*}**

SOCIAL INDICATORS AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

Introduction.

Internationally, the last decade has seen a renewed focus on a concerted effort to reduce poverty and promote social inclusion, involving partnerships between international actors, national governments, civil society groups, and other stakeholders. Alongside this, there have been many attempts to develop social indicators which can measure the state of the welfare of citizens and the extent to which progress is being made in achieving the goals of poverty reduction and social inclusion. Sometimes these have been directly linked to specific policy processes; at other times, developed alongside them.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 signalled the beginning of the end of a social experiment variously termed communism or socialism in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Alongside new freedoms post-1989, however, the expected improvements in people’s welfare and security did not occur. On the contrary, for much of the region there was a renewed instability in terms of violent nationalist conflicts and/or increased social miseries brought about by ‘shock therapy’.

In 1989, there were nine countries making up the region of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. One of these, the GDR was absorbed into a new unified Germany. The other eight have now become 27 countries in transition with the process of fragmentation of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia. Of these 27 countries in transition in CEE/FSU, excluding the former GDR, eight became member states of the European Union on 1 May 2004 (Hungary, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia). A further twelve countries, the Former Soviet Union minus the Baltic States (Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), have experienced some of the most dramatic and sustained declines in social well-being^¹.

The remaining seven countries, plus the UN-administered province of Kosovo, form the core of this study. Two of these countries, Bulgaria and Romania, were originally timetabled to join the EU in May 2004 but, as a result of serious problems in implementing elements of the acquis, and their considerable social and economic problems, now appear likely to join in January 2007. Croatia, following a positive avis, secured candidate status with the European Union in June 2004, with best estimates that, other things being equal, membership is likely in 2009 or 2010. Macedonia has also applied for candidate status but is widely considered to face something of a slower track to membership. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro are the laggards in this process, faced with considerable problems in terms of political stability and disputed sovereignty, as well as economic and social deficits.

The seven countries, termed somewhat clumsily by the EU ‘the Western Balkans’, do occupy a kind of space between a, usually positive, aspiration to a European (Union) future and a negative connection with the poverty and underdevelopment of much of the former Soviet Union. This space is deeply significant. Whilst both the European Union, and the international development community, have pursued the fight against poverty and social exclusion, and the elaboration of meaningful social indicators in the service of that fight, in the last decade. They have done so in very different ways underpinned by different assumptions, and in support of very different policy platforms and frameworks^².

For the purpose of this paper indicators can be taken to mean, in broad terms, distinct, quantifiable, statistically verifiable measures which track the performance of a system. Indicators can refer to system outcomes or outputs; system inputs; and/or system processes^³. Increasingly, social indicators are disaggregated in terms of a number of variables such as: gender; age; socio-economic status; and ethnicity. Whilst the unit of measurement for most social indicators tends to be the nation state, there is also increasing attention to regional variations within countries. As comparisons between countries assume greater importance, in the context of globalisation and the formation of transnational blocs such as the European Union, there is likely to be more emphasis on cross-national benchmarking and supra-national standards in the future.

There is increasing recognition globally that: “Poverty is multidimensional because it does not consist merely of an insufficiency of resources, but also encompasses cumulative deprivation in relation to income, housing, education and health care. In other words, it concerns non-participation in various aspects of social life”^⁴. For this reason, poverty is increasingly linked with social exclusion, which has been most usefully defined in terms of five aspects:

“First, (social exclusion) is multidimensional and implies deprivation in a wide range of indicators of living standards. … Second, it is dynamic and implies that people are excluded not just because of their current situation, but also because they have little prospect for the future. … Third, it is a purely relative concept. It implies exclusion from a particular society at a particular point in time. … Fourth, it has an agency dimension, in the sense that social exclusion lies beyond the narrow responsibility of the individual concerned. Fifth, its nature is relational, in the sense that it implies a major discontinuity in the relationship of the individual with the rest of society, inadequate social participation, lack of social integration, and lack of power”^⁵.

The paper focuses on five core sets of social indicators and policy processes for poverty reduction and social inclusion. For each, the paper addresses in broad terms: the history and current status of the initiative; the main indicators used; the state of reporting and country comparisons for the countries of South Eastern Europe; and some of the advantages and disadvantages of the indicators and policy processes.

