Российская академия наук институт международных экономических и политических исследований модели системной трансформации и социальная цена реформ (опыт России, СНГ и стран цве)
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8. Conclusions: the problems and advantages of social indicators
The social indicator business has shown rapid and quite unprecedented growth in the last decade. The range and scope of indicators in use confronts virtually all aspects of possible variables relevant to progress in tackling poverty and social exclusion. At times, however, even the most aware reader risks being confused and overwhelmed by the sheer number of variables being used, and the competing, sometimes implicit, theories of causality and of policy advocacy being addressed. There has rarely been a clearer case of the maxim ‘more information, less knowledge’. Hence, there is a real need to demystify social indicators, make them far more ‘user-friendly’ and accessible and, in the process, raise public awareness of their use, and potential misuse.
Notwithstanding increasing awareness of the importance of disaggregated data, most of the widely used indicators tend to be based on national aggregates. The need for greater attention to variations according to age and type of household; rural and urban environments; according to disability; according to ethnicity, nationality and citizenship; and in terms of spatial inequalities in terms of meaningful geographical regions; are crucial in general terms and, particularly, in the countries of the Western Balkans. Universal indicators, however important, can never provide information on the depth and extent of exclusion of groups, regions, and sectors of the population from social progress. A profile of exclusion, telling us who are excluded, how, and by how much, has to be based on notions of relationships, inequalities, and gaps. Crude aggregates are increasingly misleading within unequal societies.
The linkage between social indicators and policy processes in South-Eastern Europe is problematic. Best expressed in terms of the notion of being caught between a European future for which there have been no preparation and the present. The problem are the increasingly unhelpful indicator-policy linkages based on the model of the underdeveloped or developing world, and subject to the new conditionalities of the International Financial Institutions. This is particularly captured by the lack of data on relative poverty and, in terms of absolute poverty, the indecisiveness regarding lines at which meaningful international comparisons can be made for the region.
A focus on a wide range of outcome indicators, with no corresponding attention to monitoring policy inputs, may fail to pose some of the most important questions about evidence-based policy alternatives since it cannot be clear what the outcomes were outcomes of. This is especially important in countries in transition with more complex co-existence of ‘old’ and ’new’, ‘formal’ and ‘informal’, structures and processes. The importance of introducing meaningful quality standards, as a bridge between policy input indicators and quantitative outcome indicators also appear to be immensely important.
Above all, there is a need to advocate for indicators with a meaningful and proven link with progressive, pro-poor social policies. Debates regarding the relevance of targeted or selective versus universal provision and the role of cash transfers can be addressed through analyses of intra-household livelihood strategies and through social impact analyses.
Above all, there is a need to advocate for what Ruth Levitas has called a ‘Redistributive Discourse’ (stressing the importance of transfer of resources and opportunities), as well as a widening of a narrow ‘Social Integration Discourse’ (stressing dignity through more than only work) and, in particular, there is a need to challenge an increasingly dominant ‘Moral Underclass Discourse’ (blaming the poor)31. A combination of the EU Laeken indicators, many of the MONEE Indicators, the HDI and the much awaited Council of Europe Social Cohesion Indicators, providing they are disaggregated, rendered more comprehensible, and subject to constant advocacy work by coalitions against poverty and social exclusion, may offer a way out of the narrow concerns with social safety nets in the context of reduced public expenditures offered by the International Financial Institutions.