2. Economic changes and social exclusion in the SEE countries

The transition process that started in the region by 1990 has brought dramatic economic and social changes. Social ownership, planned economies and an extensive social network based on social priorities have been abandoned. Transition towards market economies and corresponding market and social institutions was expected to bring higher levels of welfare for the citizens on the overall. Such changes were expected to happen within a shorter period of time. Such expectations were based on the assumptions that the previous outcomes of social and economic reforms under socialism would enable a smooth and fast transition. Therefore the transition process has been focused mainly on political aspects (democratisation, political pluralism) and economic aspects (structural reforms and privatisation).

Political changes in the region did not occur smoothly, they were introduced either with hesitancy or as in most cases with high tensions and armed conflicts as was the case of former Yugoslavia. This brought with it high social costs and a postponement of full-fledged economic reforms. Structural adjustments were introduced at a slower pace as compared with other CEE countries. As a consequence of the turmoil institutional adjustments as well as the introduction of a new institutional set-up was delayed as well.

The initial assumptions that smooth political changes as well as fast and efficient economic reform as the cornerstones of democracy will bring a corresponding level of social justice did not meet the expectations. The initial assumptions and the lack of any previous experience with such social changes contributed to the fact that social aspects on the national, regional and local levels were neglected. The introduction of predatory capitalism as demonstrated through the privatisation schemes has neglected social aspects at the enterprise level (corporate ethics and social responsibility) in most cases.

The dramatic fall of output in spite of maintaining predominantly previous laws and rights in the social sphere contributed to the deterioration of social rights, the basic one being the right to work. The level of social exclusion increased as compared with the previous system. Increased competition in the globalized world had contributed to shift in output and opened the unemployment issues even within the EU (see table 1). With low growth rates since the early 90's the EU has not been the expected locomotive of growth and increasing employment rates for most of the transition countries.

The period of transition until now has marked one of extreme hardships for many people. By the end of the first transition decade one in every 20 people in the transition economies had per capita incomes below US$1 per day. Poverty increased not only because of the fall in output, but because of greater inequality in the distribution of income. Table 2 indicates the level of this problem for some of the selected countries of the region for which data are available.

Table 1:

Unemployment in Europe, 2002-2004
(% of labour force)

	2002	2003	2003 QIV	2004 QI	2004 Forecasts
Euro area	8.4	8.8	8.9	8.9	8.8
New EU members-10	14.7	14.3	14.2	14.1	14.1

Source: Economic Survey of Europe, 2004, No.2, p. 25.

Table 2

Changes in Inequality during the Transition (selected countries)

Countries	Gini coefficient of income per capita
Countries	1987-90	1993-94	1996-98
Bulgaria	0.23	0.38	0.41
Croatia	0.36	-	0.35
Romania	0.23	0.29	0.30

Source: Transition – The First Ten Years, World Bank, 2002, p.9.

The countries in transition have demonstrated after a period of almost ten years considerable improvements of output. The group of SEE transition countries had varying results. On the overall some improvements were made as a result of stronger economic recovery (see table in Appendix 1). Sometimes it is a result of state sponsored employment programs and the launching of public works programmes. Despite these improvements, however, the situation in the labour market remains rather tense, posing major challenges to economic policy. Moreover there is a wide variation across countries reflecting the diversity of macroeconomic situations and the various patterns of labour market adjustment.

The basic question is on the correlation of output growth and reduction of unemployment. In general levels of unemployment have tended to persist, despite some improvements in recent years. Weak employment growth even in the presence of strong economic growth is to some extent the consequence of structural rigidities that affect the functioning of the labour markets in some countries. On the demand side, the sustained growth in labour costs and relatively strict employment protection rules tend to reduce the willingness of the firms to hire new workers. On the supply side, generous out-of-work benefits distort job search incentives and favour employment in the grey economy. Since increasing labour utilization is critical for sustaining the growth of real GDP per head, such rigidities need to be reduced in order to increase the efficiency of labour markets.

Among the major problems in the region are high rates of youth unemployment, a large share of long-term unemployment in the total, relatively low activity rates among older workers and limited rates of female participation. These facts indicate that even with some economic growth problems also arise from structural deficiencies. Labour market reforms are partial and slow in implementation. Not enough has been done to remove entry and re-entry barriers, to facilitate and stimulate job search, to increase participation rates and to soften rigidities (including the reduction of high non-wage labour costs and reform of job protection legislation).

Besides unemployment, specific sources of poverty originate from the level of education. It can be stated that education is an independent factor of poverty. Unemployment is correlated with lower levels of education and with low literacy rates. it has its demographic (number of children, age) and regional characteristics. A number of other social indicators alongside with the poverty problem indicate that social exclusion is on the rise.

In addressing the problems of poverty and social exclusion improvements in statistical measurements and reporting is needed. Starting from that, reliable social indicators have to be identified. This should enable the design of targeted economic and social policies and the building of new social security networks.

3. The European Union and the Lisbon-Laeken process

Viewed historically, the European Union (EU) is a relatively late entrant to the international arena of measuring poverty and social inclusion. Until recently, it was much less concerned with quantitative analyses and indicators than with questions of intervention and policy prescription. Poverty and social exclusion became concerns when the cohesion of the EU appeared threatened by high unemployment and new forms of social exclusion, and when the Lisbon agenda saw exclusion as an impediment to a successful, dynamic, knowledge-based economy. Earlier poverty programmes culminated, since 1998, in the EU defining as “poor” any person whose net disposable income is below 60% of the median income in their country (usually measured by household).

The European Council held in Lisbon in March 2000 prompted a major advance in EU poverty and social exclusion policy. Aiming at ‘becoming the most competitive knowledge based-economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth and greater social cohesion’ the EU has set an agenda in which combating social exclusion became a priority. An effort towards convergence in policies was envisaged through “an open method of co-ordination (OMC) combining National Action Plans on Social Inclusion (NAPs/incl) and a Commission initiative for co-operation in this field”^⁶.

The key development, which enabled the evaluation of progress made in and effectiveness of the NAPincl process was the creation of Indicators for Poverty and Social Exclusion, initiated under the Belgian Presidency^⁷. These were agreed at the European Council meeting in Laeken, in December 2001, where the Council approved a set of 18 common statistical indicators (ten primary and eight secondary indicators) addressing four dimensions of social inclusion: financial poverty, employment, health and education (see Appendix 1). They can be supplemented by a third level of indicators, that do not require harmonisation among member states, and which can be used for outlining country-specific particularities.

The ten new EU member states submitted their first NAPs/Incl in July 2004, having earlier signed Joint Inclusion memoranda or JIMs in December 2003, prior to membership. Bulgaria and Romania are expected to sign JIMs in December 2004, with Croatia not likely to sign until at least late 2005. The other South East European countries are not targeted by the EU in terms of social inclusion measures, nor are they encouraged to use the Laeken indicators^⁸.

Whilst the indicators remain a ‘work in progress’, with considerable revision currently taking place^⁹, they remain the best basis for comparisons between countries in the European Union, and those aspiring to European Union membership, regarding the extent of poverty and social exclusion. Crucially, the emphasis on relative poverty, together with a holistic notion of exclusion, in the context of an open policy co-ordination process, offers a clear link between indicators, standards, and targets for the future.

There have been criticisms from the European Anti-Poverty Network, amongst others, regarding the failure to address subjective poverty. Much less of those in poverty in the construction of the indicators^¹⁰, combined with a lack of consultation regarding the JIMs^¹¹, and a notable absence of a clear focus on child poverty^¹². However, in many ways, the biggest problem with the indicators is, in fact, the failure to apply them systematically, thus far, within the countries of South-Eastern Europe. This leaves an enormous space for indicators, which are more based on notions of absolute poverty and derived from the work of agencies in the developing world.

4. Poverty reduction strategies

Poverty Reduction Strategies are being promoted by a wide range of international agencies, as promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, at their annual meeting in September 1999. They are an attempt to produce a more coherent and effective approach to aid and development, in response to a critique of the failing of mainstream neo-liberal, ‘top down’, universalist prescriptions for the developing world, sometimes termed ‘the Washington Consensus’.