APPENDIX 1
Gross domestic product
(percentage changes as compared with the previous year
| 1995 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 20031) | 2004 | 2005 | Index 1990=100 2003 | Index 1995=100 2003 | |
forecasts | |||||||||||||
Czech Rep. | 5.9 | -0.8 | -1.0 | 0.5 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 2.0 | 2.9 | 3.3 | 4 | 109.5 | 115.0 | |
Hungary | 1.5 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 4.2 | 5.2 | 3.8 | 3.5 | 2.9 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 119.3 | 134.6 | |
Poland | 7.0 | 6.8 | 4.8 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 3.7 | 4 | 4 | 152.0 | 136.4 | |
Slovak Rep. | 5.8 | 4.6 | 4.2 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 3.8 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 5 | 116.6 | 134.9 | |
Slovenia | 4.1 | 4.6 | 3.8 | 5.2 | 4.6 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.2 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 129.9 | 133.8 | |
CEEC-52) | 5.6 | 4.6 | 3.5 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 132.6 | 131.4 | |
| |||||||||||||
Estonia | 4.3 | 9.8 | 4.6 | -0.6 | 7.3 | 6.5 | 6.0 | 4.4 | 5.6 | 5.1 | 103.6 | 149.9 | |
Latvia | -0.8 | 8.4 | 4.8 | 2.8 | 6.8 | 7.9 | 6.1 | 7.0 | 5.2 | 5.7 | 78.6 | 158.4 | |
Lithuania | 3.3 | 7.0 | 7.3 | -1.8 | 4.0 | 6.5 | 6.8 | 7.5 | 5.7 | 6 | 87.0 | 150.1 | |
CEEC-82) | 5.4 | 4.9 | 3.7 | 2.9 | 4.0 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 129.6 | 132.9 | |
| |||||||||||||
Bulgaria | 2.9 | -5.6 | 4.0 | 2.3 | 5.4 | 4.1 | 4.8 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4 | 92.4 | 109.4 | |
Romania | 7.1 | -6.1 | -4.8 | -1.2 | 2.1 | 5.7 | 4.9 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 97.7 | 108.8 | |
CEEC-102) | 5.6 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 3.8 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 122.4 | 128.3 | |
| |||||||||||||
Croatia | 6.8 | 6.8 | 2.5 | -0.9 | 2.9 | 4.4 | 5.2 | 4.3 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 98.1 | 135.4 | |
Macedonia | -1.1 | 1.4 | 3.4 | 4.3 | 4.5 | -4.5 | 0.3 | 2.8 | 4 | 4 | 89.7 | 113.9 | |
Serbia and Montenegro3) | 6.1 | 7.4 | 2.5 | -18.0 | 5.0 | 5.5 | 4.0 | 1.0 | 2 | 3 | 53.4 | 111.2 |
Remarks: 1) Preliminary; 2) WIIW estimates; 3) Until 1998 Social product.
Source: WIIW database including national statistics, forecasts: WIIW and the European Commission (2003) for Baltic countries.
Leon Podkaminer et al. Transition Countries on the Eve of EU Enlargement, Research Report, No. 303, February 2004. p. 3.
APPENDIX 2
The EU – Laeken Indicators
LEVEL 1 INDICATORS
- Low-income rate after transfers with low-income threshold set at 60% of median income (by gender, age, most frequent activity status, household type and tenure status; values for typical households as illustrative examples);
- Distribution of income (income quintile ratio);
- Persistence of low income;
- Median low-income gap;
- Regional cohesion;
- Long-term unemployment rate;
- People living in jobless households;
- Early school-leavers not in further education or training;
- Life expectancy at birth;
- Self-perceived health status;
LEVEL 2 INDICATORS
- Dispersion around the 60% median low-income threshold;
- Low-income rate anchored at a point in time;
- Low-income rate before transfers;
- Distribution of income (Gini coefficient);
- Persistence of low income (based on 50% of median income);
- Long-term unemployment share;
- Very long-term unemployment rate;
- Persons with low educational attainment.
APPENDIX 3
The MDG Goals and Targets
G o a l | T a r g e t s | ||
1. | Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger | 1. | Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day |
2. | Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger | ||
2. | Achieve universal primary education | 3. | Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling |
3. | Promote gender equality and empower women | 4. | Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015 |
4. | Reduce child mortality | 5. | Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate |
5. | Improve material health | 6. | Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio |
6. | Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases | 7. | Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS |
8. | Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases | ||
7. | Ensure Environmental Sustainability | | Targets 9-11 |
8. | Develop a global partnership for development | | Targets 12-18 |