Essentially, Poverty Reduction Strategies and the associated Papers (PRSPs) are medium-term, national plans for poverty reduction and economic growth. PRSPs are meant to be nationally owned and driven, and based on participatory processes of stakeholder consultation, including the voices of civil society in their formulation, implementation and monitoring. PRSPs emphasise the multi-dimensionality of poverty and the need for inter-sectoral responses. On the basis of rigorous analyses, PRSPs are meant to include clear targets and to establish indicators and benchmarks against which to measure their achievement. Given the comprehensive nature of both the process and the strategy, significant results were anticipated in reducing poverty and in promoting sustainable economic growth.

However, there are no required sets of indicators or goals, which must be included in a PRSP. Whilst this is in keeping with the importance of country ownership and adaptation of the PRSPs to specific national contexts and conditions, the IFIs have themselves recently remarked on the need for appropriate indicators “to monitor outcomes and to help track the implementation of public programs”. Notwithstanding recent improvements, “indicator lists are often too long and unfocussed, ... actual indicators are sometimes not well-defined, and baseline data are not always available”^¹³.

Of the South-East European countries, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro, have been part of the PRSP process. A recent text has noted that, notwithstanding the differences in country context, there is a high degree of convergence regarding the approach to poverty. Issues of privatisation, employment, and social protection, advocating deregulation of macroeconomic and labour market policies, and an increased regulation of poor people, in terms of targeting in social protection, have become very much in fitting with the Washington Consensus^¹⁴. It is clear that there is considerable divergence in terms of indicators and in the disaggregation of data in terms of gender, ethnicity, and age.

Given that the IFIs review all PRSPs and, in the context of the increasing importance of the PRSP process for all key international aid agencies, there is a danger that the PRSPs introduce a ‘new conditionality’ on countries’ ability to secure loans and credits^¹⁵. Furthermore, some of the participatory processes have been criticised as ‘tokenistic’, sacrificing genuine consultation in the interests of quick technical ‘fixes’ to secure loans. Even more fundamentally, a number of commentators have suggested that the PRSPs do not represent a radical departure from the Washington Consensus. They do little to focus on policies for pro-poor growth; on the complex dynamics of family and child poverty; or on the impacts of market and trade liberalisation on vulnerable groups^¹⁶.

The length and complexity of recent PRSPs, for Bosnia-Herzegovina (361 pages)^¹⁷ and for Serbia and Montenegro (634 pages)^¹⁸ certainly militates against any wider public awareness. It also indicates an increasing technicisation of the issues of social and economic development although, sometimes, at the expense of poverty analysis itself. Moreover, the poverty analysis, which does exist, tends to focus on absolute poverty rather than on inequality and wider social exclusion.

5. The Millennium development goals

At the United Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000, world leaders agreed to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a set of broad goals and measurable targets to be met by the year 2015 at the latest. Subsequently, experts from the UN, OECD, World Bank and IMF outlined a number of Indicators as part of a ‘Road Map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration’^¹⁹. Under the United Nations Development Group, chaired by the Co-ordinator of UNDP, the UN agencies, the Bretton Woods institutions, and others are meant to integrate the MDGs into all aspects of their work. Some of the goals, for instance those relating to education, have a longer history, deriving from the Jomtien and Dakar goals of the World Education Forum^²⁰. As well as monitoring progress globally, each developing and transition country is meant to produce an MDG Report by the end of 2004. They are free, however, to adapt and refine the targets and indicators to suit their context.

The Millennium Development Goals have undergone a degree of refinement from their initial elaboration. This refinement has included the development of indicators to be used to measure progress. The MDGs currently consist of 8 Goals, 18 Targets, and 48 Indicators, with work continuing on the indicators. Appendix 2 shows the goals and targets.

In the countries of South-Eastern Europe, there has been some attempt to link the MDGs with both the PRSP process (most pronounced in Bosnia-Herzegovina^²¹), and with the Laeken indicators (most pronounced in the Bulgaria report^²² and, even more so, in a completion report for Central Europe, including Hungary, Slovenia, and the Slovak and Czech Republics^²³). At the time of writing, although all countries are meant to produce MDG reports by the end of 2004, the process has not yet been completed in Croatia or Macedonia. Albania appears to be unique in South-Eastern Europe in developing MDG targets for its sub-regions^²⁴.

A recent World Bank document provides an overview of progress made in meeting the MDGs in 19 of the low-middle income countries of Europe and Central Asia. It uses the targets and indicators of the Global MDG with the exception of MDG 1 regarding absolute poverty, where a figure of less than $2 a day, rather than $1 a day, is felt to be more appropriate. The likelihood of each of seven MDG goals being met in the seven countries of SEE, according to the report, is reproduced in Table 3 below:

Table 3

Progress in meeting MDGs in SEE^²⁵

Country	Likely to be met	May be met	Unlikely to be met	Not enough data
Albania	2	1	4	0
Bosnia-Herzegovina	2	2	0	3
Bulgaria	4	2	1	0
Croatia	5	2	0	0
Macedonia	3	2	0	2
Romania	4	0	3	0
Serbia and Montenegro	3	1	0	3

The Millennium Development goals clearly have an important place in terms of a renewed global fight against poverty, whilst allowing for national specificities. In comparison with the PRSPs, which have a mixed record of utilising the MDGs^²⁶, they allow for a clear linkage between goals, targets and indicators, at least in most cases. Nevertheless, changes in some of the indicators suggests that the MDGs are still something of a ‘work in progress’ which, itself, militates against clear comparison and agreement of the outcomes to be measured. Indeed, there is a lack of clarity regarding the relationship between global targets and national adaptations. Who owns the MDG process in country, and the role of Governments vis a vis other stakeholders, and the role of UNDP compared to the World Bank, also causes confusion.

Perhaps most importantly, the MDGs focus attention, again, on absolute rather than relative poverty and on basic health, educational and social services. Hence, they may be more relevant to low rather than middle income countries and, certainly, face real problems in being rendered applicable to post-socialist countries with traditions of universal social, health and educational provision. In any case, in South-Eastern Europe, the fact that 1990 is the baseline is somewhat distortive, as transition began after this in most cases. In addition, there remains low level of public, even expert public, interest in the MDGs in South-Eastern Europe which, if they are mentioned at all, are seen as applicable only to the poorest countries in the world.

6. The human Development Index (HDI)

The core assumption of the Human Development Index is that development is more than economic development measured in terms of income and wealth. Hence, the HDI takes into account wider aspects of human well-being. Under the auspices of UNDP, groups of independent experts produce annually a Global Human Development Report, Regional Human Development Reports and National Human Development Reports. The reports combine coverage of a select number of themes with a broad statistical picture of human development.

Each year, the Global Human Development Report contains a large numbers of indicators, standardised as far as possible to allow for cross-country comparisons. In the 2003 Report, these are compiled into 30 Tables, together with additional 10 tables regarding the MDGs. In addition, the process utilises a number of indicators to compile 4 Indices: the Human Development Index (HDI); the Gender-related Development Index (GDI); the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM); and the Human Poverty Index (HPI). The first and, to an extent, the last, are of particular concern to us here.

The HDI, the most cited index, with the widest coverage, has been compiled since 1975. It is a composite of three sub-indices: the life expectancy index; the education index (itself a combination of literacy rates and educational enrolment rates at primary, secondary and tertiary levels); and the GDP index at purchasing power parity. The HDI is expressed as a number between 0 and 1 and, in 2003. Based on 2001 data, 55 countries are ranked as having high human development (with a HDI over 0.8, Norway ranked first at 0.944); 86 countries -- as medium human development (between 0.5 and 0.8) and 34 countries -- as low human development (below 0.5, with Sierra Leone in 175^th place with a HDI of 0.275)^²⁷. A further 18 countries, including Serbia and Montenegro, do not have an HDI ranking, as a result of gaps in available data.

The countries of South-Eastern Europe are ranked in terms of HDI and GDP as follows.

Table 4

Human Development Indices and GDP Rankings, HDR 2003

Country	HDI	Rank	GDP in USD	Rank
Slovenia	0.881	29	17,130	32 (+3)
Hungary	0.837	38	12,430	42 (+4)
Croatia	0.818	47	9,170	54 (+7)
Bulgaria	0.795	57	6,890	69 (+12)
Macedonia	0.784	60	6,110	75 (+15)
Bosnia	0.777	66	5,970	79 (+13)
Romania	0.773	72	5,830	81 (+9)
Albania	0.737	95	3,680	108 (+13)
Serbia and Montenegro	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.

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Teodorović I., Stubbs P.*

SOCIAL INDICATORS AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

Table 2

**Teodorović I., Stubbs P.^{^}^{^*}**